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This thesis focuses on the study of the spontaneous organization
of serial behaviour as a window on primate cognitive processes. The
feasibility of a research program on non-human primates focused on
such issues was tested by confronting capuchin monkeys (Cebus
apella) with a set of search tasks.
In a first group of experiments, the subjects were required to
search serially an array of occluders presented with a WGTA, in
order to retrieve a hidden object. Socially transmitted information
allowed to infer the possible sites of the object, reducing the search
space to a sub-set of all possible locations. The subjects showed a
tendency towards searching in a principled way, either using the
information given, or the spatial constraints afforded by the linear
arrangement of the search space. However, some inadequacies were
individuated in procedures and apparatus.
Successively, tasks requiring the exhaustive exploration of a set
of icons, presented on touch sensitive computer monitors, were
employed. These tasks implicitly demand a serial and economic
search, where reiterations on sites already explored should be
avoided. The structure of the search space was manipulated so that
either spatial strategies or categorisation schemes could be used as
a memory aid to keep track of the moves already performed.
Monkeys showed a spontaneous tendency to progressively reduce
the number of redundant moves and spontaneously deployed spatial
strategies when possible. This produced economic searches in sets
of up to 9 locations. However, the subjects did not deploy
categorisation principles strategically from the outset, but learned to
use them when provided with selective negative feedback. When
used in a principled way classification proved effective in sustaining
highly economic searches.
Comparisons with data available from independent studies with
different species allowed the conclusion that the ability to self-
regulate behaviour; the qualitative analysis of search strategies and
their change over time, represent promising dimensions for
comparative studies. Having assessed the effectiveness of the
paradigms developed here, basic modifications of the procedures are
then proposed for further research.
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1.1 The evolutionary perspective; the struggle to define a new
scientific domain. Introspection and some methodological insights.
The roots of comparative psychology can be traced back to 1871,
the year of the publication of Darwin's "The descent of man". In
this book human intelligence was explicitly set in an evolutionary
perspective and it was suggested that precursors of human high
level cognitive skills might be found in mental abilities of non-human
species.
The problem faced by Darwin was to promote revolutionary ideas
in times of prejudice. When applied to organic (non-mental)
evolution, the theory of natural selection, had gained some
credibility in restricted circles. However, in the psychological
domain, even the theory's co-discoverer, Alfred Wallace, had
retreated to supernatural powers (invoking a divine creation at some
point of the evolution of man) in order to explain the gap between
the mind of ape and man. Thus, Darwin's main concern was to show
the similarities between human and non-human species, in order to
make plausible the hypothesis of the continuity of mental traits.
Darwin tried to predict and challenge the difficulties raised by
the application of the theory of evolution to human mental functions.
He identified the following: 1) the objection that animal behaviour is
guided by fixed instincts whereas humans make rational choices on
the basis of past experiences; 2) the belief that nothing similar to
human language can be observed in non-human species; and 3) the
absence of evidence of some form of conscience and morality in
animals.
Darwin addressed the first point by claiming that instinct and
learning should not be regarded as mutually exclusive. A great deal
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of the behaviour of many species, he observed, is instinctive;
nevertheless, it can be modified by experience. Moreover, ape's
tool-using behaviours seemed to Darwin more of an expression of a
kind of rationality than rigidly guided by instinct.
The problem of language was addressed suggesting that there
was evidence for its precursors in non-human species. As examples,
Darwin quoted bird songs (the development of which seemed to
depend on both instinct and learning), the vocal mimicry of parrots
and other birds and the ability of monkeys to communicate affective
states by means of vocal calls.
The last points, conscience and morality, were seen by Darwin as
the inevitable product of parental instincts, combined with the
parallel evolution of intellectual skills and language.
Darwin must be accredited for having laid down the theoretical
precondition for a comparative psychology of cognition, clearly
defining it's goal as the comparative study of the evolution of human
mind. However, his efforts were merely theoretical in their nature
and he never developed a methodology for the systematic study of
differences and analogies in the mental traits of species more or less
taxonomically related.
Instead, George Romanes, (entrusted by Darwin himself) was to
extend the methods of comparative anatomy to the study of the
evolution of intelligence. In his program, the study of mental
evolution featured two different phases: the first in which an
affluent corpus of information on different species was collected and
the second where general scientific laws were deduced from the
differences and analogies observed.
In his first book, "Animal Intelligence" (1882), Romanes
attempted a systematic classification of observations collected from
various sources (chiefly letters sent to scientific and popialar
journals by amateur animal watchers). Inferences derived from these
observations were then used to develop a theory of the evolution of
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mind, the topic of his second book: "Mental Evolution in Animals"
(1884). Romanes also tried to evidence a parallel between
phylogenesis and ontogenesis by comparing the competences
observed in children of various ages with those of species of
different zoological taxa.
The method proposed by Romanes for the investigation of animal
intelligence was introspection. It was to be used to detect which
mental process underpins a particular human behaviour. Once
individuated, this process can then be attributed to those animals
which show a similar behaviour.
Following this procedure, Romanes elaborated an additive model of
the phylogeny and the ontogeny of mind (see Wasserman, 1984;
1993) where increasing complexity was seen as a function of the
summation of qualitatively different competences.
An example of the effort invested in the characterization of
different psychological processes is the distinction he made between
sensation and perception. Sensation was considered as the direct
result of a stimulation, whereas perception was assumed to be the
product of inferential processes acting upon sensations. The term
reflex was then confined to those behaviours which are influenced
by mere sensations. Thus, behaviours which are modified by
specific physical changes of a stimulus (e.g. the level of luminosity)
would be classified as reflexive. By contrast, behaviours which seem
to be influenced by changes in relational properties of two or more
stimuli would be indexical of the action of perceptual processes.1
Romanes, thus, put forward the idea that mental evolution should
be seen as the progressive construction of a cognitive architecture
formed by different processes, whose interplay gives rise to the
most complex forms of behaviour. However, his program was
1 An example of the latter would be the behaviour of a chick that
moves towards his unseen mother, inferring her location from the
spatial provenience of her calls. This ability to deal with relational
properties of the environment was seen by Romanes as a necessary
step towards the evolution of thought.
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characterized by a lack of experimental work and most of his ideas
were developed on the basis of occasional observations, often of
anecdotal nature, interpreted by means of introspective methods.
Some years later, Robert Yerkes picked up the heritage of the
evolutionary tradition pioneered by Romanes. In his early career,
Yerkes addressed the question of whether reptiles, amphibians and
invertebrates possessed the ability to learn by trial and error and
demonstrated that all of them did. As a consequence, he proposed
that, in order to find suitable dimensions for cross-species
comparisons, more complex forms of behaviour had to be
investigated.
He detected a suitable paradigm for his scope in an experimental
device invented by a psychiatrist, Gilbert Hamilton. Independently
from Yerkes, Hamilton (1911) had reached the conclusion that
comparisons between species on the basis of quantitative measures
(like speed of learning in simple problem solving situations) was of
little use. What was needed instead was a method that provided the
explanation of why some species learned particular task faster than
others. With this aim in mind, Hamilton developed an apparatus in
which the influence of peripheral factors (such as specific
differences in perceptual or motor abilities) on the behaviour of the
subjects was minimized. The apparatus featured a chamber with
multiple doors. The procedure involved the presentation of a series
of trials where all the doors but one (chosen in a pseudorandom
fashion for every trial) were locked. The task was to find the way
out from the chamber. The search patterns among the different
doors in successive trials would have revealed if the behaviour of
the subjects was based on some principled strategies, whereas the
number of trials required in average to solve the task was taken as
a measure of the relative efficiency of the different strategies.
Yerkes considered the absence of meaningful rules (specifying
which choice was correct) as a weakness in this procedure. The
subject was forced to rely on trial and error to find his way out.
Thus, he modified apparatus and procedure to provide the subject
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with the opportunity to predict the correct choice on the basis of a
stack of rules of increasing complexity. His aim was to compare
different species on what he called "ideational behaviour" (Yerkes,
1917).
The new apparatus devised by Yerkes was a linear array of 9
compartments collocated within an open area. A subset of the
compartments (ranging in number from 3 to 9), were unlocked in a
particular trial. The subject, was released in front of the array and
had to search for a reward hidden in one of the unlocked
compartments. If an unrewarded compartment was entered, the
subject was blocked inside for about a minute. In contrast with
Hamilton's procedure, the correct compartment was not chosen on
random basis but according to a set of rules. Typically, in
successive problems, the following rules were presented: 1) chose
the extreme (say) left of the subset of unlocked compartments; 2)
chose always the second on the (say) left; 3) if in the current trial
the rewarded location was the extreme left, chose the extreme right
on the next and vice versa; 4) between the different compartments
chose always the middle one.
In a first set of experiments, Yerkes tested subjects as different
as human psychiatric patients, crows and pigs. Later, he stressed
the importance of comparing related and increasingly removed
species to establish the origins of particular human mental traits and
started a research program on non-human primates.
The first experiments were conducted on two macaques and a
young orang-utan (described in Boakes, 1984). The results proved
interesting and unexpected. On the first problem (choice of the
extreme left compartment), the two monkeys took two and three
times as many trials to reach the criterion as the pigs, and the
orang-utan took six times longer. Moreover, apart from the mere
rate of learning, the shape of the learning curves of the orang-utan
and the monkeys were significantly different. In contrast with those
obtained from the monkeys, the learning curve of the orang-utan
showed a very long period with no improvement, followed by a
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dramatic change, as the performance became suddenly almost
errorless. Yerkes proposed that there were different ways of
reaching the solution to the task. While the monkeys seemed to learn
by means of a trial and error procedure, the orang-utan solved this
problem "ideationally". The conclusion was that the number of trials
to criterion were a very weak indicator of the cognitive competences
of a species and as a consequence not a good dimension for
comparisons.
The results obtained from the second task were taken by Yerkes
as a confirmation of such a conclusion. Faced with the problem of
learning to always select the second compartment on the left, the
monkeys solved the task. In contrast, the orang-utan repeatedly
failed, even after a long exposure to the task. Yerkes proposed
that while the monkeys solved the task by means of a trial and
error procedure the orang-utan failed because it was striving to
reach some sort of insight. For bureaucratic reasons Yerkes never
completed this set of experiments, and was not able to assess
whether the orang-utan would have solved the task if given an even
more protracted exposure to it.
Overall, the rationale of the program carried out by Yerkes, was
to arrange different species along non-trivial dimensions of
intellectual ability. These dimensions were identified in the ability of
the animals to control their behaviour on the basis of complex
spatial and ordinal relationships perceived between the items of a
set of multiple alternatives. Yerkes put a particular emphasis on the
fact that only when multiple solutions are possible, some qualitative
differences between species can be detected. Moreover, protracted
periods of testing were seen as necessary to highlight those
differences.
In parallel and independently from Yerkes, Wolfgang Koehler
stressed the importance of the study of intelligence in non-human
primates to understand human cognition. His interests focused on
the problem of insight in a set of studies on chimpanzee's problem
solving (Koehler, 1917/1976), in order to "ascertain .the degree of
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relationship between anthropoid apes and man in a field which seems
to us particularly important" (Koehler, 1917/1976, p. 1). As Yerkes
did, Koehler saw in many traditional paradigms a way of forcing the
animals to find a solution by trial and error. In fact, in his view,
when the contingencies between responses and rewards are artificial
and established on arbitrary basis, or when the causal relationship
between the components of a problem are very diificult to detect,
every animal (whatever the level of its cognitive competences might
be) has to rely on very basic forms of learning.
For this reason, Koehler focused the attention on tool-use skills,
devising problem solving situations where it was relatively easy to
perceive the instrumental value of a tool to reach a particular goal.
His experiments are well known. In one of them a banana,
hanging from the ceiling of a large cage, had to be reached by
climbing a wooden box (or in more complex version by assembling
and climbing a structure of several boxes), after having placed it in
the required position under the banana. Another problem required
the use of a stick (or in analogy with the problem of the boxes, a
structure of two sticks) to collect items of food otherwise out of
reach.^ Koehler identified two distinct processes at the basis of
chimpanzee's problem solving: the first based on trial and error
learning (used, for example to build a balanced structure of boxes)
and characterized by the typical graduality of learning curves; and
the second characterized by an "insight" on the reciprocal
relationships of the various components of the problem and
characterized by a non-gradual (all or none) path towards the
solution. This "insightful" achievement of the solution was inferred,
for example, from observing chimps joining at once the two short
sticks together and directly reaching for the food without any
gradual approximation to the goal.
2 According to Koehler, an important feature of these problems was
that their solution required a detour in the path towards the goal
(e.g. to collect the sticks or to move the boxes) and so they
implied the ability to plan a sequence of actions in order to reach
the goal.
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However, Koehler's paradigms were designed exclusively for ape
subjects. The nature of the tasks prevented their use with other
species. Therefore, it was never assessed whether other organisms
would have solved by trial and error the problems which apes
solved "insightfully". As a consequence, an empirical comparison, in
terms of relative economy (as measured, for example by solution
time), between learning by insight and by trial and error was
precluded. Also lacking in Koehler's experiments was an evaluation
of transfer of learning from one problem to an other. A study of
transfer would have helped, on the one hand, to exclude the
possibility that what was interpreted by Koehler as insight was in
fact the product of previous learning experience (as proposed by
Harlow, 1959); and, on the other, to evaluate how insightful
solutions were transferable to new problems, similar in structure to
those already solved by the chimpanzees (see Wright, 1985).
Furthermore, the semi-naturalistic setting of Koehler's experiments
did not allow a rigourous analysis of the experimental data and they
were reported in a rather descriptive fashion. From the comparative
stand-point, these represent major restrictions of a paradigm which
otherwise focuses on relevant dimensions (such as the ability of
animals to plan a sequence of actions in order to achieve a goal).
In summary, the pioneers of the comparative study of cognition
were well aware of the importance of putting human intelligence in
an evolutionary context and devoted a great deal of attention to
characterization of different mental processes. In fact, it was more
or less explicitly assumed that an understanding of the way in
which such processes were clustered in progressively more related
species was essential to understand the architecture of human mind
and its natural history.
The paradigms developed within this theoretical framework, were
characterized by a focus on high order competences which would
have been demonstrated by the achievement of non-trivial solutions
to tasks otherwise solvable on the basis of simple learning
processes. Moreover, a particular emphasis was posed on the
importance of giving the animals the possibility to recognise
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meaningful relationships within the problem space. As we shall see
later, these factors, i.e. the possibility to classify qualitatively the
behaviour of different species, the presence of a range of possible
solutions to a task, and the possibility to perceive structural
relationships within the problem space (suitable to be transduced in
actions) are considered important criteria for the development of the
experimental paradigms used for the present study.
However, these early comparative studies lacked a standard
paradigm, which was widely accepted within the scientific
community. The methods and the measures were far from being
refined, and much of the observations were incomplete or reported
in an anecdotal fashion. In the meantime, a different tradition was
born under the flag of methodological rigour. However, its
development was not going to provide only benefits for the field of
comparative cognition.
1.2 Puzzle boxes and Skinner boxes: rat, pigeon, monkey, which is
which ? It doesn't matter
At the beginning of the 20th century, Edward Lee Thorndike
(1911) ventured the development of a vast research project aimed at
the systematic comparison of different species on the basis of what
he considered a precise measure of intelligence.
The project was centred on the puzzle box, an apparatus
invented by Thorndike (1911) for the comparative study of problem
solving. In a typical experiment, an animal confined in wooden cage,
had to select the appropriate response (e.g. pull a string, press a
lever, or displace a stick) that caused the opening of the cage's
door, allowing the subject to reach an item of food. In such a
situation, the animal performed first a series of inappropriate
behaviours, and then, accidentally produced the correct response.
The time employed to solve the task in successive trials was
plotted as a learning curve. The learning curve was considered as
representative of the behaviour of a particular species in a
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particular problem. In a typical learning curve, the latency of the
solution is very high at the beginning, then gradually decreases
and stabilizes after 10-20 trials. From the graduality of these
curves, Thorndike deduced that the animals were unable to
understand the causal relationships between the correct response
and its outcome. The process responsible for the solution, he
claimed, was a learning process based on the emission of random
responses followed by the selection of those which lead to the food.
On the basis of this interpretation of problem solving behaviour,
Thorndike formulated his famous "Law of effect", postulating that
the probability of producing a response is increased when it is
followed by a state of satisfaction of the organism, and reduced
when followed by a state of discomfort.^
Thorndike tested a variety of species in his puzzle boxes and
interpreted the formal similarity of the obtained learning curves as
expression of a universal law, applicable to every taxa.
Thorndike's paradigm provides a first example of how the attempt
to devise a uniform methodology produced, as a result, the levelling
of the competence of different species on basic learning skills. As
stressed by Koehler, problem boxes forced the animal to find the
solution accidentally. Provided with complicated mechanisms for the
opening of the door, they made it impossible for the subject to
perceive the respective functions of the different parts of the
apparatus (for a detailed presentation of Koehler's critical points,
see Hilgard and Bower, 1975). Thus, the opportunity to evaluate
how the respective level of cognitive competences of different
3 As pointed out by Boakes (1984), in formulating the second part
of his law of effect (the inhibition of incorrect responses),
Thorndike probably relied on the results obtained by Yerkes (whose
experiments had just been carried out a few years before). In fact
since the experiments carried out by Thorndike did not allow an
analysis of the error space (which on the contrary was possible in
the multiple alternatives situations devised by Yerkes) he did not
have any principled way to measure the behaviours whose
probability decreased.
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organisms affected the way in which the problems were solved was
missed with Thorndike's procedure.
Thus, Thorndike was probably the first scholar to complete a
vast and systematic research program with a uniform paradigm
suitable for the comparison of a wide range of species.
Nevertheless, his methods were ill-suited to detect any qualitative
inter-specific differences. The results were arbitrarily generalized
and Thorndike ventured to claim that general problem solving skills
of different species were chiefly quantitative in their nature. The
consequence was that a considerable distance was implicitly taken
from the evolutionary tradition that attempted to find an answer to
the problem of mental evolution in the relationship between
taxonomic distance and cognitive similarity.
What had been implicitly assumed by Thorndike would have been
explicitly declared by John Broadus Watson (1878-1958). In his
celebrated article "Psychology as the behaviourist views it" (Watson,
1913) and in the introduction to his book "Behaviour: An
Introduction to Comparative Psychology" (Watson, 1914), Watson
explicitly dismissed the evolutionary tradition. Animal psychology
was viewed as a privileged field of study for the mere reason that it
had traditionally focused on behaviour, which, according to Watson,
was the only appropriate object of psychological investigation. ^
Animals were taken as adequate models of human psychology. In
fact: "The behaviourist, in his effort to get a unitary scheme of
animal response, recognizes no dividing line between man and brute"
(Watson, 1913). Since no major distinctions were warranted between
men and animals, and even less between different non-human
species, the rationale itself of the comparative method started to
become more and more obscure.
Concerning the problem of the mind, as we have seen, Romanes
and Yerkes believed in the causal role of internal processes on
animal behaviour. Thus, they tried to characterize these processes
4 In contrast with the use of verbal protocols, at the time so
commonly adopted especially in European human psychology.
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on the basis of the inferences drawn from observing the behaviour
of different species. Watson, by contrast, considered the method as
non-scientific.
The fact that Yerkes had proposed some forms of "ideation" to
explain the performance of his subjects was bitterly attacked.
Referring to Yerkes' experiments on multiple choices Watson claimed
"You have made statements which are based on such flimsy and
anthropomorphic evidence that for a while I seriously questioned
your scientific spirit" (letter from Watson to Yerkes, 12th may 1916,
quoted in Boakes, 1984 p. 199).
Watson's sceptical attitude towards the results obtained by many
of his contemporaries was mainly due to the stress he put on the
need for the unification of experimental procedures in psychology.
Results which were not obtained from a standard paradigm of
general application, had to wait further confirmation by such a
methodology (when developed). Although Watson identified in the
conditioning techniques of Russian reflexology a suitable paradigm,
he never managed to fulfil his program of the standardization of
psychological methodology.
In the following years, the development of behaviourism
formulated by Watson would have taken different forms under the
common label of neobehavourism. The theoretic position assumed by
Watson was to become less radical and the main heritage was to be
based on his general methodological directives. Methodological
behaviourism might be conceived as a psychological version of
neopositivism. The researchers hold that since mental processes are
unobservable, the study of cognitive functions must be confined to
their observable expression: the behaviour. However, the presence
of internal processes here is not denied but it must be inferred
from experimental procedures based exclusively on the manipulation
of the input that an organism receives and the recording of its
responses (see Skinner, 1977 for an account of methodological
behaviourism). In this respect methodological behaviourism survives
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in much of contemporary comparative cognition (Wasserman, 1984;
1993).
It was Skinner who resurrected the radical behaviourism as
proposed by Watson. Radical behaviourism not only denies the
possibility of studying inner mental processes (if not by its
behavioural ambassadors), but makes behaviour the ultimate end of
any psychological investigation (Skinner, 1977; Wasserman, 1984).
The shift from methodological behaviourism was warranted by the
assumption that the role of any science is the prediction and not the
explanation of the phenomenon it observes. The role of psychology
as a science was, therefore, merely confined to the control of
behaviour.
As a matter of fact, this emphasis on the control of behaviour
made it necessary to divert the attention from complex problem
solving situations in favour of artificial oversimplified tasks. The
need to develop a simple experimental situation, where it was
possible to modify the behaviour of the subjects by manipulating
simple variables, led to the development of the Skinner box. This
apparatus is a cage provided with a food dispenser operated by the
pressure of a lever. The frequency of pressure responses of the
animals is controlled according to different schedules of
reinforcement.
The more different species were tested in such a simple
apparatus, the more they showed similarity in their behaviour,
confirming the assumption that essentially the same basic principle
could have accounted for the behaviour of every organism. In line
with the empiricist tradition, this single basic mechanism was
identified in the association.
Since the laws of behaviour were basically the same for all of the
animal realm (man included), it was worth studying one or two
species only and then generalizing the results with all other
species. As Skinner himself provocatively put it: "Pigeon, rat.
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monkey, which is which ? It doesn't matter" (Skinner, 1956, p.
230).
To explain the patent complexity of animal behaviour as observed
in real life situations on the basis of the simple conditioning rules
derived from Skinner box contexts, the concept of chains of
responses assumed a central role in the skinnerian theory. Skinner
(1938; 1953) maintained that all complex behaviours can be explained
as a sequence of movements, each of which provides a feedback
(internal or external) which becomes the discriminative stimulus for
the one that follows it. A modified version of this theory was
proposed by Skinner to account for the development of syntax in
human language. As we shall see, the weakness of this simplistic
explanation of grammar would have been the basis for the strongest
criticism towards radical behaviourism.
Thus, radical behaviourism, created confusion among both the
methodology and the objects of comparative cognition. The behaviour
became the direct end of psychological investigation (rather than the
indirect means of accessing mental processes) and, the association
became the unique process to account for all aspects of cognition.
The hierarchical and discontinuous level of complexity of different
cognitive competences (see McGonigle, 1991) was conceived as being
of quantitative nature, where more extensive, richer and long
chains of associations accounted for increasing complexity. For the
same reasons, obvious differences in the complexity of the behaviour
of different species (beyond basic instinctive and reflexive
behaviours with obvious innate determinants), were accounted for
by a simple summation of associations more or less easily and rapidly
established.
The end product of such an assumption was that the realm of
mind and cognition was definitively dismissed, not only for
epistemological reasons, but, mainly because they could be replaced
by behaviour itself. The meaning of the comparative exercise was
nullified. Different species, including humans, could have been
interchanged as experimental subjects, without losing any major
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source of information on the determinants of their behaviour. As a
consequence the evolutionary framework which originally constituted
the main rationale for comparative psychology lost its original
meaning.
1.3 WGTA: learning sets and the study of complex learning skills.
An attempt to go beyond the restriction of simple conditioning
was performed by Harry Harlow. He stressed the problems arising
from interpreting complex behaviours on the basis of simple
behaviours observed in oversimplified tasks (Harlow, 1959).
Harlow (1949) developed a new apparatus, the Wisconsin General
Testing Apparatus (WGTA) and a procedure which would have
allowed the comparison of different species (only primates at the
beginning) on higher order cognitive skills beyond simple associative
learning.
The WGTA features a tray with two foodwells and an opaque
screen interposed between the subject and the tester. While the
screen is down, one of the foodwells is baited and both are covered
by two objects differing multidimensionally. The screen is then lifted
and the tray is pushed towards the subject to allow it to lift one of
the stimuli. If it selects the stimulus covering the bait, it is allowed
to take the reward, if not, the tray is withdrawn and an interval is
interposed before the presentation of a new trial. Typically the
subject is presented with the same pair of stimuli for a fixed
number of trials. Then a new pair of stimuli is presented, and so
on.
Harlow (1949) found that monkeys (trained on several hundred
discriminations) eventually learned each new discrimination in one
trial only. He dubbed this sort of learning to learn "learning set"
and claimed to have found a higher order capability which allowed
the animal to transcend the particular problem at hand and to
develop strategies with a high level of generality.
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In order to find even more complex forms of transfer, the
paradigm has been successively modified so that, instead of simple
discriminations, series of discrimination reversal were presented. In
this latter paradigm, after the subject has reached the criterion on
a particular discrimination, the reward contingencies are reversed,
so that the stimulus previously unrewarded, now is the rewarded
one, and vice versa. Typically the reversal phase features a fixed
number of trials and the observed proportion of correct responses is
considered as a measure of the transfer of the discrimination
learning ability (acquired in the prereversal phase) to the novel
situation characterized by the reversal of the reward contingencies.
A series of these reversal discrimination problems, featuring
different stimuli is then presented and the "transfer of transfer" is
evaluated. In this way even a more abstract and general learning to
learn ability is acquired by subjects who show an improvement over
a series of discrimination reversal problems.
However, this higher order ability was never fully characterized
(for a discussion see McGonigle, 1984). The only conceptual
distinction that has been proposed is one which contraposes the
development of a "win-stay lose-shift strategy" (which would allow
the solution of both the reversal problem and any new discrimination
in one trial only) to associative learning (Restle, 1958; Reese,
1964).
Although most of the experimental results on learning-sets
support the hypothesis that monkeys rely on a "win-stay lose-shift
strategy" (Restle, 1958; Levine, 1965; Mackintosh; 1974), the status
of the strategy, in the context of the problems devised by Harlow,
remains unclear. In fact, it can be either selected from the pre¬
existing behavioural repertoire of the subject when its relevance for
the task at hand is recognized, or, alternatively built ex novo as a
consequence of an active process of behavioural self-regulation
produced by task practice.
Moreover, it can be noted that such a strategy fits only the
restricted context of binary discrimination, where most of learning-
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sets studies have been conducted. In situations where a larger
number of alternatives is presented, the mere deployment of a "win-
stay lose-shift" strategy would not guarantee the solution in the
minimal number of trials, unless supported by a system which keeps
track of all the alternatives already tested. However, Harlow never
extended his paradigm to procedures involving the presentation of
multiple items and, therefore, missed the opportunity to evaluate
both the generality of a "win-stay lose-shift" strategy, and, the
ability of primates to deploy other complementary forms of control.
On the basis of his findings, Harlow (1959) claimed to have
readdressed the question of insight as proposed by Koehler, but
using rigourous experimental procedures to detect transfer of
learning from one problem solving situation to others. He considered
the one trial learning performance that his subjects achieved after
prolonged learning set practice as a form of insight analogous to
that observed by Koehler. So, he claimed: "no animal can solve
problems insightfully [i.e. deploying a "win-stay lose-shift"
strategy] or with maximal efficiency without a history of earlier
solution of similar problems" (Harlow, 1959, p. 510).
Harlow failed to see a fundamental difference between his learning
set paradigms and the problem solving situations adopted by
Koehler. In fact, while in Koehler's problems the logic solution of
the task is available to the subject from the outset, in the case of
discrimination learning set the rewarded stimulus is selected
arbitrarily by the experimenter in each successive problem. Thus,
the subject is forced to find out by trial and error a consistent rule
which allows the solution of successive problems. The situation faced
by the subjects becomes even more chaotic in the case of
discrimination reversal learning sets, and therefore it is not
surprising that a protracted presentation of the task is needed to
allow the subjects to detect the appropriate solution strategy.
Although misleading, if assimilated to problems where the
appropriate response is not chosen arbitrarily, Harlow's paradigm
tapped into interesting dimensions, such as the ability of monkeys
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to develop economical solutions which transcend the specific domain
of a single problem (as shown by the one trial learning produced by
task expertise). Moreover, the paradigm allowed the systematic
manipulation of variables such as the intertrial interval and the ratio
between number of instances of the same problem and number of
problems presented.
For these reasons, the apparatus and the procedure proved
extremely influential and, since the pioneer study by Harlow, a
number of different species have been tested for their ability to
form learning sets either in its original form or in various forms of
discrimination reversal tasks.
However, the paradigm was never extended to problems more
complex than those featuring binary discriminations. This prevented
an assay of the different strategies which might be deployed by
different organisms when faced with the problem of finding an
economic solution to a series of more or less related tasks. The only
measures allowed in the binary versions of the paradigm, such as
the curves of learning set formation (based on the speed of learning
and the number of errors in successive reversal phases of a
learning set) provide very little information, especially when
primates are compared with non-primate species. After having
extensively reviewed fifteen years of research conducted on
learning-sets of different species, Warren (1965) concluded as
follows: "The major points in the discussion of learning-set
formation by primates and other vertebrates may be summarized
quite succinctly. Mammals and other birds differ from fish and
reptiles in being able to learn repeated discrimination reversals in
progressively fewer trials, but primates are not markedly more
proficient than other mammals or birds" (Warren, 1965, p. 266).
Nevertheless, the WGTA, for its versatility was successively
adapted for the implementation of several experimental procedures.
The most influential proved to be the matching to sample paradigm
and its clones. In its typical version a sample stimulus is presented
either before (delayed matching to sample) or simultaneously (0-
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delay matching to sample) with another two stimuli, only one of
which is identical to the sample. A response to the correct matching
is rewarded. Variants of the paradigm involve the oddity from the
sample task, where the stimulus which is different from the sample
must be selected; and the "Symbolic" matching to sample, where no
two identical stimuli are presented and the matching is arbitrarily
decided by the experimenter. It has been shown that all the
versions of this paradigm can be mastered by organisms as different
as pigeons (see Wasserman, 1993 for a review), monkeys (Murray
and Mishkin, 1987) and apes (Premack, 1976).
Thus, Harlow must be acknowledged for having developed a
standard paradigm to compare different species on abilities more
complex than the simple forms of associative learning studied in
Skinner boxes and simple binary discriminations. However, from the
comparative point of view, even learning-sets did not prove to be a
paradigm suitable to detect relevant dimensions for cross-species
comparisons.
1.4 Ape language projects: keyboards, plastic chips, ASL and the
primacy of the name
As we have seen, paradigms focused on the frequency of single
responses (as in skinner boxes) or on the number of correct choices
in binary discrimination tasks (as in both learning sets and
matching to sample paradigms), produced a levelling effect on the
performances of different species (and eventually led to a decline of
the comparative method). Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising
that at the end of the Sixties, the rebirth of comparative cognition
focused on the study of ape's competence in one of the most
structured and hierarchically organized cognitive domain: language.
Although in the twenties Yerkes had pioneered an abortive
project to teach chimpanzees to articulate words, it was only after
the development of cognitivism and the publication of Chomsky's
(1959) famous critical dissection of Skinner's theory of Verbal
Behaviour (1957) that projects aiming to the assessment of ape's
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linguistic skills started to blossom. Apes were taught to use the
American Sign Language (ASL) (Gardner and Gardner, 1971;
Terrace, 1979), and more artificial languages, based on arbitrary
symbols to be selected on a keyboard (Rumbaugh, 1977), and plastic
icons to be arranged on a board (Premack, 1976).
Although some of the early studies adopted basic variants of
skinnerian procedures of training and were still influenced by most
of the theoretical assumption of behaviourism (Gardner and Gardner,
1969; Rumbaugh, 1977), ape language projects can be considered
more as a reaction to chomskyan criticism of behaviourism than as a
natural development of behaviourism itself.
The role played by Chomsky in the development of ape language
projects is twofold. On the one hand, the hypothesis of the
discontinuity in the evolution of human language and of its
independent origin from primate communication, strongly advocated
by Chomsky, led to the development of experimental programs aimed
to its falsification (for a review see Terrace, 1985). Beatrice and
Allen Gardner, the researchers who carried out the Washoe project
(Gardner and Gardner, 1969), one of the first attempts to teach the
ASL to a chimpanzee, declared: "If a form of behaviour such as
human language appears to be different in character from other
forms of human and animal behaviour, we do not abandon the search
for general laws; instead we question the adequacy of existing
observations" (Gardner and Gardner, 1978, p. 37).
On the other hand, the fact that the theory of syntax was the
field where Chomsky made his major contribution to linguistics and
where the Skinnerian theory of language revealed most of its
deficiencies (Lyons, 1991) produced a major shift in the variables to
which researchers started to give attention. Instead of taking for
granted the ubiquity of associative chaining in all behaviours with
serial components (including the syntactic organization of linguistic
production) new paradigms were developed in order to validate the
hypothesis that apes possessed the ability to creatively produce long
sequences of symbols, under the control of sophisticated ordering
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rules (Gardner and Gardner, 1974; Patterson, 1978; Terrace et al.,
1979; 1980).
However, the syntactic output of language trained apes proved to
be very poor. From exhaustive reviews of ape language projects
(McGonigle 1980; Wallman, 1992) it emerged clearly that although
apes seem to be able to acquire a relatively large "vocabulary", this
does not result in a parallel expansion in the Mean Length of
Utterance (MLU) (McGonigle, 1980). The ability to acquire a
substantial "vocabulary" of arbitrary symbols does not represent per
se either evidence of linguistic competence or of striking cognitive
competences. In fact, dogs, rats, horses and other animals can
learn to produce arbitrary "words" to obtain specific rewards
(Terrace, 1985). By contrast, in children's linguistic development a
dramatic increase in the length of MLU accompanies the enlargement
of vocabulary.
According to Wallman (1992), it is impossible to find evidence for
a grammatical competence in the linguistic production of apes. None
of their "sentences" seem to go beyond the production of fixed
sequences of "words" and those which have been claimed to be novel
combinations of signs seem to be nothing more than random
permutations of single "words", in an otherwise fixed list of signs.
It has also been questioned whether the constituents of apes'
"sentences" carry a particular meaning even when presented in
isolation (McGonigle, 1980; Terrace, 1985). When syntactic rules are
not specified as permissible relations among categories of meaningful
elements, the organization of serial production in language would be
merely reduced to the rote learning of a number of well formed
expressions. Such an approach is likely to overload the memory
system of an organism which is faced with the task of producing
"sentences" comparable in length to those observed in human
language production. This could explain the high redundancy and
recursiveness observed in the strings produced by the apes (e.g.
"Give orange me give eat orange me eat orange give me you", as
mentioned by McGonigle, 1989). If a subject is unable to assign a
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semantic role to the components of a sentence the aim of evaluating
its grammatical competences might be unrealistically ambitious
(Terrace, 1985).
Therefore, current research on ape language (Savage-Rumbaugh,
1986) is devoted to the assessment of whether the signs produced
by the apes (when taken in isolation) share some important
characteristics with the words produced by children. The field
chiefly investigated is that of referential communication. The
attention of the researchers is particularly directed towards the
socio-pragmatic aspects of the interaction of trainer and ape, in
analogy with the mother-infant interactions (such as eye-to-eye
contact, pointing, joint attention etc.) which, according to recent
trends in the study of language acquisition by children (Bates,
1976), support the development of intentional referential
communication.
Thus, current perspectives seem to be characterized by an
appraisal of the importance of studying those paralinguistic or
prelinguistic skills (generally dubbed as Acquisition Support
System) which might help or even be a necessary precondition for
the development of language (Bruner, 1983; Bates 1976).
However, to date, the attention has been put on naming and on
the social and communicative skills that might support it. Little
effort has been devoted to those cognitive competences which in
extra-linguistic contexts support the hierarchical and serial
organization of elements (Chalmers and McGonigle, 1994).
This is a field of intrinsic interest, even setting aside the still
controversial question of whether the evolution of syntactic
components of language should be regarded as independent from the
evolution of those cognitive skills which enable animals and humans
to organize serial behaviours in other domains.
In fact, as Lashley put forward in 1951, language strikingly
presents the integrative functions which are characteristic of high
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level cortical functions and that reach their highest development in
human thought processes. However, the problem of syntax is not to
be found exclusively in language: "the coordination of leg
movements of insects, the songs of birds, the control of trotting
and pacing in a gaited horse, the rat running the maze, the finger
movements of a piano player, present a problem of sequences of
actions which cannot be explained in terms of chains of responses"
(Lashley, 1951).
If serial behaviours are supported by complex competences (and
not merely by associative chaining), the study of the way in which
they are organized might be particularly fruitful in determining
different control strategies which different organisms have developed
to solve the problems posed by the production of long series of
responses.
Over-emphasizing the non-linguistic, communicative competences
which might support the development of naming, researchers
involved in ape language projects, have neglected the importance of
studying the non-linguistic competences at the basis of syntactical
component of behaviour. Recent research trends (some directly
related with ape language projects and some independently developed
from the study of seriation) which have recently produced relevant
findings in this area will be reviewed in the next chapter.
1.5 Conclusion
In brief, this chapter aimed to show how different research
projects failed to develop experimental paradigms suitable to detect
relevant dimensions for cross species comparisons. Comparative
psychology began as the comparative study of the evolution of
human mind. Darwin and subsequent scholars within the
evolutionary tradition believed in the possibility of characterizing
different animal mental traits. The comparison of psychological
processes of related and increasingly removed species was
considered the chief method for tracing the evolution of human
cognition. From the analysis of the paradigms developed within this
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tradition emerges the implicit assumption that to find relevant
dimensions for comparison it was necessary to adopt tasks suitable
to be solved either by trial and error or in a more "insightful" way.
Often, the importance was stressed of providing the subjects with
problem spaces where the relevant information for the solution was
available to the subjects from the outset and did not require a
blind, inductive process to find out the relevant characteristics of
the problem. The comparison of the problem solving strategies
deployed by different species would have then allowed the discovery
of their respective cognitive restrictions and abilities. However, a
standard paradigm which allowed the fulfilment of all the
requirements of a systematic research project was never developed.
In most cases the methodologies lacked in experimental rigour and
this led to a strong criticism of the whole tradition.
In the name of experimental rigour the original objectives of the
field have been distorted for a great part of this century. In the
present interpretation it is proposed that this confusion has been
the inevitable consequence of a set of circumstances. The need for
methodological rigour caused a shift of attention from mental
processes to behaviour and how to control it. The over-emphasis
put on the prediction of behaviour led to a disregard for the
problem of understanding its causes. These premises produced the
design of oversimplified experimental environments, typically
exemplified by skinner boxes and binary discrimination problems.
The use of such experimental techniques, allowed the observation of
simple forms of learning, shared by the vast majority of the species
studied. Since in most of the paradigms developed in this framework
the correct responses were arbitrarily defined by the experimenter,
the animals were forced to rely on trial and error procedures in
order to solve the tasks. The levelling effect produced by these
experimental devices on the behaviour of various organisms
reinforced the belief that a simple summation function of the same
atomic mechanisms could explain the differences in the level of
complexity of these organisms. For the same reason, concepts such
as evolution and cognitive growth were trivialized as the mere
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expression of the number of associations and speed with which they
simple formed.
Learning sets and related paradigms seemed to offer the
possibility of distinguishing different species on the basis of their
ability to deploy strategies of different levels of complexity beyond
simple associative learning. However, no major differences were
observed among species which are taxonomically very distant.
Moreover, the procedures adopted in learning set studies (in
contrast, for example with the problem solving situations devised by
Koehler, where all the elements for the solution of the problem were
at disposal of the subjects from the outset) required the subjects to
achieve the solution inductively by means of a selection of those
strategies which proved successful in successive problems. This led
to interpretative problems regarding the origins and the status of
the solution. Were the strategies part of the repertoire of the
subject ? Were they developed as a consequence of task practice ?
Would the subject have deployed them from the outset if given the
possibility to perceive their relevance for the task at hand ? All
these questions remained unanswered.
Apart from the restrictions imposed by the inductive nature of
the problem posed to the subjects, a major difficulty of the
paradigm was detected in the fact that it was never extended to
problems beyond binary discrimination learning. Problems featuring
larger sets of stimuli would have offered a much richer range of
strategic possibilities and their differential use might have been a
more profitable dimension for comparisons.
Focusing on competences dealing with the complex and
hierarchical organization of behaviours with a strong serial
component, ape language projects produced a shift of attention from
the binary discrimination context. However, the assay of non-human
grammatical competences in a strictly linguistic context proved to be
a far too ambitious project. Language was taken as a privileged
undivisable object of study, neglecting its relationship with different
non-linguistic cognitive skills which might support it. In absence of
Chapter I 26
independent evidence for the status of the signs produced by the
apes, the "verbal" behaviour of the apes can be interpreted as the
mere learning of sequence of arbitrary symbols. The failure to show
any grammatical competence in non-human subjects led to the
recognition of the necessity to ascertain the presence of non-
linguistic prerequisite competences which apes might or might not
possess or be able to acquire. However, researchers still involved
in ape language training have mostly focused their attention on
naming. This has led to the recent development of paradigms with
strong social components and dealing with discrete responses
(pointing to objects, ability to refer symbolically to a set of pictures
and so on). The ability to organize series of responses by means of
sophisticated strategies (a field which might evidence some
continuity between pre-linguistic or proto-linguistic competences of
apes and others serially organized behaviours shown by different
species) has been neglected. In the next chapter, recent research




2.1 From Lashley to recent trends in the study of serially organized
behaviours
As we have seen from the previous chapter the behaviouristic
tradition postulated the ubiquity of a single process, associative
chaining, in all behaviours with patent serial components. This
explanation has been influential till recent years and it remains
widely accepted by scholars still influenced by behaviourism.
However as pointed out by Lashley (1951), most of serially
organized behaviours cannot be explained postulating a single
mechanism to account for them. For example from the skilled
succession of movements, which can be observed in the different
gaits of an horse, such as trotting, pacing and single footing,
which involves the same pattern of muscular contraction in the
individual legs, but nevertheless involve a different temporal order,
it can be inferred that a separate mechanism must be responsible for
the serial organization of the same atomic movements. This
mechanism must work quite independently from the sensory
information provided by each single movement.
On the other hand, from the misplacement errors which can
occasionally be observed in behaviours which otherwise maintain
their general serial structure (such as slips, interference and order
mistakes which occur in speech, typewriting or music playing) it
can be inferred that other forces play a role in determining the
serial performance quite independently from a general motor plan of
the sequence. It is also necessary to postulate a mechanism which
enables the coordination of temporal and spatial informations to
account, for example, for reaching and grasping behaviours.
Chapter II 28
The problem of the serial organization of behaviour in real life
situations has been vastly ignored, notwithstanding its relevance in
foraging strategies (Krebs, 1981), navigation (McGonigle, 1991;
Gallistel, 1990), explorative behaviours (Menzel, 1974),
representation of social hierarchies (Cheney and Seyfart, 1992) and
practically the vast majority of situations, either in natural or
laboratory environments, where the basis for rational decision
making is investigated (see McGonigle and Chalmers, 1992).
Ethologists have dedicated some attention to behaviours with
evident serial components observed in natural environments.
However, they have traditionally focused on reflexive or instinctive
behaviours in lower species such as insects. Since these behavioural
patterns have very strong genetic determinants and their sequence
is by definition very rigid and hardly modifiable, ethologists have
failed to offer any characterization of the dimensions along which
different levels of complexity can be compared in various organisms
to find a path toward human intelligence (see McGonigle, 1991;
Terrace and McGonigle, 1994). In fact, temporally integrated actions
do not reach any degree of complexity until the appearance of the
cerebral cortex (Lashley, 1951).
By contrast, the understanding of the functioning of the
mechanisms underpining serially organized behaviours in complex
organisms might serve a twofold objective.
First, the characterization of the different sub-systems which
underpin serial behaviour and their interplay might possibly offer a
rich set of qualitative different possibilities in the way in which
sequences of actions are organized, providing the basis for
meaningful comparisons.
Second, in contrast with artificial situations featuring binary
choices only, the investigation of serially organized behaviours
might provide a basis for cross-species comparisons in situations
which seem much more related with real life environments.
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Under these conditions, it might be possible to detect, on the
one hand those requirements which must have an high degree of
generality among different taxa because of common problems of
information management, and on the other to find those variables
which account for differences in cognitive complexity between
different organisms and their possible adaptive function. To use
Lashley's words again:
"Analysis of the nervous mechanisms underlying order in the more
primitive acts may contribute ultimately to the solution even of the
physiology of logic" (1951, p. 515); since "I am coming more and
more to the conviction that the rudiments of every human behaviour
mechanism will be found far down in the evolutionary scale" (1951,
p. 526).
More recently (as we have seen in the previous chapter) some of
the serial components of behaviour have received more attention in
the form of the study of syntactic competences of language trained
apes and reflexive activities performed by lower organisms.
However, as pointed out by Terrace and McGonigle (1994), following
the arguments put forward by Lashley (1951), an important but
neglected middle ground is the behaviour shown in various tasks
which require the serial production of responses which are neither
directly related with verbal production nor fixed and stereotyped in
their nature.
In this chapter, following a review of recent studies focused on
serial aspects of behaviour, it will be proposed that the study of
these sorts of behaviours, tapping onto non-trivial aspects of
cognition, might allow us to put back the comparative study of
animal intelligence in its original evolutionary tradition. In fact it
would allow the qualitative comparison of different species on the
basis of a rich spectrum of organizational possibilities which might
underpin such behaviours.
In the previous chapter there often emerged a contraposition
between experimental paradigms characterized by a strong component
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of arbitrariness in the definition of the responses required to the
subjects and, by contrast, tasks where the structural properties of
the problem space were more or less easily detectable from the
outset. Also, among recent studies on sequential behaviours, a
major division can be made between those focused on serial learning
of lists of items in the order arbitrarily defined at the outset by the
experimenter and those, which, by contrast, focus on the way in
which primates exploit some form of organization implicitly embedded
in the sequence to be produced.
2.2 Serial Learning: how arbitrary sequences of responses are
learnt
The main root of this type of study stems directly from ape
language projects.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, on the basis of an
analysis of the syntactic characteristic of the "utterances" produced
by subjects of different projects, Terrace and colleagues (Terrace,
1979; Terrace et al., 1979) argued that most of the sequences of
signs produced by apes could be explained more parsimoniously than
assuming an underlying grammatical competence.
Although it seemed implausible to assume that the apes memorised
every single sequence which they were able to produce, Terrace
and colleagues proposed that, for example Sarah (Premack, 1976)
and Lana (Rumbaugh, 1977) multisign utterances might have been
rotely learnt sequences of symbols arranged in particular orders.
There was no evidence that the apes understood all the "words" in
the sequence they produced and it seemed more likely that what
they learned was the meaning of several key words, which were
inserted in turn in the appropriate position of an otherwise fixed
sequence (e.g. "please machine give apple period" and "please
machine give drink period").
To show that such a competence was not very elaborate and
might have been widespread among different zoological taxa, Terrace
started a program to teach pigeons to perform fixed sequences of
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arbitrary signs. The first positive results showed pigeons pecking
four colours in particular sequences and transferring this ability to
novel arrays of colours (Terrace et al., 1977; Straub and Terrace,
1981). This led to the development of a more ambitious program to
study the competence of ordered responses in pigeons and rhesus
monkeys.
The paradigm used by Terrace and his group consists in
displaying (originally in an operant chamber, now on touch sensitive
computer monitors) a set of items (icons of different colours or
photographs of different objects). The spatial configuration of these
items on the screen is varied from trial to trial, in order to prevent
the subjects from learning a chain of spatial responses. If the
subject executes the sequence of responses in the order previously
decided by the experimenters, a reward is dispensed.
The subjects are trained by a "forward" procedure: a single item
is presented at the beginning, and then new list items are added,
one at a time, until the whole sequence is learnt. Negative feedback
(omission of reward and additional intertrial interval) is provided at
each point of training. For example to teach a sequence of four
items (here symbolized as ABCD), item A is presented first, the
subject responds to it and receives a reward, then the sequence AB
is presented and the subject is required to touch the items in the
AB order (a BA response would be penalized), once a given
criterion (usually the 75%) of correct responses on the two items
series is reached, the third item C is added to the sequence, and
so on.
The main aim of this research program was to determine the sort
of processes underpining serial learning. The program started when
most of American experimental psychology was still heavily under
the influence of radical behaviourism. Thus, as we have seen, the
dominant explanation of list learning was based on the chaining
theory.
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The chaining theory of learning postulates that the selective
reward of particular sequences of responses produces associations
between temporally successive responses. Although behaviourists
have proposed different versions of the chaining theory, each
according a weight to associations developed between stimuli and
responses or between responses to non-adjacent items of the list,
the different versions of the theory share the assumption that each
response represents the discriminative stimulus for the following
one. Since the main associations develop between successive items,
according to the theory the subjects should find it difficult to
respond to subsets of the list which contain only non-adjacent
items.
However, Terrace and colleagues have shown that pigeons are
able to respond accurately to pairs of non-adjacent items from an
already learnt list, although they do so only if the subset contains
a start and/or an end item.
For example, once pigeons have learnt a five term series ABODE,
they are able to respond accurately to the subsets AB, AC, AD,
AE, BE, CE and DE, but their performance falls at chance level on
the subsets BC, BD and CD. Thus, Terrace and colleagues claimed
that although pigeons seem unable to form an ordered representation
of the series (Terrace, 1984; 1987; 1991), a simple chaining
hypothesis fails to account for their behaviour. By contrast,
Terrace (1987) provided some evidence that pigeons impose some
forms of organization upon the sequence of items to be remembered
which goes beyond a simple association of successive items.
Terrace (1987) reported that pigeons trained with colours serving
as items ABC and forms as items DE seem to "chunk" the two
classes of stimuli. In fact, an experimental group, trained with the
two classes of stimuli, learned both four-item and five-item term
series much faster than control groups for which only colours were
used or for which the two forms were not presented as adjacent
items but interspersed among the three colours. Moreover, in
subsequent test trials where non-adjacent pairs of items were
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presented, the experimental group performed better than the control
groups.
Thus, it seems that pigeons are able to decompose a sequence in
two different "chunks", a three item one (ABC) and a two item one
(DE). Furthermore, the superimposition of such a form of
organization over the list to be remembered leads to a more accurate
performance.
Following the first experiments conducted on pigeons by Terrace
and colleagues, D'Amato and Colombo, pioneered the study of serial
learning in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). By means of an
extensive research program D'Amato and colleagues were able to
demonstrate that monkeys' performance, in analogous serial learning
tasks, were underpinned by processes and representations
substantially different from those of pigeons.
Having trained capuchin monkeys and pigeons in an operant
chamber on a five term serial learning task, in a series of
successive experiments, D'Amato and Colombo tested the subjects on
a variety of tasks in which the items of the learnt series were
manipulated in various ways.
In one of their experiments (D'Amato and Colombo, 1988), pairs
of non-adjacent items were used. It was shown that, in contrast to
the pigeons, monkeys were able to perform at a high level of
accuracy on all of them. Furthermore, on the basis of an analysis of
the latencies of the responses to each of the items of the series,
D'Amato and Colombo (1988) presented evidence for a linear internal
representation of the series in the monkeys. The rationale of the
time analysis was that if the monkeys in the course of training
developed an internal linear representation of the series, one might
expect to find an orderly relation between response latency to the
first item of a test pair and the position of that item in the original
series.
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For example, the response latency to the first member of a pair
should increase across the test pairs AE, BE, CE, DE. The reason
is that in order to decide which member of a test pair to respond to
first, the subject presumably would start at the beginning of its
internal representation of the series and progress through the
seguence until locates one of the displayed items. The more
represented items there are to be consulted, the longer the
response latency.
These were exactly the results obtained by D'Amato and Colombo
(1988). The monkey's latency of responding to the first item of each
subset of the original seguence, increased monotonically as a
function of the position of the item in the original list.
The research program performed by D'Amato and Colombo
progressed, and provided further evidence against a behaviouristic
interpretation of serial learning in monkeys. In a successive set of
experiments these authors (D'Amato and Colombo, 1989, experiment
1) introduced wild card items in the serial learning task. Monkeys
already expert on the ABCDE sequence were trained with a wild
card item (W) that could replace any of the items of the original
sequence, thus, forming five additional sequences WBCDE, AWCDE,
ABWDE, ABCDWE, ABCDW. In another experiment D'Amato and
Colombo (1989, experiment 2) used two wild cards (X and Y),
forming 10 different sequences (e.g. AXYDE, XBCYE, etc.). The
monkeys reached high accuracy of responses in all the sequences
containing wild cards. The rationale for these experiments was that,
since the position of wild cards within the sequence was changed, it
was unlikely that the monkey's performance was based purely on
associations between adjacent items of the list. On the contrary, it
seemed more plausible to attribute to the monkeys some knowledge of
the ordinal position of the items within the sequence.
The evidence for some form of representation of ordinal position
in monkeys has some important implications. In fact, it can be
conjectured that if a monkey is able to process information about
ordinal position, it might have also the competence to form an
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abstract template of a serial learning task. The template, once
formed can then be used with novel series by filling in, at the
appropriate position, each of the items of the sequence in hand.
The formation of such a template would result in a positive transfer
to successive series containing new items. Such a device would be
much more powerful than the ability to form associations between
each of the elements of a particular series because the associations
developed to learn an unique sequence cannot be exported to new
isomorphic problems.
Some evidence for transfer abilities on successive serial learning
tasks has recently been presented for rhesus monkeys (Macaca
mulatta) by Swartz, Chen and Terrace (1991). These authors
trained their subjects on multiple 4 item series lists. Each sequence
contained different items. While the macaques were learning
successive series, Swartz et al. (1991) were able to modify the
training procedure, eliminating the early phases of training. Thus,
while the early series needed to be drilled using the forward
procedure described above (i.e. only one item is presented first and
then one more item is added to the series and so on), in acquiring
successive series, the subjects were able to deal with a training
procedure which featured the presentation of more than one element
of the list from the outset (for example three items ABC, or the
whole 4 item series ABCD).
Although the performance, under these latter training procedure
was mediocre at the beginning, the accuracy steadily increased on
each of the subsequent lists. On the basis of their results, the
authors claim that some form of hypothesis testing and chunking of
adjacent items underpinned the transfer. For example, on lists
trained starting with the simultaneous presentation of three items,
the performance of the subjects dramatically improved when they
became able to identify the first two items (A and B). The authors
argue that this result supports the idea that the subjects chunked
the first two items and then responded to the item C by default.
The same phenomenon was observed in lists trained starting with
the simultaneous presentation of 4 items. In this latter case, the
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dramatic improvement appeared after the identification of the third
item C, so that the fourth item D, could now be responded to by
default.
These results support the idea that some changes occur in the
way in which the representation of the list is organized in the
course of task practice. They also indicate that the experience of
learning successive lists produces both the formation of abstract
templates of ordered items and the ability to assign items from novel
lists to particular ordinal positions.
Overall, serial learning studies show that, in order to report an
arbitrarious list of items, non-human subjects organize the items in
memory in more sophisticated ways than a simple associative chaining
theory would suggest. Moreover, there seem to be qualitative
differences between monkeys and pigeons in how the list is
represented. Therefore, these studies somehow confirm the idea that
when the competences involved go beyond the conditioning of a
single response and binary discrimination learning, new dimensions
can be discovered, along which the cognitive complexity of different
organisms and the functional value of different representational
devices can be compared.
However, serial learning studies appear to be more a reaction to
simplistic behaviouristic explanations of the behaviour of complex
organisms then an attempt to fully characterize their cognition. As a
matter of fact, the original rationale of Terrace and colleagues was
in line with the behaviouristic tradition. Their aim was to show that
apes' linguistic production could have been explained better in terms
of associative learning than as the product of grammatical
competence. Successive studies focused on the issue of whether
response chaining was to be considered the only mechanism
responsible for serial learning but the training techniques were still
a basic modification of the standard behaviouristic procedure to
teach chains of responses. The tension was mainly between the idea
that associative response chaining can explain all serial behaviours
of all organisms and the questioning of the ubiquity of such a
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mechanism. The results clearly showed the inadequacy of associative
chaining and some alternative mechanisms were proposed. However,
the possibility was never explored that within the class of non-
associative mechanisms a variety of different strategies might be
explored by different species according to their cognitive status or
that a shift of strategy might take place in function of the level of
expertise that a subject acquires in the course of task practice. In
this latter respect an attempt was made by Terrace and colleagues
with their successive list learning paradigm. The formation of a
general template for list learning in the course of practice was
tested but the process of formation of such a template and its
features were never fully characterized.
It can be conjectured that the reason for these restrictions of the
research program might lay in the nature of the paradigms used.
When the sequence of the items to be learnt is chosen on an
arbitrary basis and strict training procedures are employed, the
subject have few opportunities to show any ability to impose some
forms of organization upon the items to be reported. A different
scenario emerges from studies which focus on tasks featuring items
serially ordered on a non-arbitrary basis.
2.3 Non-arbitrary series and the role of cognitive regulation
As we have seen, the studies reviewed in the previous section
featured tasks where subjects were required to reproduce a
sequence of responses in the specific order established arbitrarily
by the experimenter. A different line of research focuses on the
problem of how the subjects organize series of items connected by
implicit and non-arbitrary relationships.
This line of enquiry can be traced back to the study of
discrimination learning. Every theory of learning must in some way
specify what the subjects learns, when trained to a particular
discrimination between a rewarded stimulus (S+) and an unrewarded
one (S-). In situations where the subject faces unconnected stimuli,
such as traditional discrimination tasks and Harlow's learning sets,
Chapter II 38
the problem is obviously reduced to the question of characterizing
the process by which the subject identifies the features constantly
present in S+ and absent in S- (Hilgard and Bower, 1971). These
are the relevant features of the discrimination for the very reason
that they are selected before-hand by the experimenter and (by
external intervention) correlated with the reward contingencies.
However, in situations where the stimuli to be discriminated are
related (arranged along an ordered continuum such as size,
brightness, weight, etc.) the interpretation of what is learned
becomes more ambiguous. Here, in fact, the subject is allowed a
certain degree of freedom. It can select, as relevant features for
the discrimination, either the absolute or the relative properties of
the stimuli. Therefore, appropriate paradigms become necessary to
detect the properties of the stimuli which control behaviour.
Typically, the paradigms developed to clarify this issue (e.g.
Koehler, 1918) use a post-training transfer test to identify the
process underpinning the original discrimination learning of the
training phase. For example, an animal can be presented with 2
blocks of lcrrv^ and 2cm^ volume respectively, and trained to select
the 2cm^. Then, in a transfer test the 2cm^ is paired with one of
(say) 3cm^, in absence of differential reinforcement. If the animal
selects the stimulus previous rewarded it can be conjectured that it
responded to the absolute properties of the stimuli. If, by contrast,
it selects the larger of the pair (the 3cm^) it is assumed that the
relational properties of the two stimuli assumed control over
behaviour.
Although widely employed (see Reese, 1968 for an extensive
review) this method featuring only one training and test episode has
strong limitations. In fact, different alternative explanations have
been proposed in respect to the properties of the stimulus which
gain control over behaviour even when subjects seem to choose on
the basis of the relational properties of the stimuli in the transfer
test (e.g. the classical theory of excitatory and inhibitory gradients
of generalization which can produce an apparent relational response
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on the basis of the processing of absolute properties of the stimuli;
Spence, 1942).
Moreover, as stressed by McGonigle and Jones (1978), even when
evidence for relational learning emerges from the results, another
question remains unanswered. This concerns the problem of whether
the processing of relational properties of stimuli should be
considered as based on systems which act upon primary forms of
encoding which are essentially absolute in their nature (and
therefore where the relational properties of a set of alternatives
play a minor role in the process of decision making) or whether, by
contrast:
"relational perception is itself a primary form of coding which makes
fewer processing demands on the perceiver" (McGonigle and Jones,
1978, p. 636).
To answer such a question McGonigle and Jones (1978) developed
a WGTA based paradigm featuring a long series training and testing
episodes for the comparison of relative and absolute stimulus
judgement by monkeys. In contrast with Harlow's learning set
procedures,1 the authors adopted tasks in which subjects who
responded to the relational properties of pairs of stimuli (such as
select always the larger or the brightest) could predict the correct
choice on the first trial of novel problems featuring binary choices
or triplets of alternatives.
A careful manipulation of different experimental conditions and
the comparisons of groups of monkeys with different training
histories allowed McGonigle and Jones (1978) to conclude that
the processing of relational properties has a primary role in
discrimination learning. Moreover, it was confirmed the hypothesis
that relational learning is less demanding for the memory system and
1 In which, as we have seen in Chapter I, transfer of learning is
measured on successive problems featuring novel and unrelated
stimuli and therefore the subject has to discover de novo the
appropriate discrimination, on the basis of the outcome of its first
choice in each novel problem.
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less affected by interference produced by additional stimuli and by
transformations of the context in which the task is presented (such
as different lighting conditions). It also allows to make transitive
choices to the largest of three stimuli following training to choose
the larger in a binary discrimination.
In summary, from the results of these experiments it can be
concluded that monkeys are not only able to process relational
properties of a set of stimuli, when connected in an non-arbitrary
way, but also that these forms of processing sure very basic, robust
and economic in respect to the management of cognitive resources.
These are the conclusions which can be drawn from tasks
featuring a limited space of alternatives such as binary or triadic
choices. However, these results suggest that, in the context of
serial learning studies (such as those reviewed in the previous
section), paradigms where the criterion for ordering is provided
merely by the temporal succession correlated with reward might
overlook fundamental properties of the mechanisms which control the
serial organization of behaviour. Now a series of studies, focused on
tasks with stronger serial components, which support this conclusion
will be introduced.
The experiments mentioned so feu: featured items connected by
relations which are explicitly presented and, therefore, directly
perceivable by the subject. A different paradigm focuses on
situations where a series of binary discriminations is connected by
the fact that each pair of discriminations shares a common term.
Here the relation between the items is not perceivable directly and
has to be constructed at a representational level by the subject.
A version suitable for comparative studies was used by McGonigle
and Chalmers (1977; 1992; Chalmers and McGonigle, 1984), in order
to investigate the basis of transitive reasoning within a series of 5
items connectable on "symbolic" basis. The authors compared the
role of logic as opposed to more parsimonious forms of behavioural
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control by means of an experimental procedure featuring a series of
connected binary discriminations.
In order to develop their paradigm, McGonigle and Chalmers
modified the conventional five term series task A>B>C>D>E
(originally designed for children by Bryant and Trabasso, 1971)^ so
that the same procedure and apparatus could be used with human
and non-human subjects.
McGonigle and Chalmer's task involved a training on couples of
"premises" A+ B-, B+ C-, C+ D-, D+ E- (where the sign plus
indicates reward and the sign minus nonreward), presented as
coloured containers. The training was followed by a testing phase
which featured the presentation of all the possible pairs obtained
from the five items A B C D E, in absence of any further
differential reinforcement. The authors aimed to assess whether from
such a training the monkeys formed an ordered representation of
the series A>B>C>D>E, which then would have led to
transitive choices in the pairs of non-adjacent items of the testing
phase. The subject showed a transitive bias in selecting the
appropriate item in the different couples of the testing phases,
2 The original task as designed by Bryant and Trabasso (1971)
involved a training phase where five rods, differing in length and
colour were presented in pairs (the premises A > B, B > C, C > D,
D > E). The rods protruded from a box, so that their actual length
could not be perceived. The children were required to use the
colour differences to make a choice (pointing to the selected item)
between different lengths. Following a choice, either the length of
the rods was shown or a verbal statement was given as feedback.
After this training phase, the subjects were tested on all the
possible binary combination of the five terms, without receiving any
further feedback after choice.
Children as young as 4 yrs old, showed a transitive bias in their
choices in the critical comparison B > D (the only non-adjacent items
equally referred as "longer" and shorter during training). This
finding was taken as a challenge to the Piagetian assumption that, it
is only when children (at about 7 yr old) acquire a relativist notion
of relations and manage to coordinate inverse relations around the
same term, that they are able to make transitive inferences. It
further allowed the conjecture that logic was possibly innate (see
Breslow, 1981 for an extensive review of early interpretations of
this finding).
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including the critical pair B > D (the only non-adjacent items
equally reinforced and non-reinforced during training).
The finding that monkeys, which are not well known for being
logically competent, were able to solve the five term series task,
pointed against the assumption that success in this task was
necessarily based on logical skills (as previously interpreted, see
footnote 2).
However, the key to assess unambiguously which sort of
mechanism supported the transitive choices of the monkeys came
from the liberalization of the binary restrictions of the task as
originally conceived. In fact, McGonigle and Chalmers (1977, 1986,
1992) devised a new version of the test trials by extending the
decision space. Once the subjects were proficient with the binary
testing, they were presented on a triadic version of the test trials.
The triads were obtained by combining the items of the original
sequence in order to obtain test trials in the form, for example, of
B > C > D. The rationale was that if the subjects solved the binary
version of the task by means of a coordination of each of the pairs
of non-adjacent items around a mental representation the absent
middle term, as a logidst explanation of transitivity such as that
proposed by Inhelder and Piaget (1964) would postulate, then the
explicit presentation of this middle item should facilitate transitive
inferences.
The results clearly showed the inadequacies of a logicist
explanation of the success of the monkeys. In fact, a dramatic
decrement in the transitivity of the choices in the triadic testing
was observed. This originally led McGonigle and Chalmers to
elaborate a stochastic sampling model (see McGonigle and Chalmers
1977 for an accurate description of the model) which allowed to
predict the performance of the monkeys on both pairs and triads.
That this sort of mechanism was not species specific was indicated
by the fact that Chalmers and McGonigle (1984) obtained the same
results in a successive study conducted on children.
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These are choice based assessments of the mechanisms underlying
transitive reasoning. However, other measures supporting the
triadic based interpretation come from assays based on decision time
analyses of the behaviour of the subjects. These analyses focus on
a well known phenomenon found in reaction times of human subjects
when faced with tests of ordering skills: the Symbolic Distance
Effect (SDE).
In the context of the five term series task, this effect has been
reported for children by Trabasso, Riley and Wilson (1975) . ^
Subjects trained to criterion on items ordered along a linear
dimension, such as their size (for example a series ABCDE where A
is the smaller and E is the bigger), in the testing phase show a
negative correlation between reaction times and the ordinal distance
of the items in the series (e.g. the BC comparison takes longer
than the BD comparison). In other words, the time required to
perform transitive choices is shorter than the time needed to
retrieve the premises taught during the training phase. Therefore,
the SDE (when observed) runs against explanations which postulate
that logical deductions are performed on-line at the time of testing.
In fact, if the subjects memorised the premises independently and
then retrieved and coordinated them during the testing phase, one
should expect the reaction times to be shorter for the premises and
in general to be correlated with the number of transitive inferences
needed by the different comparisons (Breslow, 1981).
3 The Symbolic Distance Effect has also been evidenced in studies
on humans, carried out within the so called mental psychophysics
paradigm. In these studies the subjects are required to compare
mentally the dimension of well known objects or animals. For
example, in a typical experiment, a subject might be required to
answer the question: "what is bigger a cat or a whale ?". On the
basis of the response time, the underlying representations of the
subject and the processes used to compare the different
representations is derived. Since the earliest studies (Moyer, 1973;
Paivio, 1975), it has repeatedly been found that the response time
of adult humans varies inversely with the distance between the
referents of the dimension being judged. So that, for example the
comparison of a cat with a cow takes longer than one involving a fly
and an elephant.
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As we have seen, the results obtained by McGonigle and
Chalmers (1977; Chalmers and McGonigle, 1984) from triadic testing
already undermined the coordination hypothesis. However, since
these studies did not incorporate an assay of decision times, the
status of the SDE and the psychological mechanism that produces it
remained to be explained. In fact, there remained the possibility
that different psychological mechanisms were in operation when the
phenomenon had been observed in other studies.
When observed by Trabasso and colleagues (Trabasso and al.,
1975) the SDE was considered as evidence for the presence of a
linear spatial representation of the set of items, which is scanned to
find the response to a comparison. The further apart the items are
along this spatial continuum, the easier it would be to discriminate
them and to find a solution to the comparison. Although this
hypothesis implies that no inferences are made at the time of
testing, Trabasso and colleagues (Trabasso et al., 1975) argued
that subjects use transitive inferences during the training phase in
order to construct the linear order.^
For a definitive clarification of the issue, a study designed to
integrate all the information provided by the presence of the SDE,
an assay of the decision times shown in the binary testing and an
evaluation of the performance shown by the subjects in the course
of triadic testing was necessary. Such a study has recently been
conducted by McGonigle and Chalmers (1992) using squirrel
monkeys.^ This study of 1992, was in part a replication of the 1977
study, but it incorporated an evaluation of decision times.
Furthermore, the study featured an extensive presentation of the
4 Moreover, according to these authors there is a bidirectional
principle in the way the premises are learned and integrated in the
linear representation during the training phase. Subjects would
learn the premises in a "ends-inwards" fashion. Initially they would
learn the response to the premises involving the end terms of the
series (i.e. AB and DE), and successively those of intermediate
position (i.e. BC and CD) (Trabasso et al., 1975).
5 A set of experiments conducted on the SDE in monkey subjects,
which although developed in a different context have interesting
implications for the themes presented in this chapter are reviewed in
appendix A.
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triadic testing, in order to evaluate possible changes in performance
with practice, although in absence of further selective
reinforcement. Some control procedures (in the form of pseudo-
triadic tests such as BCC) were also incorporated to ensure that the
presentation of three items per se was not the main factor
responsible for the performance decrement found between binary and
triadic testing of the 1977 study.
Evidence for a Symbolic Distance Effect (SDE), was found for
both group and individual subjects and, on the basis of an accurate
analysis of the performance and its time correlates in the triadic
testing phase, McGonigle and Chalmers were able to reinterpret the
meaning of the SDE. The triadic testing, in fact, not only allowed
to test a coordination hypothesis in order to explain the competences
of the subjects, but also hypotheses based on a linear
representation of the five term series. If the SDE is expression of
the mental ordering of the set of items A>B>C>D>E, one can
expect that subjects who showed the effect in their reaction times
should be able to rank the items presented explicitly in a triad such
as B > C > D.
As for the 1977 study, decrement in performance was observed at
the beginning of the triadic testing, as compared with the level of
performance achieved on the binary testing. This result suggests
that it is unlikely that the performance of the subjects was either
based on the coordination of non-adjacent items around the middle
term or that a perfect linear representation of the set of items was
formed during the binary testing.
From a further assay of the reaction times showed in the binary
testing McGonigle and Chalmers (1992) obtained data which
supported a novel interpretation of the SDE, not necessarily based
on linear ordering. In fact, these author showed that, if plotted as
a function of the end points and not of the distance of the items
(i.e. AB, AC and AD vs. DE, CE, and BE), the reaction times
formed two population of scores, one fast (for the pairs including
the term A) and one slow (for the pairs including the term E).
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Thus, the SDE observed in the binary testing can be explained by
the fact that, as the distance of the separation between two items
increases, the more likely it is that the two items belong to the two
different populations of fast and slow responses. The results of this
analysis thus supported an interpretation, as that provided for the
1977 study, where processes more parsimonious than linear ordering
were proposed in order to explain the transitive choices in the
binary testing.
However, an analysis of the errors observed during the triadic
testing showed that the selection of incorrect items was not
performed at random. Each subject showed a bias in neglecting some
particular items of the set and some preferences for other items.
Thus, also the stochastic model originally proposed by McGonigle
and Chalmers (1977) seemed unsatisfactory in the light of these
latter results. This led the authors to develop an alternative
explanation based on an ordered set of conditional rules, such as if
1) E is present select it, 2) if A is present avoid it and so on. The
model has also been implemented as a computer simulation based on
production rules and seem to fit both group and individual data (for
an accurate description of this model see Harris 1988; Harris and
McGonigle, 1994).
Since it had already clearly emerged that task practice was a
factor of primary importance for an accurate evaluation of the
competences of the subjects, McGonigle and Chalmers (1992,
experiment 3) presented the subjects with an extended phase of
triadic testing without supervised learning procedures. A significant
improvement of performance was observed under these conditions. In
order to explain such a dramatic change in absence of explicit
feedback, the authors proposed that the search for a solution which
was applicable to any of the triads could have been an incentive per
se. In other words, the subjects were self-regulating their
behaviour in order to find a solution to the task which for the
memory system was more economic than storing an ad hoc solution
for each of the triads. In fact, on a set based rank, a response to
only three items (C, D and E) has to be encoded in order to solve
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at a relatively high level of accuracy all the ten triads; every
deviation from this strategy would just increase the number of rules
to be remembered.
Furthermore, after having assessed that the monkeys were able
to self-regulate their behaviour up to a given level of efficiency,
McGonigle and Chalmers (1992, experiment 4) trained some of the
monkeys on the triads, this time providing explicit feedback in the
form of selective reinforcement of transitive choices. The percentage
of errors of the monkeys was further reduced, falling to 15.6% in
average, compared with the 36% registered in experiment 3, where
triads were presented without differential feedback. In this way, it
was possible to demonstrate that a perfectly transitive ranking over
3 simultaneously presented items was not beyond the cognitive
competences of the monkeys. On the contrary, given enough
feedback and task practice they became fully competent on the five
term series problem, even presented in its triadic form. Moreover,
only when they reached such a level of expertise on the task, the
response times to the items C D E started to show a clear linear
profile, with the fastest responses registered for the "biggest" item
and the slowest for the "smallest" of the three (only reaction times
for these three items were reported in the study, according to the
hypothesis that learning the correct choice to a subset of the five
items would have been sufficient to perform correctly all triads).
The fact that monkeys eventually showed a fully principled
transitive behaviour after having practiced the task, as a product
of self-regulation or further feedback, seems to show that only
when the subject become expert with the task, they were able to
change from a strategy effective only in the binary testing to one
which was based on a some form of ranking and thus fully
compatible with all the versions of the task.
Overall from this extensive study it was possible to conclude,
first of all that the SDE had been over-interpreted as expression of
the presence of scanning processes which operate on an ordered
linear representation of a series; and, secondly, that from binary
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versions of transitivity tests it is much more difficult to infer
principled forms of control of sequences of responses. By contrast
tasks requiring the organization of multiple items presented
simultaneously seem to be much better proof of the ordering abilities
of the subjects.
These studies are an example of how a strategic use of monkey
subjects in cognitive research can shed some light on controversial
issues regarding human cognition. It allows us to evaluate whether
the role of language has to be taken as essential in tasks
traditionally considered as tapping on logical skills, and to assay
the effects of protracted periods of testing, often prevented by the
use of young children as subjects.
In summary, the paradigms developed in the context of the
studies on transitivity provided the basis for interspecies
comparisons in tasks where the subjects had the opportunity to
detect the intrinsic "orderability" of a set of 5 items. From the
results it was clear that monkeys (and young children) rank the
set, that they do so quite spontaneously and by means of
mechanisms more basic than logical skills. However, it was also
apparent that situations where the size of the set is expanded and
where items are presented simultaneously represent the best test of
the status, the possible function, and the limitations of the ordering
abilities of the subjects. The expansion of the decision space has in
fact a twofold rationale. On the one hand, it provides a transparent
window on the competences underpining the performances of the
subjects. On the other hand, the problem of facing a large decision
space might represent an incentive for the subject to deploy more
sophisticated strategies in order to cope with the increased demands
of the task.
These considerations led McGonigle and Chalmers to develop a
research program aimed at the evaluation of the competences
necessary to solve explicit size seriation tasks of sets of multiple
connected items presented simultaneously (McGonigle and Chalmers,
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1986; McGonigle, 1987; McGonigle and Chalmers, 1992; Chalmers and
McGonigle, 1993).
In fact, seriation tasks usually involve the presentation of a set
of objects of different sizes and a child has to reproduce a model
presented by the tester, which features the items in a linear
monotonic series from smallest to biggest. Since early Piagetian
studies (see Inhelder and Piaget 1964), it has been shown that the
ability to solve seriation tasks is one of the most robust indicators
of cognitive growth. However, as originally conceived, seriation
tasks do not allow an unambiguous characterization of the nature
and the ontogenesis of the competences required for their solution.
Traditionally, seriation has been considered (as for the ability to
perform transitive inferences) as requiring logical competences such
as the understanding that an item can be the biggest of one class
(the pool of the items not yet selected) and at the same time the
smallest of another (the set of items already lined up in a
descending monotonic series).
By contrast, McGonigle (1987) proposed the hypothesis that even
logically competent subjects might solve seriation tasks using a
combination of strategies (which do not necessarily require a high
level of relational and ordinal competence). At the same time,
failures might be accounted for by difficulties in only some sub¬
components of the task, such as the ability to organize sequences of
responses or the ability to compute the ordinal status of each item.
Moreover, the original piagetian version of the task is very
difficult to implement in a comparative context. For example, it
would be very difficult to attract the attention of a monkey on an
ordered construction of three-dimensional objects, and (for
ergonomic constraints) to train it to select and align a set of objects
scattered on a table in front of a cage. In this situation it would be
very difficult to attribute possible failures to pure cognitive
limitations as opposed to spurious factors deriving from motor
constraints or the level of general activity of the subject.
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Thus, McGonigle developed new paradigms aimed at the
decomposition of seriation tasks by means of training procedures
(McGonigle 1987, 1989) and suitable to be implemented with non-
human subjects. One study (McGonigle and Chalmers, 1986;
McGonigle, 1987) conducted on squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus)
was WGTA based. The animals were presented with sets of objects
ordered by size and on the basis of the colour of the set had to
learn to choose one belonging to a particular ordinal position (e.g.
if the objects are black choose the biggest, if they are white choose
the smallest, and so on). In this task monkeys reached an almost
perfect performance (McGonigle and Chalmers, 1986).
Although informative regarding the ability of the monkeys to
process ordinal information, this task was however based on a single
response per trial, albeit performed within a relatively large set of
ordered items. These sorts of tasks are not informative respect to
the mechanisms which underpin a serial production within similar
contexts. However, for the reasons outlined above, in order to
present seriation tasks to monkey subjects new technologies such as
touch sensitive computer monitors, which do not require the careful
manipulation of three-dimensional objects, were required.
Therefore, an extensive project aimed to the investigation and
the decomposition of seriation skills in human and non-human
subjects was implemented as a set of experiments featuring the
presentation of icons on touch sensitive computer monitors
(McGonigle, 1987, 1989; Chalmers and McGonigle, 1993). A schema
of the different paradigms used by McGonigle and Chalmers in their
studies on seriation is provided in Fig. 2.1.
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Fig 2.1. Schema of tasks employed for the decomposition of
seriation skills by McGonigle and Chalmers. See text for
explanation.
Children, ranging from 5 to 7 years old, were required to select
one after the other icons of different sizes and received feedback
for success or failure. By means of this paradigm (see McGonigle
and Neapolitan, 1993; Chalmers and McGonigle, 1993) it proved
possible to compare different forms of seriation, such as monotonic
(e.g. from smallest to biggest) and non-monotonic (e.g. second
biggest, smallest, third biggest, biggest, forth biggest) series.
Moreover, two forms of seriation were also compared with serial
learning, presenting the subjects with a set of icons of the same
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size but different colours to be touched in an arbitrary order, as in
the experiments quoted in the previous section.
Even 5 year olds were able to seriate with this training
procedure. However, the form of seriation proved to be an
important predictor of success. In fact, 5 year olds were able to
learn to seriate only monotonic sets of items. By contrast, non
monotonlc series proved difficult even for 7 year olds. For the 7
year old children, the speed of learning on the monotonic series was
also higher than on the serial learning of arbitrarious sequences.
This finding was interpreted by McGonigle and Chalmers as
suggesting that subjects were able to seriate by noticing the value
of the size interval between adjacent items of the series, and
thereafter selecting in turn the correct Items by reiterating the
same response to this size interval. The deployment of such a
strategy was impossible in non-monotonic series where the size
interval between adjacent items changed for each response.
This interpretation was also corroborated by the results obtained
from another condition of the experiment (Chalmers and McGonigle
1993), specifically aimed to the evaluation of the role played in
seriation by ordinal competences alone. The paradigm was based on
a matching to sample task. Two sets of icons, the samples and the
targets, were simultaneously presented on a touch screen. The size
of the icons varied both within each set and between the two sets.
The sample icon blinked (e.g. the third biggest in the sample set)
and the subjects had to select the one which held the same ordinal
position within the icons belonging to the target set (e.g. the third
biggest of the target set). As compared to the seriation tasks
described above, this ordinal task proved to be the most difficult
for all the subjects. In sharp contrast with accounts of seriation
based on high level ordinal competences, thus, there was evidence
for the fact that subjects who failed in ordinal tasks were
nevertheless able to reproduce a highly constrained series such as
the monotonic one.
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On the basis of these results, Chalmers and McGonigle (1993)
proposed that seriation is to be considered as a search task, where
the subjects try to detect forms of constraints afforded by the
configuration of items, in order to produce long sequences of
responses, without overloading the memory system. In fact,
whereas, in learning a long series of arbitrarious responses (such
as the non-monotonic size seriation or an arbitrary sequence of
colours) the subject needs to rely on its brute memory alone, with a
monotonic series (once its implicit redundancy has been detected)
the reiteration of an identical response to size interval reduces
almost to nothing the amount of memory resources required by the
task.
This argument led McGonigle (1987) to develop a research
program aimed at assessing presence of a tendency towards economy
in human and non-human primates faced with different situations
where the subject was given the opportunity to deploy data
reduction strategies to simplify tasks otherwise demanding for the
cognitive resources of the organism. This program would have
featured the presentation of both seriation tasks (like those
administered to the children in McGonigle and Chalmers experiments)
to monkey subjects and classification tasks to monkeys and children
to assess whether they would have exploited strategically and
spontaneously the categorical affordability of a set of icons to be
memorised. The implementation of the program started with the
administration of seriation tasks to the squirrel monkeys used for
previous experiments on transitivity. However, the ageing subjects
died one after the other before the project could be completed. This
thesis represents the first test opportunities for viable monkeys
within the program.
2.4 Conclusions
Overall, a critical look at the literature on serial aspects of
behaviour seems to indicate that the use of paradigms featuring
multiple connected items represent the best policy for programs
which are aimed at the characterization of the cognitive potential of
primates.
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First of all, it seems that when serial learning is considered on
the basis of sequences arbitrarily defined by the experimenter, the
subject is left with only few strategical possibilities to organize its
behaviour in ways which are fitted to the task. These take the form
of chunking the lists to be recapitulated on the basis of either
temporal contiguity, or the belonging of the items to different
classes. Moreover, there is some evidence for some forms of
transfer, based on the formation of "empty" templates for a list,
which can be then filled up by the particular list at hand. However,
these studies failed to provide a characterization of these templates.
On the contrary, studies which have used structured material to
be organized in sequences have produced results which allow some
richer interpretations of the processes which underlie the
performance of the subjects.
In the context of binary discrimination learning, careful studies
have demonstrated that the processing of relational as opposed to
absolute properties of the stimuli is a more basic, robust and
economic mechanism. Therefore, it can be assumed that paradigms
featuring unconnected items force the subject to rely on more
demanding and less effective processes and obscure important
cognitive potentialities of the organism under examination. However
this observation needs further verification in contexts featuring an
expanded set of stimuli.
The studies on transitivity, using paradigms series of connected
binary discriminations, show that when a set of five items has an
intrinsic ordered structure the subjects are able to detect it and
organize the items accordingly as expressed by their transitive
behaviour.
However, the mechanisms on which this ordering is based became
evident only when the paradigm shifted from the binary to the
triadic context. Here, strong evidence was provided for the fact
that logical competences are not required for transitive reasoning.
Chapter II 55
By contrast, it seems that some forms of rational decision making,
based on the ranking of rules of selection to a sub-set of the items
of the ordered series, allow a satisfactory solution to the task.
Interestingly, furthermore, such organization of behaviour, seems to
emerge quite spontaneously, when the subject is given enough task
practice, as a strategy aimed to reduce the amount of memory
resources required to solve the task.
This strongly suggested the need for the use of experimental
situations where the subject is faced with large sets of rankable
items presented simultaneously. In fact, whereas the serial
behaviour of the subjects becomes more easily interpretable when
the structure of the set is presented explicitly, the enlargement of
the set of stimuli might have provided an incentive for organization
and, at the same time, enabled the evaluation of the length of the
(non-arbitrary) series that subjects are able to cope with.
The studies of seriation helped the clarification of these issues
that would have been difficult in the context of the transitivity
paradigms. The use of new touch screen based procedures made it
possible to set the basis for a comparative study of seriation and
enabled the implementation of a set of tasks aimed to the
decomposition of seriation skills.
The results showed that, when items embedded in a non-arbitrary
series (of up to 7 items) have to be selected in succession, subjects
benefit from constraints which the situation affords by means of the
deployment of strategies which allow the reiterative use of a single
response (again, economizing the amount of cognitive resources
otherwise required by the task).
On the basis of these results, following McGonigle and Chalmers
(1986), it can be hypothesized that there is a tendency towards
economy at the basis of cognitive growth. This argument can be
applied either ontogenitically and phylogenetically, so that, for
example an older child or a more complex species, might be
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competent on tasks failed by younger children or lesser organisms,
because, by strategic means, they manage to make it easier.
2.5 The economy/data-reduction hypothesis and the development of
the experimental program presented in this thesis
The economy/data-reduction theory proposed by McGonigle and
Chalmers can be characterized in greater detail as follows. First of
all, a distinction must be made between different cost functions
which can be applied to the solution of a serial problem.
One source of costs is provided by the environment itself. In the
first instance, fitness to the task is required. The fitness of goal
oriented behaviour can be considered the achievement of the goal
itself. Then, within the success space, a dynamic regulatory
function is provided by the external costs of different solutions.
The economy of a particular solution can be evaluated in terms of
the number of moves performed to reach the goal state. If one
assumes that each move requires a constant amount of time to be
performed, then every redundant move adds time costs to the
achievement of the goal.
On the other hand, a further regulatory function is provided by
the internal management of cognitive resources. A subject starts to
select those strategies which sustain behavioural fitness without
putting his cognitive system in danger of overloading. It is in this
way that the serial organization of behaviour can be characterized
as a search problem. In a situation where the subject is faced with
the problem of choosing successive moves in order to achieve a
goal, it will start to seek for those constraints afforded by the
situation at hand which allow to decide which move to do next
investing a minimum of cognitive resources. A factor of major
importance in this respect is that the serial problem should be one
which really challenges the cognitive system of the subject. For
example the length itself of the serial production must be long
enough to represent an incentive for the subject to deploy data
reducing strategies.
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An experimental program aimed to evaluate such issues should,
thus, be characterised by the use of tasks which allow multiple
solutions. Moreover, these solutions should be of a kind that allows
a measurement of their respective economy defined in terms of the
relative amount of external cost that each of them requires. Finally,
it should be available to the subject a rich set of strategic
possibilities to chose from, and they should be transparent enough
to allow an interpretation of their economy, this time defined in
terms of internal costs of cognitive management.
Obviously, to implement such a project a major paradigm shift is
required with respect to the traditional tasks employed by
comparative psychologists. Tasks based on binary choices fail to
provide the dynamic spectrum of different strategical solution and
their possible changes over time as a function of gaining task
expertise. Serial learning tasks, seem inadequate too. The rigid
training imposed on the subject does not leave enough freedom to
evaluate the spontaneous interplay of different regulatory functions.
The arbitrariness of the sequences, moreover, does not offer
enough constraints for the subjects to impose some form of
organization on their serial production.
Therefore, McGonigle (1987) proposed a series of tasks which
would have allowed the subjects to express spontaneously strategic
factors (such as classification and seriation along different linear
dimensions) allowing a better management of the amount of data to
be retained to solve the task. However, the part of the project that
should have focused on non-human primates had to be suspended
because of the mortality of the sample.
This thesis is a natural development of the project. In fact, at
the time when the work for the present study was planned, a new
colony of capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) had just been established
at the Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience of the University of
Edinburgh. The study is an attempt to devise and implement new
paradigms which provide a richer set of dimensions (such as
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spontaneous regulation and deployment of strategic factors) on
which different organisms can eventually be compared.
The prototypical set of tasks employed here is based on an
exhaustive search within a set of icons presented on touch sensitive
computer monitors.
The first versions of the task feature the presentation of sets of
identical icons which can be individually identified on the basis of
their spatial location on the screen (see Chapter IV). Then, richer
sets of organizational possibilities are offered to the subjects with
the presentation of sets of icons which can be divided in different
categories on the basis of distinctive features such as shape and
colour (see Chapters V and VI).
The paradigm, in all its different versions, offers the subjects
the opportunity to develop strategic search modes based on the
constraints (either spatial or non-spatial) afforded by the search
space. For the high degree of spontaneity accorded to the subject
and for the rich set of organizational possibilities afforded by the
sequences to be produced, the new paradigms differ radically from
traditional serial learning tasks. Nevertheless, they share with them
a strong serial component and the fact that multiple responses have
to be produced (in contrast with tasks based on binary choices).
The main focus is on non-human primates. However, whenever
analogous data on different species were collected or available from
different studies, these have been described and discussed.
Despite the fact that the research project featured here, as we
have seen, requires specific tests for its investigation (and
therefore the development of the paradigm outlined above), a
practical problem had to be solved before the core sets of
experiments could be conducted. This problem rested in the fact
that the experimental subjects at my disposal were wild born, and
as such still completely naive in respect to any experimental
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environment and without any previous extended contact with
humans.
Therefore one of the first objectives of this study was to
familiarize the subjects with the testing environment and the tester.
For this scope it seemed necessary to endure a transitional phase,
offering more opportunities for the subjects and the tester to
interact than touch screen based procedures would have allowed.
This transitional phase will be described in the next chapter. It was
implemented as a set of experiments based on the modified version
of the WGTA as described by McGonigle and Chalmers (1977, 1992).
The reason underlying the selection of the apparatus and the
experiments will be presented in detail in Chapter III. The reader
howevei should bear in mind that those expeximeriLS represent only
a first step towards the implementation of the rest of the research
program and are somehow detached from the major issues on which
this thesis focuses. Therefore the next chapter should be taken as
a long, albeit necessary, parenthesis in the flow of the arguments
presented in this study.
60
CHAPTER XXX
THE FAMILIARISATION OF THE MONKEYS
3.1 A WGTA based search task
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the first necessary step
towards the implementation of the present research project was to
familiarize wild born capuchin monkeys with the testing environment
and the tester himself.
In fact, the monkeys had just completed their period of
quarantine and a new colony had been established at the Laboratory
of Cognitive Neuroscience of the University of Edinburgh. In order
to provide an optimal social environment these monkeys were kept
together in a large indoor cage. Therefore, in order to test them
separately, it was necessary to establish a daily routine where each
monkey spontaneously entered an individual testing cage. Obviously,
a precondition to this was that the monkeys had a good relationship
with the tester and were faced with testing situations which they
were comfortable with.
An appropriate context with which to start seemed that of search
tasks where the retrieval of a hidden object within a set of three-
dimensional occluders was required. The decision to begin with
these particular tasks was chiefly motivated by practical needs.
These practical aspects rested in the necessity to find a
straightforward experimental set up. A suitable apparatus was
identified in a modified version of WGTA (McGonigle and Chalmers,
1977; 1993) which allows the presentation of arrays of up to five
items. The readiness to adapt to the WGTA is well documented for
monkeys in general (Harlow, 1949; Warren, 1965; McGonigle and
Chalmers, 1977; 1993) and capuchins in particular (De Lillo and
Visalberghi, 1994). Moreover, considering the spontaneous tendency
of capuchin monkeys to manipulate objects (Visalberghi, 1990), the
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use of an apparatus that requires the displacement of three-
dimensional objects seemed particularly fitting for this species.
Finally, putting the subjects directly in front of the tester, the
WGTA is appropriate for socially familiarizing the monkeys with the
tester. In fact, Harlow (1949) enthusiastically described how
macaques implicitly develop "social learning sets" during repeated
experience with different testers at the WGTA.
Moreover, with the sort of experiments presented in this chapter
it seemed possible to overcome some of the difficulties which WGTA
based tasks have traditionally encountered. As emerged from the
review of Harlow's WGTA studies on learning-set presented in
chapter I, the main limitations of WGTA based procedures can be
identified in 1) the fact that correct responses were arbitrarily
defined by the experimenter and therefore the subjects are forced
to rely on inductive processes in order to find the solution to the
task; and 2) the binary nature of the tasks which prevented an
evaluation of forms of control appropriate to deal with more realistic
situations featuring a multiple choice problem space.
Search tasks where an object is hidden within a set of multiple
occluders in presence of the subject allow on the one hand to
liberalize the binary discrimination context of traditional learning set
studies. On the other hand, since the relevant information (the
hiding procedure observed by the subject) about the location of the
object to be retrieved is provided from the outset, the subject does
not necessarily have to rely on blind trial and error learning in
order to solve the task (see e.g. Spence, 1951 for a distinction
between trial and error and "insightful" learning processes). This
allows an evaluation of whether subjects show any tendency to
search strategically, on the basis of the constraints afforded by the
search space and/or of relevant information at their disposal.
Therefore, these first experiments, although somehow detached
from the main theme of the rest of the thesis, allowed nevertheless
the introduction of the subjects to situations encouraging the
spontaneous deployment of strategic modes of search in contrast
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with tasks featuring a predominant role of selective reinforcement
over blind trial and error learning procedures.
Search tasks of different types have a long history of exploration
in research on both human and non-human species. Perhaps the
oldest form is the delayed-response task pioneered by Hunter
(1914), elaborated later with primates by Yerkes (1929), and
culminating in the well known versions introduced by Piaget (1955)
as "object permanence" tasks. A common feature of these tests is
the role they give the tester who first acts to capture the subject's
attention by presenting an attractive object, such as a toy, or a
piece of preferred food, before hiding it within containers or behind
occluding screens which remain at all times within the test field.
Either immediately afterwards, or following a delay, the subject is
given an opportunity to seek hidden items. Persistence of search in
the absence of direct perceptual information is the first indication of
object memory or event permanence. However, beyond search
orientated behaviour per se, the use of strategies may indicate a
great deal about the subject's ability to constrain search to the
relevant occluder alone, or, in the case of direct information
concerning the precise location of the bait, to infer from its absence
the most likely locations which remain to be explored.
Thus, infants in an object permanence task may search the first
occluder visited by the experimenter, even though the item sought
has been quite explicitly removed and placed in an alternative site
by the experimenter, in full view of the subject (Bower, 1974;
Diamond, 1985). In tasks, furthermore, where the act of hiding
could not be perceived directly, but could be inferred only from the
sequence of events in each task, Haake and Somerville (1985) found
a strong developmental trend from 9 month to 18 month old infants
in the way they co-ordinated temporal and spatial information.
As these authors point out, the sequential nature of the hiding
procedures required children: "to attend to, remember and use
information about the presence and absence of the object in the
context of movements among potential hiding locations. In order to
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search logically, events occurring at different times and places in
the displacement sequences had to be linked together to determine
exactly where the object had been hidden" (p. 185). Under these
conditions, only the oldest children in the sample showed some
response consistency searching, for example, the last place the
target object was seen, following a discovery that it was now
"missing".
Tests of "pure" cognitive competences are rare, if they exist at
all, however, as in so many other such cases, the task used - or
the conditions under which it is introduced - may itself be a factor
in determining whether subjects will deploy exhaustive and relatively
inefficient strategies or opt instead for controlled, efficient search.
Certainly, Wellman, Somerville and Haake (1979) found considerable
task-induced differences in strategies (which themselves change with
age) of children aged from 2 to 6 years. Given doors in a cupboard
to search versus areas of a playground, for example, children's
responses indicated that "searches were more systematic and
comprehensive in the cupboards than on the playground" (p. 541).
The authors account for this difference by suggesting that
searching "logically" makes greater demands on limited cognitive
resources than other strategies, and that certain environments may
be easy to search completely, as their cupboard task indicates. This
factor has been given further emphasis by the findings of Somerville
and Capuani-Shumaker (1984). Their study, which forms the basis
of the investigation reported in this chapter found that children
from 3-5 years of age were able under some circumstances at least,
to constrain search on the basis of watching a tester hide or find
an object within a small test field containing 4 occluders. Somerville
and Capuani-Shumaker suggest, in fact, that making the children
pay particular attention to the task (affording, as it does, a low
cost solution even if the subject searches randomly), is a crucial
factor in the subjects' success.
Whatever the role of the various factors involved, it is surely
clear that the tasks described are of interest to the comparative
psychologist, designed as they are both to evaluate the role of
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observer based and self-directed (discovery based) inference, in
promoting search economy in a situation not unlike a foraging task
(see McGonigle and Chalmers, 1992). Watching a conspecific visiting
putative food sites, for example, may materially reduce the costs of
search by an observer otherwise left to its own devices. Left to its
own devices, on the other hand, the way an agent searches may
also have a profound impact on the effort it expends when achieving
its goal. Executing search in a random and unprincipled way, for
example, could lead to costly reiterations, especially if the search
space and the actual space to be searched is large (see Olton,
1982).
In summary, there would appear to be 3 main aspects to the
search problem as described. The first is concerned with the extent
to which an agent can improve efficiency of exploration when
observing the behaviour of others. The second is concerned with
the sorts of strategies which an agent, working on its own, will
devise to keep search as efficient as possible. Common to both, are
the cost functions which the agent must calculate in deciding if it is
worth the effort of devising a strategy designed to make search
efficient i.e. the "cost" of inference must be offset by the benefits
of search economy.
Apart from their value as a way of familiarising the monkeys with
the testing environment, the experiments reported in this chapter,
aimed to determine whether socially transmitted search constraints
are exploited by a non-human primate (Cebus apella). In the light
of the somewhat conflicting evidence from the developmental studies
just cited, however - attributed, at least in part to the specific
verbal instructions and pre-task procedures adopted in the
Somerville and Capuani-Shumaker study (1984) - it was decided to
first test some children of ages similar to those used in the Wellman
et al. (1979) and Somerville & Capuani-Shumaker (1984)
investigations. In doing so the tasks were modified as necessary,
making them as similar as possible to those designed for the Cebus
apella - who could not benefit, of course, from linguistically based
instruction. In this way, it was hoped to establish a robust template
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of performance in young children (when amalgamated in the research





The subjects were 9 children (5 boys and 4 girls) with a median age
of 4 years and 11 months and a range of 4 years and 8 months to 5
years. All children attended the nursery of the Department of
Psychology of the University of Edinburgh.
Apparatus
The testing apparatus was a specially modified WGTA, designed to
enable the simultaneous presentation of a maximum of 5 stimuli
(McGonigle & Chalmers, 1992). For the test described here, four
white plastic cups were presented in line across a 18 x 50 cm tray.
The objects to be hidden were a red and a blue rubber eraser
which could be enclosed in the tester's hand and placed silently
under a given cup, without giving any clues that it had been
secreted there.
Design
The experiment comprised two tasks, i.e a Hiding Task and a
Finding Task. Each task involved an Absent Condition and a
Present Condition.
The presentation of each task was preceded by warm-up trials of
two kinds (dubbed Type 1 warm-up trials and Type 2 warm-up
trials). There were 4 different types of warm-up trials i.e. a Type
1 and a Type 2, for the Hiding Task; and a Type 1 and a Type 2
for the Finding Task.
Each subject was presented with both the tasks. Five subjects,
selected at random (three boys and two girls), were presented first
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with the Hiding Task and the remaining four (two boys and two
girls) were presented first with the Finding Task.
Procedure
General procedure. Before each daily session, each child was taken
from the departmental nursery to an adjacent testing room. The
child sat in front of the tester, in the full view of the cups, unless
occluded by a screen. Each session lasted approximately 12 minutes.
A camera positioned in front of the subject recorded his\her
behaviour while looking at the hiding\finding procedure as well as
while responding.
Task specific procedures. A schema of the procedure followed in the
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Fig 3.1 Schema of the conditions featured in the Hiding and the
Finding Task. OP (Object Present) indicates that the object is
shown to be present in the tester's hand at that point of the
sequence of displacements. OA (Object Absent) indicates that the
tester's hand is shown to be empty at that point of the sequence
of displacements. Arrows indicate the direction of travel of
tester's hand. Asterisks indicate the possible location of the
objects after the completion of the Hiding\Finding procedure.
1) HIDING TASK
Instructions. At the beginning of each test session, each child was
told that the object was going to be hidden under a cup and that
their task was to find it by lifting the cups.
Each daily session comprised the following trials,
a) Object-Present Condition. Eight experimental trials were
administered in which the object was shown in a open hand at one
end of the cups array, the hand was then closed and moved under
all the four cups in succession before being opened after the fourth
cup to show that the object was now absent. Between the second
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and the 3rd cup the hand was opened, to show that the object was
still in transit.
b) Object-Absent Condition. Eight experimental trials were
administered. These were identical to those of the Object-Present
Condition, except for the fact that, when the hand was opened
between the 2nd and 3rd cup, it was shown to be empty.
Half of the sequences in both conditions were left-to-right, half
right-to-left. The four experimental trials comprised one of each of
the four different sequences generated by combining the two
directions of travel with the two intermediate events. The order of
presentation of the four trials was selected at random for each daily
session.
2) FINDING TASK
Instructions. The verbal instruction given to the children at the
beginning of each daily session was: "here are two objects which
always hide together under the same cup; I will find one of them
and you must find the other one".
For each trial, a cardboard screen was interposed between tester
and subject and the objects (now two, a red and a blue eraser)
were hidden under one of the cups, out of the sight of the subject.
Each daily session comprised the following trials.
Eight experimental trials analogous to those given in the Hiding
Task, except that the objects were hidden, initially, out of sight of
the subject. The informing event at the beginning of the sequence
was now the absence of objects in the tester's hand. The
intermediate event between the 2nd and the 3rd cup was either the
presence of one of the objects in tester hand (Object-Present
Condition) or its absence (Object-Absent Condition).
The counterbalancing of the sequences of displacements followed
the same schema as described for the Hiding Task.
Warm-up.
a) Warm-up for the Hiding Task. Before the administration of the
Hiding Task, each testing session featured the presentation of
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warm-up trials of two different types (Type one and Type 2), as
described below:
- Type 1 warm-up trials where presented until a criterion of two
consecutive correct searches, each performed within a latency of 5
sec, was achieved. In each of these trials, the tester's hand was
moved under one cup and then removed and opened in order to
show that the object had gone. The subject was then allowed to
search.
- Two type 2 warm-up trials where the object was shown in an open
hand at one end of the cups array, the hand was then closed and
moved under all the four cups in succession, before being opened
after the fourth cup to show that the object was now absent. The
subject was then allowed to search.
In both cases above, the movement of the bait alternated in
direction from trial to trial.
b) Warm-up for the Finding Task. As for the Hiding Task, the
administration of the Finding Task was preceded by the presentation
of type 1 warm-up trials (until the achievement of the criterion)
followed by two type 2 warm-up trials. These trials were similar to
those used for the Hiding Task. The only difference was that the
tester's hand was initially shown empty and later, after passing
under the cup(s), revealed to contain one of the objects.
Data recording.
The tester recorded the location and order of occurrence of each
search performed by the subject. A search was defined as the
lifting of a cup.
A scrutiny of the videotape records, in slow motion mode, was
performed in order to ensure that the data analysis was conducted
only on those trials in which the subject watched without
interimptions the whole hiding\finding procedure. In the event,
none of the trials had to be eliminated.
Statistical analysis
All statistical analyses were based on the Binomial Test. In the
Warm-up 1 trials the probability of occurrence of a correct search
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by chance was p = .25. In the Hiding and the Finding Task the
probability of performing an appropriate first search by chance was
p = .50, whereas that of locating the object by chance in a second




Type 1 for the Hiding Task. All the children understood the hiding
procedure, satisfying the criterion of two consecutive correct
responses with a latency of < 5 sec. The group performance was of
87% correct responses (p <.01) and all subjects showed a proportion
of correct responses above chance level (p < .01).
Type 1 for the Finding Task. All children but one understood the
procedure, reaching the criterion of two consecutive correct
responses, each performed within 5 sec. The group performance was
45% correct responses (p < .01). The individual scores showed that
7 children out of 9 performed a significant (p < .01) proportion of
correct responses.
Type 2. In view of the similarity of the warm-up type 2 data from
both Hiding and Finding Tasks, these have been combined in an
analysis of the different modes of search adopted by the subject to
explore the array. These have been divided into Systematic mode of
search (SS), i.e. the subjects explored the array from one end to
the other (no fixed sequences other than end to end exploration
were observed) and Asystematic mode of search (AS) i.e. the
search was performed at random.
As should be expected by chance (p = .25), in the absence of
any clue about where to search, the subjects located the object on
their first choice only in the 21% of the trials. Subjects adopted a
Systematic mode of search in the 49% of the trials and an
Asystematic one in the 30% of the trials).
HIDING AND FINDING TASK
Group Performance
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First searches. The percentages of appropriate first searches
performed in the Hiding and the Finding Task are shown in Table
3.1(a) and 3.1(b), respectively. From these it can be seen that
appropriate first searches were performed above chance level.
However, the most striking feature of the data is the selective
effects of the sub-conditions within each task type. In the Hiding
Task, the Present Condition contributes almost uniquely to the
overall success within this condition; in the Finding Task, by
contrast, the Absent Condition is the more successful.
Second searches. As not all searches could be correct on the first
choice even when controlled by a logical strategy, it was necessary
to analyse second choice behaviour following putatively appropriate
if unsuccessful first choices. Thus, second searches have been
included in table 3.1 and show that in the case of both tasks,
second choices (following an appropriate but unsuccessful first
choice), are significantly performed in the correct location.
As Somerville and Capuani-Shumaker (1984) point out, however,
it is necessary also to distinguish between endpoint based second
choices and mid-position ones. This is because second choices which
follow on from a choice of an end location and are adjacent to the
endpoint, may be simply the result of object proximity per se, and
not at all a reflection of the subject's understanding of the
implication of the first choice. By contrast, when the first choice is
performed at an appropriate inner location, a second response
performed on the basis of mere proximity would locate the object
only in the 50% of the occasions. For this reason, in Table 3.1
second searches have been divided into those that followed first
searches at inner and end points of the array. It can be seen that
subjects were significantly correct in both tasks, even when only
second searches following a first search at an inner point are
considered.
Chapter III
Table 3.1 Distribution of children's searches in the Hiding and the
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Individual performances
Given the asymmetrical distribution of appropriate first searches
between the two sub-conditions of the Hiding and the Finding Task
and between the two tasks themselves, it is particularly interesting
to consider how each child handled the various situations. The
frequencies of appropriate first searches performed by each subject
are reported in Table 3.2. From this it can be seen that only one
child succeeded in both conditions of the Hiding Task and one in
both conditions of the Finding Task. The behaviour of the remaining
subjects is highly consistent with the group results: performing
appropriate searches mostly in the easiest condition of each task. No
subject succeeded on both tasks. Combining the percentages of
correct first searches performed by each subject in the two
conditions of each task, it emerges that three children succeeded in
the Hiding Task and two in the Finding Task.
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Table 3.2. Appropriate first searches (Cs) performed by






N Cs N Cs N Cs
a) Hiding Task
Gi 8 6 8 5 16 11
Ko 8 8** 8 2 16 10
Kr 8 8** 8 8** 16 16* *
Za 10 10** 10 6 20 16*
Jo 8 6 8 5 16 11
Br 8 7* 8 5 16 12
Ka 10 8 10 8 20 16*
Em 8 7* 8 3 16 10
An 8 8** 8 2 16 10
Tot. 76 68** 76 44 152 112**
b) F inding Task
Gi 8 4 8 6 16 10
Ko 8 6 8 5 16 11
Kr 8 3 8 3 16 6
Za 8 2 8 8** 16 10
Jo 8 6 8 7* 16 13*
Br 8 5 8 4 16 9
Ka 8 5 8 7* 16 12
Em 8 8** 8 8** 16 16**
An - - - - - —
Tot. 64 39 64 48** 128 87*
* = p < .05
** = p < .01
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Identification of strategic behaviours
Up to this point, we have evaluated how successful our subjects
were in selecting the two appropriate locations on the basis of the
inferences that could be drawn from the observed sequences of
displacements. However, it is important to take as much of the
behaviour into account as possible. Some strategies (which do not
lead directly to "significant" correct performance) may be at work
for example in the residual error space. This would indicate that
searches, even when not appropriate, are not performed at random.
In order to evaluate this possibility, we subjected the choice data to
a further analysis based on a taxonomy of other strategic
possibilities proposed by Somerville and Capuani-Shumaker (1984)
and described as follows.
For each subject, a significant difference (p < .05) from the
value expected if first choices oscillated randomly between two
possible pairs of locations (Binomial Test, two tailed) was considered
evidence for conformity to a strategy.
One strategy would lead to a bias towards the selection of either
the first two or the last two locations visited by the tester's hand
and can be designated as temporal. Two children conformed to a
temporal strategy in the Hiding Task and one in the Finding Task,
selecting consistently the last two locations.
Another strategy could be a simple position bias towards the two
left hand side (LHS) or the two right hand side (RHS) locations. In
the Hiding Task, one subject conformed to this spatial strategy
selecting consistently the right hand side locations, while in the
Finding Task such a strategy was used by two subjects: one
selected the right hand side locations and the other one chose the
left hand side locations. Overall, only two subjects did not appear
to use any strategy at all in the Hiding Task and three in the
Finding Task.
Strategic consistency. Here we evaluated the relationships between
the strategic behaviour of each subject on each of the Tasks. There
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was little evidence that strategies deployed in one task were used
by the same subject in the other. For example, two of the three
subjects that showed evidence for a "logical" strategy in the Hiding
Task did not conform to any strategy in the Finding Task and the
third, in the Finding Task, always chose the last cup visited by the
tester. The two children that selected the appropriate locations in
the Finding Task, turned out, respectively, to be selecting always
the same location or not using any strategy at all, when presented
with the Hiding Task. Ko searched according to a temporal strategy
(Last 2) in the Hiding Task and according to a spatial strategy in
the Finding Task (RHS); Br did not use any strategy in the Hiding
Task but conformed to a spatial strategy in the Finding Task
(LHS); Gi did not conform to any strategy in both the tasks; and
An, who was tested in the Hiding Task only, searched according to
a spatial strategy (Last 2).
Discussion
Children in this study are not found fully competent to use
observationally based constraints on choice when both Hiding and
Finding Tasks are taken as criterial. No child succeeded in both
tasks. Instead, success was partial, emerging primarily in the
Absent Condition of the Hiding Task, and the Present Condition of
the Finding Task. A similar trend has been found by Somerville and
Capuani-Shumaker (1984). This result, combined with our evidence
that the behaviour, even when unsuccessful, was essentially non-
random indicates that the children's failure was not merely the
result of boredom, or of inappropriate testing procedures.
Overall the picture which emerges from the child data appears a
heterogeneous one. Some children seem to perform observationally
constrained searches in one or the other of the two tasks. However,
no one subject conforms fully to the criteria set to determine
"logical" search in both tasks and for both conditions of each task.
There are, nevertheless, many consistent features of performance
which suggest that data are not idiosyncratically generated by each
subject, nor the product of poor test conditions or procedures.
Instead, in my opinion, this suggests that children of the age we
Chapter III 77
tested are only partially competent at dealing with some of the
implications of events which they perceive directly, even in a
situation as (ostensibly) simple as the one we describe. There is
evidence of weakness in the control of the negative search space,
motivated by the experience of absence of object or event. In
addition, the requirement to couple simple background knowledge
(conveyed linguistically) with the interpretation of directly
perceived events is far from optimal.
These lacunae aside, however, there is also evidence of a gradient
of constraint on search and object choice which these subjects may
exploit on the basis of the observations of the behaviour of a third
party. Would this also be true of the behaviour of a non-human
primate, the Cebus apella? Informed by a behavioural base for 5
year old humans, this question was addressed in experiment 2.
3.3 Experiment 2
The experiment comprised of two different phases, phase A and
phase B.
A precondition for the administration of the Hiding and Finding
Tasks which feature complex sequences of displacements is that the
subject will search at all, under conditions where the size of the set
to be searched is four items and sometimes under delays of at least
3sec.
Phase A was essentially an attempt to give the monkeys experience
of searching under these conditions.
Phase B featured the presentation of the Hiding and the Finding




The subjects were two adult males (A1 and Ch) and three adult
females (Lu, Ki and Ol) wild born tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus
apella). They were housed in a colony compound within the
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Laboratory for Cognitive Neuroscience of the University of
Edinburgh. At the time of the experiments the colony was composed
of two adult males and five adult females. The enclosure was
equipped with perches, water sources, tree branches and hangers
suspended from the ceiling in order to provide locomotor
opportunities. A layer of wood shavings covered the floor. To
encourage foraging behaviour, a mixture of seeds was dispersed into
the wood shavings on daily basis. Water was available ad libitum.
The monkeys were transferred in individual cages for the testing
sessions that took place in the morning. Reward was based on
highly preferred food (grapes). All the monkeys were experimentally
naive and had just terminated a period of quarantine of 6 months.
Apparatus
The testing apparatus was a modified version of WGTA, similar to
that used for the children in experiment 1. The tray was especially
wide, designed to take 5 discriminanda simultaneously (McGonigle
and Chalmers, 1986, 1992). The occluders were the same sort of
white cups used for the children in experiment 1. The bait was a
white grape that could be enclosed in the tester's hand and placed
silently under the cups without giving the subject any auditory or
visual clue.
Stimuli
Up to 5 polystyrene white cups were used as occluders.
Design
Essentially the design was motivated to enable the monkeys to cope
with up to 5 occluders per trial and a delay interposed between
hiding and retrieval. To achieve this, 3 conditions were presented
to the monkeys in the following order: a visible baiting condition,
comprising 5 phases featuring the presentation of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
occluders, respectively; a control condition; and a delay condition.
Procedure
The following conditions pertained:
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1) Visible baiting condition. A cup was baited while the subject was
looking. Starting from trials in which only one cup was presented
on the tray, the number of cups was increased until a linear array
of five cups was presented. For each trial, the cup to be baited
was randomly chosen within the array. When the subject reached a
criterion of five consecutive correct responses, each performed
within a latency of five seconds, one more cup was added to the
previous array.
On reaching this criterion for the five cups array, subjects were
overtrained for several sessions to ensure a stable performance
before the administration of the next stage.
2) Control condition. An array of 5 cups was presented. The
procedure consisted in moving a second cup simultaneously with the
displacement of the bait. Thus, the mere movement of a cup could
not be taken as a sign indicating which cup was being baited. The
second cup to be moved was randomly selected for each trial.
3) Delay condition. The task featured the presentation of a 5 cups
array. First, a 3 sec. delay was introduced between the
displacement and the retrieval of the bait, subsequently increased to
5 sec. for those subjects which did not show a noticeable
performance decrement.
Data recording
The data recording was exactly as described for Experiment 1.
Statistical analysis
A Binomial Test was performed on data obtained from the extensive
testing with the 5 cups array, the Visible Baiting Condition, the
Control Condition and the Delay Condition. The probability of
occurrence of a successful search by chance was p = .20.
Results
1). Visible baiting condition. All subjects immediately searched for
the bait when it was hidden under the only cup presented. In the
phases featuring the presentation of 2, 3, 4 and 5 occluders, the
averaged numbers of trials to criterion were 24.6 (sd = 20.9), 8.6
(sd = 4.1), 8.8 (sd = 4.1), 6.8 (sd = 2.2), respectively. The
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highest number of trials to criterion was found (for four subjects
out of five) in the condition were two cups were presented. For one
subject (Lu) the highest number of trials to criterion was found
when it was presented with 4 cups.
The averaged percentage of correct choices in the extensive
testing with the five cups array was 92.8% (sd = 4.4, p <.01). The
overall percentage of correct choices made by each subject was also
highly significant (A1 = 97%, p < .01; Ch = 91% p < .01; KI = 94% p
< .01; Lu = 96% p < .01; Ol = 86% p < .01).
2. Control condition. The mean percentage of correct choice in the
control condition was 90% (sd = 9.5), p < .01). As for the visible
baiting condition with five cups, all the subjects showed a highly
significant percentage of correct responses. Only one subject (Ki)
showed, in the control condition, a percentage of correct responses
lower than that shown in the visible baiting condition with five
cups.
3. Delay condition. The interposition of a 3 sec. delay between
hiding and retrieval did not disrupt the performance of 4 subjects
out of 5. The percentages of correct choices made by Ol (90%), Ch
(94%), Lu (80%) and A1 (92%) were all highly significant, while that
performed by Ki (32%) did not reach statistical significance. When
the delay was increased from 3 to 5 sec. most subjects became
frustrated and distressed. We were thus obliged to terminate the
administration of this condition. However, the two subjects (Ol and
Ch) that received enough trials to compare their percentages of
correct responses (Ol = 68% and Ch = 73%) to chance, searched
correctly (p < .01) even when a 5 sec. delay was interposed
between hiding and retrieval.
Discussion
Visible baiting condition. Results obtained from this first set of
tests show that all subjects were committed to search for an object
they had seen disappear under a cup. The incentive to search for
an object, now out of sight, was apparent even from the first
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condition in which only one cup was presented. However, in a
single cup condition, the action of lifting it might be expression
only of a manipulative disposition on the part of the subject, and
not necessarily motivated by the bait per se. The fact that the
subjects chose the baited cup only, under multiple cup conditions,
indicates the contrary. Nevertheless, this selective response in the
presence of multiple occluders was acquired in the course of testing
and was not expressed spontaneously. It would seem, therefore,
that there is already a disposition to use a self-directed mode of
search. When one cup is presented, this mode is sufficient for
immediate success; where there are alternatives, however, it is not.
Informed by failure, however, the monkey's search, once
constrained through observation of the tester, appears unaffected
by the addition of further distractors (up to five cups presented in
a linear array).
Control condition. Results obtained from the control condition show
that subjects were not using cup movement alone as a unique clue to
location of reward. Instead, the whole displacement procedure was
taken as the informing event.
Delay condition. An evaluation of the delay that subjects were able
to tolerate was necessary before the Phase B of Experiment 2; that
required an attentional phase of approximatively 2-3 sec., if the
tasks were to be administered successfully. As four of the subjects
proved able to cope with an interval of at least 3 sec, a necessary




The four monkeys (Al, Ch, Lu, and Ol) that proved able to tolerate
at least a 3 sec. delay in the preceding stage.
Apparatus
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The testing apparatus was the WGTA used for Phase A. Four white
plastic cups, identical to those used in Experiment 1 and in Phase A
of experiment 2, served as occluders. The baits were black and
white grapes.
Design
The experimental design was as described for children in Experiment
1. Two monkeys (Ch and Lu) were first presented with the Hiding
Task and the remaining two (A1 and Ol) began with the Finding
Task.
Procedure
The procedure adopted with the monkeys in the Hiding and the
Finding Task followed the same schema featured in Figure 3.1, with
the following minor modifications:
1) HIDING TASK
At the beginning of each daily session subjects were motivated with
five trials in which the bait was hidden under a cup and the subject
had to retrieve it. This was followed by 4 experimental trials.
2) FINDING TASK
Before the administration of the Finding Task, it was necessary to
convey, non linguistically to the subjects the crucial information
that two baits were always hidden together under the same cup.
This was attempted by administering a task identical to the visible
baiting condition described above, except for the fact that two baits
(a black and a white grape) were hidden together under one of the
cups. This was followed by 4 experimental trials per session using
the procedures as described for children in Experiment 1.
Warm up
The warm up trials presented to the monkeys, both for the Hiding
and the Finding Task, were identical to those presented to the
children and described for Experiment 1.
Statistical analysis
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Type 1 for the Hiding Task. The group performance averaged 84%
correct responses (p c.Ol). Three of the monkeys (Ch, Lu and Ol)
were individually correct above chance level (p < .01, Binomial test,
one tailed)) indicating that the hiding procedure was understood.
The fourth subject (Al), that was presented first with the Finding
Task, became so stressed during the presentation of the Finding
Task that the experiment had to be terminated before the
presentation of the warm up trials for the Hiding Task.
Type 1 for the Finding Task. The monkeys were given on average
25 visible baiting trials with two baits (range = 21-30) before the
administration of two Warm-up 1 trials. The averaged percentage of
correct searches was 95.2% (range = 90%-100%). The percentage of
correct searches of all the subjects was above chance level (p <
.01, Binomial test with a chance probability of occurrence of a
correct search = .25). The combined percentage of correct searches
for the two monkeys (Al and Ol) presented with the Warm-up 1
trials was 73% (p < .01) and also significantly above chance level (p
< .01) considered as individuals. The other two monkeys stopped
searching after a few failures and the administration of this task
was terminated.
Type 2. As for the child sample, preliminary data analyses showed
no major differences between the results obtained from the warm-up
2 trials for the Hiding Task and the Warm-up 2 trials for the
Finding Task. Therefore, the results from the two tasks have been
combined.
As with children, monkeys were at chance when locating the object,
on their first attempt (22% of the trials). They adopted a Systematic
mode of search more often than an Asystematic one, although the
percentage of occasions in which the subjects were Asystematic is
considerable. In fact, 36 searches (50% of the total number of
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searches) were performed in a Systematic way, while 20 (28%) were
Asystematic.
HIDING AND FINDING TASK
Group Performance
First searches. Table 3.3 shows the percentages of appropriate first
searches performed by the monkeys the Hiding (section (a) of the
Table) and the Finding Task (section (b) of the Table). From Table
3.3, it can be seen that the percentage of appropriate first searches
was above chance level in the Hiding Task but was not significant
in the Finding Task. This taken together with a selective effect of
sub-conditions within each task type, analogous to that found for
the children, leads to a major difference between tasks.
Second searches. Table 3.3 shows also the number of correct second
searches performed after an appropriate but unsuccessful first
search.
In the Hiding Task the monkeys identified the correct location
after a first appropriate choice. Correct second searches were above
chance level either when following a first appropriate choice at an
end point or at an inner point of the array.
In the Finding Task, the combined percentage of correct second
searches for the two conditions is again above chance level; when
analyzed according to first search location, second correct searches
following an end point first choice are highly significant; those that
followed a first choice to an inner location, whilst correct in all
cases (3) are too few to yield to statistical test.
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Table 3.3 Distribution of monkey's searches in the Hiding and the
































= p < .05
**
= p < .01
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Individual Performances.
As for children, given the asymmetrical distribution of first choices
across tasks and conditions, the data were analyzed on an individual
basis. The results are presented in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 Appropriate first searches (Cs) performed by
each monkey in the Hiding Task and Finding Task.
Present Absent
Subj. condition condition Combined







































Tot. 27 11 29 19 56 30
* = p < .05
** = p < .01
In the Hiding Task, three subjects searched appropriately above
chance level in the Object-Present Condition and two in the Object-
Absent Condition. Neither of the subjects presented with the
Finding Task performed above chance in either the Object-Present
nor the Object-Absent Condition. Combining the results obtained
from the two conditions of each of the tasks secures the conclusion
that all three monkeys tested in the Hiding Task correctly
performed first searches above chance level; in contrast, the two
that were presented with the Finding Task both failed it. The main
differences are, therefore, between tasks, not conditions. What
seems clear is that the finding procedure is itself difficult to
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understand. In fact, the subject that was presented with the
Finding Task first never solved it, and became so frustrated and
distressed that we were forced to discontinue testing. Moreover, the
two subjects that proved successful on the Hiding Task, failed the
warm-up trials of the Finding Task; after a few unsuccessful
attempts they eventually ceased search for the hidden bait.
Identification of strategic behaviours.
We have already seen that monkeys behaviour was "logicalwhile
performing the Hiding Task. However, when presented with the
Finding Task they used a spatial strategy. In particular each
subject in the Finding Task always chose the same end location on
the same side (one subject chose left, the other right).
Discussion
Monkeys in this experiment appear able to use the behaviour of a
third party in the Hiding but not the Finding Task. This indicates
that even in this small task domain, the cost functions are
appropriate to the induction of an observationally based strategy.
Special, desirable food may well be a strong factor, energising the
subject in circumstances where children may need strong social
facilitation to maintain attention and devise more complex solutions
perhaps than the task may otherwise warrant.
However, where the tester acts as finder, the monkeys fail. While
this may indeed be a direct result of a failure to appreciate a
"finding" role, as described by Fischer & Jennings (1981) and
Berthental & Fischer (1983), the fact that the performance of
children in this study was also relatively poor (as indeed was the
performance of subjects in the Somerville and Capuani-Schumaker
study) indicates that the task is difficult to comprehend. One index
of this is given by the number of verbal prompts required in the
Somerville and Capuani-Shumaker study (1984). Task communication
apart, however, the subject must link some background knowledge
with the perception of object displacement i.e. it is crucial that the
1 For an extended analysis and discussion of inferential behaviour
in monkeys see McGonigle & Chalmers, 1992.
Chapter in 88
subject interprets the object event at the end of the finding
sequence in the light of the background knowledge that the objects
are always together. The most likely reason for the failures in the
Finding Task, therefore, would thus appear to be based on the
extra demand it makes on the subject.
3.4 General discussion
Apart from the pratical aim to familiarize the subjects with the
testing environemnt, the tasks reported in the experiments
described in this chapter have been designed to evaluate the
strategies subjects may use when searching for unseen objects.
Ostensibly they are about the ways in which the agent constrains
search both on the basis of information received and (as in the
Finding Task) on the basis of prior information, needed to interpret
the events under the subject's interrogation. The results vary both
across and within species. In the former case, the variation seems
to have something to do with the type of task used, the effort of
searching and the cost functions attaching to that search (see
Wellman et al., 1979). In addition, there may well be social factors
at work. The (social) costs of mistake in situations where the adult
tested has carefully coached the child in the rubric of the test may
well contribute to the performance recorded by Somerville and
Capuanl-Schumaker (1984). Whilst these are unlikely to apply in the
case of the monkey, failure to retrieve highly preferred food, albeit
in situations where search is otherwise un-costly may dispose the
Cebus in these experiments to pay particularly good attention to the
behaviour of the tester.
A further social factor is the sort of role assigned the tester, as
Hider or as Finder, as collaborator or as deceiver. These latter
factors may all play a part, particularly in encounters with
conspecifics. For these reasons, it may be best to specialise and
develop experimental paradigms which target a cohort of closely
related issues. For example, the social aspects of the encounters are
already represented in experiments on social inference and imitation.
In non-human primates, recent studies Visalberghi & Fragaszy
(1990) and Povinelli et al. (1991) are examples of controlled
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assessments of the use of socially derived information by non-human
subjects.
A complementary but separable line of inquiry is one concerned
with self-directed search under conditions which do not presume
socially based observational competences as a precondition for its
operation. Here the tasks used in the study described are flawed,
when considered from this perspective alone. One major reason for
this is that each manual interrogation of an object displaces it from
its test position, thus leaving a visible trace of a visit. Under these
circumstances, it would be a very foolish subject who attempted to
reiterate visits to previously interrogated locations. Yet a measure
of reiteration is essential if we are properly to evaluate the extent
to which subjects can keep track of choices made serially over time.
For these reasons, as outlined in the previous chapter, for the
rest of the research program, serial-order search tasks for human
and non-human primates were developed using touch screen based
paradigms and procedures designed to evaluate size seriation skills
(McGonigle, 1987b; McGonigle, 1989; Chalmers and McGonigle, 1993).
These, intended primarily to evaluate self directed search strategies
without reference to a third party, will be described in the
following chapters. The aim of the following experiments was to
assay whether a non-human primate, Cebus apella could devise its
own strategies in an exhaustive search task, becoming more
economical by paying attention to the spatial organization of items in
the search space (McGonigle et al., 1992).
As a consequence of the experiments described in chapters IV-VI
used a new paradigm (McGonigle, 1987b) based on computer-
interactive touch screen technology which enables the experimenter
to display a wide range of items through which the subject must
search. However, unlike our present procedures, each touch leaves
no lasting trace of a touch, leaves the subject to discover its own
best (most efficient) route through the search space, and is
sufficiently motivating to keep the subject working for protracted
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periods, thus enabling a comprehensive in-depth analysis of each
case.
In short, once the object of familiarizing the subjects with the
tester and the testing environment had been achieved, it was
believed that restricting the research to issues concerning self
regulatory factors in cognition and leaving social regulatory ones to
other studies, offered the best prospect for the study of information
organisation and management by primates.
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CHAPTER XV
TOUCH-SCREEN BASED SEARCH TASKS
4.1 Introduction
Now that the monkeys to be used as experimental subject
had been familiarized with the testing environment and the
tester, it was possible to proceed along the experimental
project as announced and outlined at the end of chapter II.
In this chapter two experiments will be reported. They
are the first implementation of the new technologies mentioned
already. Following the experimental procedures adopted by
McGonigle and Chalmers with children and monkeys using
touch sensitive computer monitors (see Chapter II for a
detailed review), the new apparatus was employed in an
attempt to overcome the limitations of WGTA based
experiments.1
1 For example, the WGTA used for the experiments described
in the previous chapter did not allow protracted periods of
testing, the social nature of the cues provided to the
subjects prevented an unambiguous interpretation of the
difficulties which they encountered in solving the task, and
each move left a permanent trace of the choice, preventing
an evaluation of the ability of the subjects to keep track of
their moves throughout the search space. These were major
difficulties for a research program aimed at the investigation
of issues such as economy and data reduction in serially
organized behaviours. First of all, when subjects do not
tolerate protracted testing, it is impossible to observe those
strategy shifts, which, as we have seen in Chapter H, might
accompany the gradual acquisition of task expertise
(McGonigle and Chalmers, 1992). Secondly, the fact that the
displacement of an object leaves a permanent mark of each
choice made, deprives the subject of the incentive to behave
strategically provided by the need to keep track of long
series of action. It can be expected that the larger the space
to be searched, the more the system is at risk of overloading
if strategic data-reducing factors are not deployed.
Obviously, no incentive to use data-reduction strategies is
present when the subjects leave involuntary external clues of
each of the items to be remembered (i.e. the locations
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The new paradigms
As already outlined at the end of Chapter II, the general
paradigm is a search task where subjects are required to
respond to each icon of a set, presented on a touch sensitive
computer monitor. The subjects are provided with a variable
number of icons to search. So long as search is exhaustive,
the task requirements are achieved, a termination signal is
given, and a peanut is dispensed as reward.
The paradigm allows the manipulation of the length of the
production as an independent variable to assess its effects as
an incentive for organization. In fact, since the requirement
of the task is an exhaustive search, the increase of the size
of the search space, would result in a longer series of
responses being performed. Moreover (in case the subjects
do not spontaneously perform economic searches), the
procedure and the apparatus were designed to provide the
subjects with explicit feedback (penalization of surplus
redundant moves by omission of reward).
The tactic followed for the implementation of the set of
experiments consisted in starting with versions of this task
where the search of the subjects is completely non-
supervised. In fact only when the role of training is made
minimal in the first stages of the study, does it become
possible to understand the potentiality of an autonomous
cognitive system.
Thus, here subjects are required to perform an
exhaustive search of the set but are left free to select the
items in any order and are allowed to reiterate on items
already selected. In this chapter, experiments based on a
spatial version of the task will be reported, i.e. the subject
already explored). Thus in such a circumstance the interplay
between length of the production and strategic control over
serial behaviour becomes impossible to assay.
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is presented with a set of identical icons and each choice can
be identified only on the basis of the spatial location of the
icon selected. The following chapters will focus on
experiments featuring search spaces with richer structural
properties.
The general procedure summarized above, was designed
according to the criteria which, as stressed in Chapter II,
tasks aimed to investigate the issues of economy and data
reduction must satisfy, namely: 1) the subject must be
allowed a high degree of spontaneity in the selection of his
own path toward solution; 2) there must be a variety of
solutions within the context of behavioural mastery to allow
the subject to find the most effective one, and; 3) the task
must be repeated sufficiently to enable the subject to express
genuine strategic shifts as a function of practice.
With the new paradigms featured here, spontaneity is
granted by the absence of selective feedback on the best
trajectories through the search space. As ±ong as the search
is exhaustive, the trajectories selected by the subjects
represent different solutions to the task. Finally, given the
minimal requirements of the task, it was reasonable to predict
a high tolerance to task exposure by monkey subjects.
Moreover, in such a context, it is possible to identify
unambiguously the different factors postulated by an
economy/data reduction hypothesis. These are the following.
First of all, since success is defined unambiguously as the
ability to perform exhaustive searches, an objective measure
of fitness to the task is granted. Then, within the success
space, there is a range of more or less efficient searches,
again suitable to be measured objectively. In fact (in a task
where a set of locations has to be visited exhaustively and
only one visit per location is required), a behaviour best
fitted to the task would produce only one visit per each
location. On the other hand, a less fitted behaviour would
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produce some reiterations on locations already visited. Thus,
the ratio between the number of icons presented to the
subjects and the number of moves performed to exhaust the
set provide an index of the relative efficiency of behaviour
within the success space. The costs attached to unnecessary
"surplus" moves, in relation to the task requirement are
extra-cognitive in their nature. The task implicitly provides
the currency in terms of time (and/or energy) spent in
searching before obtaining a reward and, as a consequence,
feedback information to evaluate the relative efficiency of
successive searches.
A second type of costs is related to the amount of
cognitive resources which are employed in order to maintain a
particular level of fitness to the task. These sort of costs
are intra-cognitive and might vary according to different
ways of solving the task.
It can be conjectured that a system striving to achieve a
high level of behaviour fitness at a low cognitive cost will
start to self-regulate. In other words, given the opportunity
to practice with a task, it will try to select those constraints
afforded by a particular problem space which allow the
subject to satisfy the task requirements with an optimal
management of internal resources.
With tasks of this sort, it becomes possible to assess,
whether subjects spontaneously deploy strategic factors, and,
if they do so, whether they shift to more economic strategies
in the course of practice. The observation of (if any) the
sort strategies used by the subject and their change over
time, can then become a window on the dynamic of the
management of intra-cognitive resources.
Empirical templates of "fit" and "unfit" behaviours, in a
spatial version of the paradigm, similar to that used for the
experiments reported here, was provided by a parallel study
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conducted on children (McGonlgle, De Lillo and Dickinson,
1992; Dickinson, in preparation). While 4 and half year olds,
showed to be able to search sets up to nine items, showing
maximal efficiency from the outset, the behaviour of 3 year
old children was characterised by the presence of a high
percentage of redundant moves.
Moreover, the searches of the older children were based
on a number of spatial strategies which included the use of
fixed starting points (in a particular configuration, always
start touching the same icon), an adjacency principle (when
possible, touch the item spatially next to the one just
touched), and the use of preferred directional vectors (as
your search path, always follow a vertical trajectory). In
contrast with the older subjects, younger children deployed
only some of these strategic factors and never combined them
all to produce a very principled trajectory through the
search space.
Thus, children provide an illustration in principle of the
relationship between principled searches and success. The
strategic use of a principled trajectory through the search
space, which at any point of the search tells the subjects the
portion of the search space which has already been explored
and which icons remain to be touched, can be considered an
effective device to reduce the demands which would have
been put on the memory system by storing all the icons
already touched.
However, children (according to their age group) show
either immediate success or failure. Young children who are
not economic at first have poor tolerance of task repetition in
this context. Nevertheless, it would be of great interest to
assess whether increase in economy of search can be obtained
in the course of protracted task practice. It is here that the
monkey is an ideal experimental subject, since its tolerance
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to prolonged task exposure is well documented (Harlow, 1949;
McGonigle and Chalmers, 1977; 1993; Shwartz et. al; 1991).
The experiments which will be soon reported were, thus,
an attempt to evaluate if these criteria of rationality could
have been applied to capuchin monkeys. Now for a longer
assay of strategic factors in mature subjects capable of task
repetition tolerance.
4.2 Experiment 1
The focus of this experiment is on spontaneity. It aimed to
evaluate whether monkeys would have spontaneously searched
exhaustively a set of icons presented on a computer monitor;
at the assessment of whether they would have deployed
strategic factors in doing so; and at the characterization of




The subjects were 6 (2 males, Al and Ch; and 4 females, Ki
Lu, Mi and Ol) adult, wild born tufted capuchin monkeys
(Cebus apella). ^ None of the subjects had previous
experience with touch screen based procedures. The monkeys
were housed in a colony compound within the Laboratory for
Cognitive Neuroscience of the University of Edinburgh.
Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of a IBM clone computer equipped
with a Microvitec Touchtec 501 frame. This touch sensitive
apparatus is based on a infra-red scanning technology which
2 One of the subjects used in this study (Mi) has not been
mentioned in the previous chapter. This is because, at that
time, Mi was pregnant and successively lactating. Therefore
it was impossible for her to be tested on regular basis and to
undertake all the different phases of the WGTA based study.
However, when available she was extensively exposed to
WGTA procedures and therefore undertook, as well as the
other subjects the necessary familiarisation phase.
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enables it to detect a finger or object placed within the plane
of the monitor screen and communicate the coordinates of this
position to the computer. The monitor could hold up to 9
stimuli simultaneously in a 3 x 3 (3 rows and 3 columns of
icons) matrix of possible positions. The monitor was fitted
with a transparent plexiglass screen with hand-holes
corresponding to each of the location in which a stimulus
could appear on the screen. A touch of any of the stimuli
displayed resulted in a blink of the corresponding stimulus,
a 0.5-seconds flash around the stimulus, and a simultaneous
beep.
Figure 4.1 depicts the apparatus and the experimental set-up
used for this study.
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Fig. 4.1 The experimental set up used for this and the
following experiments, a) The indoor cage where the
colony of capuchins is housed. b) The monkey
spontaneously enters the individual testing cage, c) The
testing station provided with touch sensitive computer
monitor and video camera, d) The cage with the monkey is
hooked in front of the monitor (on the side of the cage,
the food dispenser can be observed).
Chapter IV
The system's software recorded the location of the stimuli
touched as well as the length of the time interval between
two consecutive touches and allowed to automatically dispense
peanuts as rewards.
As shown in Fig. 4.1, a camera was positioned over the
experimental apparatus to allow an accurate recording of the
actions performed by the subjects during the testing
sessions.
Design
The experiment was divided into a pre-training phase, where
subjects were familiarized with the apparatus, and 3 testing
phases.
Each of the 3 testing phases was designed and
implemented on the basis of the results obtained from the
previous one. For this reason what is described here is an a
posteriori schema of the experiment as it was carried out.
For the same reason, the features of the method shared
by all the testing phases will be described first in a section
called General Procedure. The specific rationale and
procedure of each phase will then be described in details,
only after the presentation and the discussion of the results
obtained from the previous phase.
Phase I consisted of 4 conditions each featuring the
presentation of a different number of icons. In particular,
conditions featuring the presentation of configurations
composed of 2, 3, 4, and 5 items were presented. The
conditions were presented successively, i.e. after the
completion the 2 stimuli condition, the 3 stimuli condition was
presented and so on.
Phase II was carried out in the course of 10 experimental
sessions. In each of sessions 1-5, subjects were presented
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with 5 different conditions, administered in random order.
The 5 conditions featured the presentation of 4, 5, 6, 7, and
8 icons, respectively. As for sessions 1-5, each of sessions
6-10 featured the presentation of 5 conditions presented in
random order. This time the 5 conditions involved the
presentation of 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 icons, respectively.
Phase III featured a protracted presentation of sets of 9
icons, until a stable state of performance was observed.
General Procedure
The testing environment comprised two working stations,
each provided with a computer, a touch screen and a video
camera. The subjects were tested in pairs, each on one of
the two working stations. Before each daily testing session,
the subjects were transferred to individual cages. The cages
were then hooked in front of the monitors.
Each session consisted of 50 trials. In each trial a set of
stimuli, all identical in shape (squares), size (3cm x 3cm),
and colour (green), was displayed on the screen. For each
trial, the stimuli were randomly distributed among 9 locations
defined by a 3 x 3 matrix (3 rows and 3 columns).
The subject was required to touch all the stimuli
presented on the monitor in order to clear the screen,
produce a series of tones, and obtain a peanut as reward. A
new trial was presented after an interval of 15 sec. Both
repetitions (i.e. temporally contiguous touches of the same
stimulus) and reiterations (redundant moves to stimuli
previously touched in the same trial), were allowed. The
number and the spatial relationship of the stimuli varied




The subjects were faced with a monitor displaying one
stimulus. For each trial, the location of the stimulus on the
screen was selected at random.
A number of peanuts were dispensed at regular intervals
in order to familiarize the subject with the use of the feeder
and the noise produced by the dispenser. Then, a peanut
was dispensed selectively when the subject approached the
screen until, eventually, the stimulus was touched. At this
point, a peanut was automatically dispensed whenever the
subject touched the stimulus.
Phase I: do monkeys spontaneously perform exhaustive
searches ?
This first phase was an exploratory one. In fact, given the
novelty of the paradigm, the assessment of how the monkeys
behaved when faced with the task was mandatory. Therefore,
a primary aim of this phase was to check whether they would
have spontaneously started to produce a series of responses,
leading eventually to exhaustive search and reward.
The only information about the memory span of monkeys in
a related task, comes from serial learning studies where the
ability of macaques to acquire 6 term series has been
reported (Swartz et al., 1991) and of capuchin monkeys to
learn 5 term series (D'Amato and Colombo, 1988). The
assessment of the length of the series of responses which
capuchin monkeys would have been able to cope with in the
new paradigm featured here was therefore necessary. For the
present study, it was particularly relevant to find the
number of items that would begin to challenge the memory
system of the subject, since an important assumption of the
hypothesis under scrutiny was that an incentive to the
deployment of strategic devices is constituted by the length
of the serial production itself.
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Thus, the first aim of Phase I was to assess whether the
subjects would spontaneously perform exhaustive searches
within sets comprising from 2 to 5 identical stimuli and, if
they did so, to evaluate their search behaviours.
This evaluation was based on a number of natural
measures of efficiency that the paradigm afforded. First,
having a well defined search space, it was possible to define
unambiguously the minimal number of moves necessary to
exhaust it. This number, obviously, corresponded to the
number of icons itself. Every redundant move, as a
reiteration on an item already touched, would increase the
disparity between actual and optimal performance. Thus, the
"fitness" of the behaviour of the subjects to the task, was
first evaluated according to two different measures based on
the number of responses: the percentage of minimal path
searches (i.e. trials where no redundant moves were
observed) and, the percentage of non-redundant moves in
the course of successive trials. It can be observed that
although the two measures are related (a subject registering
100% minimal paths, will necessarily register 100% non-
redundant moves, and vice versa) they do not always
converge. For example, in exploring 10 configurations of 5
items each, a subject could register an overall percentage of
non-redundant touches equal to 83%, by making only one
"surplus" move per trial, yet no minimal paths would be
observed.
Apart from a criterion of "fitness" based on the number of
response, the time spent by the subject in each search was
recorded as another natural measure of fitness to the task.
Again, measures based on the number of responses and
measures based on search time are obviously related, but not
always converging. In fact, a very fast subject can make
more redundant touches than another and still register the
same search time.
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A further major aim of the study was to evaluate the
effect of task repetition on search efficiency. Thus, in case
the subject did not show a maximal efficiency of search from
the outset, the task would have been presented repeatedly,
in order to observe eventual changes in efficiency (in terms
of a spontaneous reduction of redundant moves) over time,
without giving the subject any differential feedback.
Finally, by means of an overall inspection of video
recordings, it was aimed to gain further qualitative
information about subjects' search behaviour.
Procedure
Sets of stimuli comprising from 2 to 5 monochromatic icons
were displayed on the monitor. On each trial, the location of
the stimuli varied at random.
Fig. 4.2 depicts some examples of possible configurations
for each of the different conditions.
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Fig 4.2. a) Condition 1, an example of configuration with 2
stimuli, b) Condition 2, an example of configuration with 3
stimuli, c) Condition 3. An example of configuration with 4




Each subject was first presented with 2 stimuli, then the
set size was gradually incremented up to five stimuli. Before
a further stimulus was added to the set, a criterion of 75%
non-redundant touches had to be achieved within an
experimental session. The phase continued until sets of 5
icons were displayed. After the administration of the 2
stimuli condition (where the only possible redundant touches
were repetitions), in evaluating the achievement of the
criterion, repetitions were deleted from the analysis and only
reiterations were considered as redundant moves. The
removal of repetitions from the analysis appeared necessary
for two different reasons. First, while reiterations can
reasonably be accounted for by a memory failure in keeping
track of the icons already explored, the status of the
repetitions is more ambiguous. Being performed on the icon
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just touched, they can hardly be caused by a memory fault^.
The second reason was that repetitions are ignored by
authors who have used related tasks and a similar apparatus
(see Terrace, 1987; 1991; Swartz et al., 1991; D'Amato and
Colombo, 1988); and, thus, it seemed reasonable to adopt the
same procedure in order to provide data comparable with
those obtained from these studies.
After the achievement of the criterion, and before the set
size was increased, the subjects were presented with the
same condition, until they showed no further increment in




To compare the distributions of scores obtained in the
different conditions with those expected by chance, the
Kolmogorov-Smimov one sample test was used (see Siegel and
Castellan, 1988). This test is based on the comparison of a
theoretical and an observed cumulative distribution.
The theoretical distribution was obtained from a
mathematical model of random moves within an analogous
search space. The model was developed by St Johnston
(1993) and provided the probability of each search length,
assuming a random walk across the search space. The
mathematical details of the random model are provided in
appendix B.
The observed percentages of trials in which the search
was completed in a particular number of moves, and those
3 On the contrary, it can even be conjectured that they
might be expression of the emphasis posed by the subject on
his choice (like in situations where the subject is not sure
that the machine has registered the touch).
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predicted by the random model were respectively transformed
in an observed and in an expected cumulative distribution.
The distributions were built according to the following
procedure.
The observed and the theoretical distribution were both
constructed on the basis of 50 classes, defined by trial
length (i.e. class 1 contained the number of trials where the
set of icons was exhausted in the minimal number of moves;
class 2 incorporated class 1 plus the number of trials which
contained one redundant move;.. .class 50 incorporated class
49 plus the number of trials containing 50 or more redundant
moves). Then the percentages of trials in each class were
calculated. Finally, with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test the
probability of obtaining the observed sample of scores from a
population distributed as the theoretical distribution was
determined.
All the subjects spontaneously performed exhaustive
searches and reached criterion (75% non-redundant touches in
2 successive sessions) in all the different conditions. The
comparison of their performance with chance (for each of the
single conditions), will be reported in the following
paragraphs.
3 stimuli condition.
The distribution obtained in the 3 stimuli condition is
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Fig. 4.3. 3 stimuli condition a) Observed (bars) and
expected (line) percentage of trials of a particular length,
b) The observed (bars) and expected (line) cumulative
distribution of trials on which the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
was based.
In this condition, the distribution of scores of none of the
subjects differed significantly from the expected. This result
is not surprising, considering that with such a small number
of icons to be explored, even a random trajectory throughout
the set would lead to a high number of exhaustive searches
and several even in the minimal number of moves. In fact, on
the basis of chance, a minimal path search of a set of 3 icons
is expected in the 50% of the trials (the probabilities being
equal to 1 for the first and the second response, and 0.5 for
the third. Thus 1x1x0.5 = 0.5, would be the probability
of a minimal path search).
4 stimuli condition.
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Fig 4.4. 4 stimuli condition a) Observed (bars) and
expected (line) percentage of trials of a particular length,
b) The observed (bars) and expected (line) cumulative
distribution of trials on which the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
was based.
The distribution obtained combining the scores of the six
subjects was significantly different from the expected (D =
. 2633 p <. 005). Results obtained for each of the individuals
showed that the distribution of scores of five of the six
monkeys was different from the expected (Al, D = .2691, p
<.005; Ch, D = .2987, p <.005; Ki, D = .3835, p <.005; Mi,
D = .2524, p <.005; Ol, D = .1896, p <.05).
5 stimuli condition.
The distribution obtained in the 5 stimuli condition is
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Fig 4.5. 5 stimuli condition a) Observed (bars) and
expected (line) percentage of trials of a particular length,
b) The observed (bars) and expected (line) cumulative
distribution of trials on which the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
was based.
The overall distribution obtained for the six subjects was
significantly different from the expected (D = .3671 p <.005).
Individual results showed that the distribution obtained from
five of the monkeys was significantly different from the
expected (Al, D = .3671, p <.005; Ch, D = .3176, p <.005;
Ki, D = .4307, p <.005; Mi, D = .2121, p <.005; Ol, D =
.2516, p <.005).
Overall, these results show that (with the only possible
exception of the 3 stimuli condition), the subjects not only
spontaneously performed exhaustive searches within sets
containing up to 5 stimuli, but they did so in an economic
way. Evidently, for each of the stimuli condition the costs
associated with a random search provided enough incentive
for the subjects to perform at a level significantly above
chance. A detailed evaluation of how these constrained
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searches developed in the course of practice will be reported
in the following section, where the trends observed in the
level of performance of the subjects at different stages of
testing (and the strategy that possibly sustained it) will be
analyzed.
Evidence for improvement with practice.
This trend analysis aimed to evaluate the tendency of the
subjects to progressively reduce the number of redundant
moves while practising the task. The global set of data
obtained for each subject in each of the different conditions
was divided in vincent sixths. The percentage of non-
redundant moves obtained for each of the sixths was
considered representative of the economy of search at a
particular time (the first sixth representing the initial phase
of testing and the last sixth its end phase). A Page's trend
test was performed for the six subjects. A positive trend was
considered as evidence for improvement with practice.
Trends (Page's L trend test) were significant for all
conditions at p <.05 (see Fig. 3.6-3.8).
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Phase 1 3 stimuli condition
trend across blocks of trials
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Fig. 4.6. 3 stimuli condition. Trend across blocks of trials
(vincent sixths). On the horizontal axis the different
vincent sixths are reported in which the global distribution
was divided. On the vertical axis the percentage of non-
redundant touches observed in each of blocks of trials is
reported.
Figure 4.6 depicts the trend observed in the condition
featuring 3 stimuli. This was the condition where the overall
distribution of scores of the subjects was found to be non¬
significant. From this figure it can be seen that the
behaviour of the subjects was not uneconomic as the previous
analysis seemed to suggest. On the contrary a significant
trend in the percentage of non-redundant moves across time
can hardly be accounted for by chance alone. From the
figure it can also be observed that on the IV block of trials
the performance of the subjects dropped dramatically.
Although difficult to interpret, this phenomenon can account
for the failure of the previous analysis to show a significant
result.
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Phase I 4 stimuli condition
trend across blocks of trials
Fig. 4.7. 4 stimuli condition. Trend across blocks of trials
(vincent sixths). On the horizontal axis the different
vincent sixths are reported in which the global distribution
was divided. On the vertical axis the percentage of non-
redundant touches observed in each of the blocks of trials
is reported.
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Phase I 5 stimuli condition
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Fig. 4.8. 5 stimuli condition. Trend across blocks of trials
(vincent sixths). On the horizontal axis the different
vincent sixths are reported in which the globed distribution
was divided. On the vertical axis the percentage of non-
redundant touches observed in each of the blocks of trials
is reported.
From figures 4.6-4.8 it emerges clearly that the subjects
were benefiting from task practice.
Since there was clear evidence that the behaviour of the
subjects was fitted to the task and improved spontaneously
with practice, an investigation of the strategies on which
such improvement was based would have been interesting. In
other words, the evaluation of whether the subjects were
exploiting some of the spatial constraints afforded by the
different configurations would have provided useful
information. However, the fact that the configurations
changed on each trial and the huge number of different
possible configurations, prevented a strictly numerical
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analysis of the paths followed by the subjects in searching
the sets.
Nevertheless, from a visual inspection of the videotapes
(counterchecked daily by two experimenters), it seemed clear
that the subjects were deploying spatial organizational
strategies such as using an adjacency rule (i.e. "Always
select the closest item to one just touched").
An analysis of such sorts of strategies will be reported
for Phase III, where the presentation of a single condition,
featuring a set of icons which completely filled up the 3x3
matrix, made it possible to collect a more affluent data base.
Relationship between performance and number of stimuli.
Comparing the percentage of non-redundant touches
observed in the different stimuli conditions, the number of
stimuli was not correlated with performance (Friedman test,
Xr^(N = 6 C = 4) = 9.6 n.s.). Thus, given the opportunity
to practice the subjects achieved a similar performance,
irrespective of the size of the search space.
The averaged number of trials to criterion for the group
was of 413.33 for the 3 stimuli condition, 785.83 for the 4
stimuli condition, and 490 for the 5 stimuli condition.
Analogous profiles were obtained for individual subjects. This
result supports the conclusion that with such a small number
of stimuli, there was not a linear relationship between the
number of items presented and the difficulty of the tasks.
The 4 stimuli condition appeared more difficult to master than
the 3 stimuli condition, but it seems as if a transfer of
expertise occurred from the 4 stimuli condition to the 5
4 It can be noted that with sets ranging from 2 to 5 items,
as those featured so far, the costs (in terms of length of the
serial production required to search exhaustively) associated
with searches were not particularly high. Therefore, the
incentive to deploy strategic behaviours might not have been
particularly strong in this phase of the study.
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stimuli condition. In fact the number of trials required to
master the 5 stimuli condition was only slightly above the
number of trials required to reach criterion in the 3 stimuli
condition.
In summary the results obtained from Phase I show that
the subjects spontaneously performed exhaustive searches,
and reduced redundant moves in the course of practice. This
improvement resulted in a similar profile of performance in
sets ranging from 3 to 5 stimuli.
The following Phase was designed to evaluate the effect of
set size in conditions where the subjects did not have
extensive exposure to each search space.
Phase II: assessment of the effects of set size.
The results obtained from the previous phase show that
monkeys spontaneously performed exhaustive searches within
sets containing up to 5 icons. Moreover, they showed a
spontaneous tendency towards economy of search and their
performance seemed to remain relatively unaffected by the
increase of set size. Overall, it was clear that even the
largest set (5 icons) was well within monkey's competence.
However, in the previous phase the set size was increased
progressively and thus it was difficult to separate the effect
of set size from that of transfer of expertise from one
condition to the next.
For these reasons an independent assay of the effect of
set size on performance was necessary. Such an assay had a
twofold rationale. First of all, the effect itself of length of
the serial production over the spontaneous deployment of
strategic devices constitutes an important assumption of the
economy/data reduction hypothesis. In fact, the hypothesis
states that only when memory span risks overloading by the
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amount of information that it has to keep track of, a
cognitive system will strive to find data reducing strategies.
So, it was necessary to validate the assumption that the
increase of set size was accompanied by an increase in task
difficulty.
Secondly, it was necessary to find the set size that
corresponded to an optimal level of difficulty such as one
where the subjects had enough incentive to behave
strategically but did not result in a high level of frustration
that could have affected monkey's tolerance to protracted
task exposure.
In order to isolate the effect of set size from the effect of
task practice, a number of conditions, featuring different
number of items, were presented in blocks of trials,
randomly interspersed within each testing session.
As for the previous condition, the percentage of non-
redundant touches was taken as an expression of the level of
performance. On the basis of this measure it was evaluated
the effects produced by the set size.
Procedure
10 experimental sessions were administered to each
subject. Each session involved the presentation of 5 blocks of
ten trials each. The set's size was hold constant within each
block. The first 5 sessions administered to the subjects
comprised blocks featuring 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 stimuli, whereas
the last 5 sessions comprised blocks featuring 5, 6, 7, 8 and
9 stimuli.
The stimuli were all identical in shape and colour. Their
location on the monitor varied randomly for each trial (except
for the blocks in which 9 stimuli were presented, where the
3x3 matrix was completely filled up). Fig. 4.9 depicts some
examples of configurations featuring 6, 7, 8, and 9 stimuli
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respectively (conditions featuring 4 and five stimuli were




Fig 4.9. Some examples of configurations pertaining Phase
II a) An example of configuration with 6 stimuli, b) An
example of configuration with 7 stimuli, c) An example of
configuration with 8 stimuli. d) An example of
configuration with 5 stimuli.
Within each session, the order of presentation of the 5
blocks was based on a 5 (sessions) x 5 (blocks) Latin Square
design. The randomization of the Latin Square was performed
according to Winer (1971, p. 689).
Results
Relationship between performance and number of stimuli
In contrast with the results obtained from Phase I, in Phase
II, a significant difference between performance in the
various conditions was found (Freedman test, XjP(N = 6 C =
6) = 18.2 p <.01), now that the number of icons had
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increased beyond a low level. Moreover, a negative
correlation between performance and the number of stimuli
presented was observed (Page's L trend test, L(N = 6, C =
6) = 520 p c.001). Fig. 4.10 shows the averaged percentages
of non-redundant touches and minimal path trials obtained by
the group of subjects in the different conditions of phase II.
Phase II
Averaged performance for the group N ■ 6
%
condition
Y/A non-redufuL laahB 353 lalrdnai path trial*
Fig 4.10. Percentage of non-redundant touches and minimal
path trials obtained in the different conditions of Phase II.
In Fig. 4.11 individual data are reported, from which it
can be observed that the same relationship observed between
performance and number of stimuli for the group holds for
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Fig. 4.11. Individual percentages of non-redundant
touches and minimal path trials observed in the different
conditions of Phase II.
Comparison with chance
After the global evaluation of the effect of set size on
performance, an analysis was conducted to evaluate how
economic the subjects were in each single condition. For the
comparison of the distribution of scores obtained in the
different conditions of Phase II with chance, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test described for the previous phase was used. The
results were the following.
4 stimuli condition.
The distribution obtained combining the scores of the six
subjects was significantly different from the expected (D =
.3564 p c.005). Likewise, on individual basis, the
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distribution of all the six monkeys was significantly different
from the expected (Al, D = .3778, p <.005; Ch, D = .4378, p
<.005; Ki, D = .5066, p <.005; Lu, D = .2778, P <.005; Mi,
D = .2578, p <.005; 01, D = .2578, p <.05).
5 stimuli condition.
The overall distribution obtained grouping the scores of
the six subjects was different from the expected (D = .3332
p <.005). On individual basis, the test was significant for
five monkeys (Al, D = .4656, p <.005; Ch, D = .4091, p
<.005; Ki, D = .4663, p <.005; Mi, D = .3591, p <.005; Ol,
D = .3591, p <.005).
6 stimuli condition.
The distribution obtained combining the scores of the six
subjects was significantly different from the expected (D =
. 3204 p <. 005), as well as the distributions obtained for each
of the monkeys (Al, D = .4507, p <.005; Ch, D = .4150, p
<.005; Ki, D = .3948, p <.005; Lu, D = .1875, P <.005; Mi,
D = .2374, p <.005; Ol, D = .3570, p <.05).
7 stimuli condition.
The distribution obtained combining the scores of the six
subjects was significantly different from the expected (D =
.2936, p <.005). On individual basis, the distribution
obtained for five of the monkeys differed significantly from
the expected (Al, D = .3282, p <.005; Ch, D = .4738, p
<.005; Ki, D = .4060, p <.005; Mi, D = .2361, p <.005; Ol,
D = .3282, p <.005).
8 stimuli condition.
The distribution obtained combining the scores of the six
subjects was significantly different from the expected (D =
.2698 p <.005). On individual basis, the distribution of
scores of four monkeys was significantly different from the
expected (Al, D = .4271, p <.005; Ch, D = .4769, p <.005;
Ki, D = .3427, p <.005; Ol, D = .2615, p <.005).
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9 stimuli condition.
The distribution obtained combining the scores of the six
subjects was significantly different from the expected (D =
.2690 p c.005). On individual basis, the distribution of
scores of four monkeys was significantly different from the
expected (Al, D = .4807, p <.005; Ch, D = .5118, p <.005;
Ki, D = .3519, p <.005; Ol, D = .3532, p <.005).
Overall, the results obtained from Phase II show that the
performance of the subjects was above chance level in all
conditions. This finding raised the question of whether
performance was underpinned by the deployment of some
strategic factors. Moreover, the assessment of whether the
subjects (when faced with larger sets of icons) tried to
compensate the inevitable increase in the delay of reward
(caused by the necessity to perform a longer search) by
speeding up their response latency was considered
interesting. The following section features a time analysis
performed in order to clarify these issues.
Analysis of temporal aspects of performance
The time analysis had two overall rationales.
a) Speed-accuracy trade-off
Since a negative correlation was found between the number of
icons presented and the performance of the subjects, it was
important to check whether the decrease of accuracy could
have been accounted by the subjects speeding up their
responses at expense of carefulness.
b) Evidence for organization.
A number of experiments conducted on adult humans (for a
review see Wright, 1990), have put evidence for motor
programming in relation with various time analyses in tasks
which share some similarities with those featured in this
thesis. In these experiments (Sternberg et al. 1982; Wright,
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1990) the subjects are required to report, either by speaking
or typewriting, a list of items (ranging from, single letters
or numbers to words of different lengths) previously
presented on a computer monitor. The results showed a
relationship between the length of the list to be reported and
the averaged inter-item interval during retrieval. This
finding has been interpreted as evidence for the presence of
motor programming, as opposed to simple chaining of
responses as a behaviourist account of the process underling
serial retrieved would postulate. In fact, a chaining
hypothesis would suggest that the production of each
component of the list to be reported is elicited by the
stimulus provided by the response to the previous one. This
latter process being local and always the same for different
list lengths, it cannot explain a difference in latencies as a
function of global features of the list to be reported (such as
its length). On the contrary, more sophisticated processes
used to organize the items in memory, to detect, retrieve,
and report them, might well be sensible to global features of
the list such as its length or its structural properties.
Of course, the sort of tasks used with human adults
differ in many aspects from those featured in this study and
the specific model proposed to account for the results
(Sternberg et al., 1982) do not allow to draw useful
predictions in the present study.
However, the tasks featured here require the production
of sequences of actions, in a context that provides both the
incentive and the opportunity to use some form of
organization of the series to be produced, as those devised
by Sternberg and colleagues (1982).
Thus, of particular interest was considered an assay of
the relationship between the length of the serial production
and the averaged inter-response time in monkey subjects, to
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see if it was possible to suggest some form of organization
and planning in their serial production.
The time analysis aimed to the evaluation of the
relationship between inter-touch intervals and the number
stimuli presented.
The specific rationale behind the present analysis was the
assumption that the larger the search space the more
organizational factors are recruited to control the search
behaviour (in order to reduce the memory load required by
keeping track of all the moves). If the behaviour of the
subjects is controlled by some forms of motor planning,
according to Sternberg and colleagues (Sternberg et al.,
1982), the length of the serial response should be correlated
with the averaged intertrial interval. Similarly, in our case,
a positive correlation between set size and intertrial interval
should be found.
The analysis was made as similar as possible to those used
by Sternberg and colleagues. In their experiments the time
analysis was conducted only on correct trials, and all trials
which contained pauses or where the subjects were not fluent
(In speaking) were eliminated from the analysis (Wright,
1990). Thus, the present analysis was conducted only on
minimal path trials, and all trials containing at least one
intertouch interval of 2 seconds or more were excluded. A
Page's L test was performed on the mean intertrial intervals
for the different sub-conditions.
Results
The test was highly significant (L, C=6, N=6 = 506 p
<. 001), showing that there was a regular increase of the
intertouch interval moving from the 4 stimuli sub-condition
up to the 9 stimuli sub-condition (see Fig. 4.12).
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Phase II
Mean Intertouoh Interval per condition
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Fig. 4.12. Averaged inter-touch interval for the different
conditions featured in Phase II.
From Fig. 4.12, it can be observed that only 4 subjects
out of six showed a positive trend. However, this was
enough to account for an overall positive trend.
The finding reported in this section, thus, can be taken
as evidence that 4 subjects were principled in their searches
and organized their responses according to global features of
the search space, such as its size. This finding rules out
the possibility that the observed negative relationship
between set size and economy of search was due to a speed
accuracy trade-off. On the contrary it seems better explained
by an increase of task difficulty produced by the increase of
the length of the serial production necessary to search
exhaustively a larger set of icons.
Conclusions
Overall, the results obtained from Phase II show that the
subjects were principled in all conditions. Moreover, from the
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time analysis some evidence of the use of organizational
constraints emerged. In fact, capuchins seemed to control
their behaviour according to some global features of the
search space such as its size. On the basis of these results,
therefore, it appeared worthwhile to evaluate the behaviour
of the monkeys during protracted testing with a configuration
which affords strong spatial constraints, such as the 9
stimuli one. This was done in Phase III.
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Phase III: assay of strategic behaviour
By presenting the subjects with the same configuration of 9
items until a stable state of performance was achieved, phase
III aimed at detecting possible changes over time in the level
of economy showed by the subjects, and the spectrum of
strategies which might support search efficiency.
From the results obtained from the time analysis performed
for phase II some evidence emerged supporting the fact that
larger set sizes produce incentive for organization. The
present phase, therefore, aimed at determining whether a
long exposure to the task would have changed search
behaviour in a large set with spatial affordability.
Filling up the 3x3 matrix, the 9 stimuli configuration
affords strong linear constraints. Moreover, it offers the
opportunity of using a fixed location from which the search
can begin, as well as the possibility of moving along fixed
paths through the search space, and of conforming to an
adjacency principle in exploring the array.
As mentioned above, a parallel study conducted on
children (McGonigle et al., 1992; Dickinson, in preparation)
showed that four and half year olds, when faced with an
analogous set, exploited all the spatial constraints afforded
by the configuration by means of very principled trajectories
through the search space. This led to an almost perfect
performance (about 100% non-redundant touches). The fact
that the use of such strategic factors sustained performance,
was confirmed by the observation that younger children (3
years old) were never as principled as their older
companions, and, as a consequence, their performance was
defective. The relationship between age and minimal path
trials is shown in Fig. 4.13a. Examples of typical trajectory
throughout the search space used by subjects of the two age
groups are shown in Fig. 4.13b and c.
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Fig. 4.13. a) Percentage of minimal path trials performed
by children of different ages, redrawn by permission from
Dickinson (in preparation), b) A trajectory frequently
observed by the most proficient children (whose
performance is represented by line I of the graph), c) an
example of a less principled trajectory performed by the
youngest children (whose performance is represented by
line IV of the graph). The unfilled arrows represent non
adjacent moves towards the pointed item.
Although it was clear that older children were able to use
the perceptive information about the spatial constraints of the
set to control their search behaviour, while the younger
children failed to do so in such a principled way, the
experiment on children did not bring results about the
regulatory mechanisms, which, according to the working
hypothesis for the present experiment, might be deployed in
the course of task practice.
Nevertheless, the behaviour of older children provided an
empirical template for maximal fitness to the task. On the
other hand, the mathematical model of the probabilities
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associated with searches of a particular length, obtained
assuming a random walk through the search space (St
Johnston, 1993), was taken as representative of the lower
end of the distribution of possible search patterns. Within
this scale, ranging from unprincipled to highly strategic
behaviour, an assay was attempted of the spatial organization
imposed by monkey subjects on the search space and its
change over time.
Procedure
All the 50 trials presented in each daily session featured
the presentation of 9 monochromatic stimuli. The
administration of this condition continued if a positive trend
in the percentage of non-redundant touches was observed.
Data analysis
The data analysis featured an evaluation of the overall
performance shown by the subjects in phase III and a trend
analysis to assay changes in economy of search over time.
Both were based on the percentage of non-redundant touches
performed by the subjects.
The analysis of the overall performance of the subjects in
phase III (as for the previous phases) was a comparison of
the obtained distributions of scores with those expected by
chance, performed using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
The trend analysis was based on the Page L trend test
(Siegel and Castellan, 1988).
Results
OVERALL ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE
a) group performance
The combined distribution for the six subjects was
significantly different from the expected (D = .3281, p
<.005). The distributions of trials for this condition are
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Fig. 4.14. a) Observed (bars) and expected (line)
percentage of trials of a particular length observed in
Phase III. b) The observed (bars) and expected (line)
cumulative distributions of trials on which the statistical
test was based on.
From Fig. 4.14 it can be observed that the obtained
distribution differed from the expected mainly for its modal
tendency toward economic trials.
b) individual performance
On individual basis, the distribution of scores of four
monkeys was significantly different from the expected (Al, D
= .2844, p <.005; Ch, D = .5427, p <.005; Mi, D = .2887, p
<.005; Ol, D = .4183, p <.005). Fig. 4.15 shows the




nurtxr of tautfw iwtfar of kul« oiotw at maw
ttM rioter si ffak-M1 tw rirtw of BW* • 7«o toMmjtwottM-800
MM Lxte Klssy
iurtw of mtm tirtxr of Uucta nurtw of Durt»
taUnotrslttt-eeB kM ru*r of Ma • 690 toUnurt»o<ti«t-3B8
Fig. 4.15. Distribution of trial lengths obtained in Phase
III for each of the monkeys.
Thus, 4 monkeys performed exhaustive searches in a 9
stimuli set above chance level. The shape of their
distribution of scores was so different from the expected to
lead to a significant result for the group.
In the next section, an analysis of the development over
time of such a proficiency will be presented.
EVIDENCE FOR IMPROVEMENT WITH PRACTICE
As for Phase I, a Page L trend test was performed on the
observed percentages of non-redundant touches obtained for
each of the vincent sixths in which the overall distribution
was divided. A positive trend in the percentage of non-
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redundant touches over these successive different blocks of
trials was considered as a suggestion that the subjects were
self-regulating their behaviour in order to achieve a better
economy of search.
The Page L trend test performed on the combined data for
all the subject was significant (p <.05), as shown in Fig.
4.16.
Phase III
trend across blocks of trials
Pife'i L trend teat, [{MI, N"8) ■ 479-6 p <.06
Fig. 4.16. Percentage of non-redundant touches. On the
horizontal axis the different vincent sixths, in which the
global distribution was divided, are reported. On the
vertical axis the percentage of non-redundant touches
observed in each block of trials is reported.
Individual trends for the 9 stimuli sub-condition are




Fig. 4.17. Individual trends observed in Phase III. See
Caption of Fig. 4.16 for explanations.
From a visual inspection of Fig. 4.17, it can be noted that
the performance of 4 monkeys (Mi, Ol, Ch and Lu) accounts
for the overall trend, while the other 2 monkeys (A1 and Ki)
did not show a positive trend.
Fig. 4.18 shows how the distribution of trial length
changed in the course of practice. From it, the fact that the
improvement of performance was mostly due to shift of the
mode towards searches progressively closer to minimal paths
can be observed.
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Fig. 4.18. Change in the distribution of trial lengths with
practice. Blocks I-VI, respectively from top left to bottom
right.
Overall, these results showed the ability of the subjects
to achieve great economy of search and self-regulate their
actions over time. In the next section the use of some forms
of spatial constraints available to the subjects in this 3x3
matrix, will be scrutinised, in order to evaluate which sort
of strategic factors (if any) their performance was based on.
EVIDENCE FOR THE USE OF CONSTRAINTS
Starting points
In order to assess if subjects were beginning their
searches from preferred positions, a chi squared was
performed on the location selected to start the search in each
trial.
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The results showed that starting points were not equally
distributed among the 9 possible locations (Chi squared (df =
8) p <.001 for all the monkeys.
This result was considered to be the first indication of
the fact that the subjects were deploying strategic factors in
order to reduce the memory effort required by a high level
of fitness to the task. In fact, it can be assumed that a
subject which knows the location (or set of locations) from
which its searches always start, is less likely to reiterate on
this location in the terminal phase of the search. It will know
that the starting location is likely to be already visited.
Thus, the number of items to remember is reduced of one
element.
Adjacent moves
In order to assess if the trajectory followed by the
monkeys in the search space was based on successive moves
on adjacent locations, chi squared were performed on the
four classes of possible transitions defined by the distance of
two successive touches in the set of stimuli. The analysis
was based on the frequency of each transition type.
The chi squared performed on the combined frequencies
for the group of six monkeys was highly significant (chi
squared = 17854.8, df = 3, p <.001). Fig. 4.19 shows the
obtained and the expected percentages for each transition
distance (between successive moves).
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Fig. 4.19. Obtained and expected percentages of
transitions for each distance (calculated in terms of items
interposed between two locations on the screen).
From Fig. 4.19, the fact that only adjacent moves were
more than expected can be observed. In contrast, all other
types of transitions were below the expected value. This,
together with the high total number of transitions observed,
(n = 61027) explains the very high value of the obtained chi
squared.
The same results were obtained for individual subjects
(Al, chi squared = 4263.6, df = 3, p <.001; Ch, chi squared
= 3715.4, df = 3, p <.001; Ki, chi squared = 4748.2, df = 3,
p <.001; Lu, chi squared = 1894, df = 3, p <.001; Mi, chi
squared = 3556, df = 3, p <.001; Ol, chi squared = 4568.3,
df = 3, p <. 001). The obtained and expected percentages of















































Fig. 4.20. Individual monkeys. Obtained and expected
percentages of transitions for each distance (calculated in
terms of items interposed between two locations on the
screen).
Fig. 4.20 shows that results based on individual subjects
support the conclusions drawn for the group as a whole.
Thus, monkeys were using adjacent moves more than
expected. However, their percentages of adjacent moves
never reached the level shown by the most proficient
children of the study quoted earlier. In fact, a trajectory
such as the one showed in Fig. 4.13b, consists of a 100% of
adjacent moves. The percentages of the monkeys never
approximated this value.
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In addition, a visual inspection of the videotapes of the
testing sessions, showed a high variability among different
trials in the paths followed by the subjects during their
searches. For this reason, it was impossible to evaluate on
quantitative basis if the monkeys were using some form of
vectorial organization of their search paths like children,
even if just on probabilistic basis, and perhaps only on some
sub-sequences of responses. However, from ocular inspection
of the videotapes the fact that the subjects were using some
privileged directions of travel seemed quite clear.
Examples of common directions of transitions (taken from the
behaviour of one the most proficient subjects, Ch) are shown
in Fig. 4.21. There, the fact that not all the possible
directions of transitions were represented in the search
patterns of the monkey (and that some transitions were
highly preferred) can be observed.
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Charlie Directions of Transitions
Adjacent transitions Non-adjacent transitions
100-199 200-299 300-399 400-499
frequency
600*
Fig. 4.21. Subject Charlie, frequencies of transitions in
particular directions. The transitions are calculated on the
first 9 moves (8 transitions). Only frequencies above
chance level are reported in the figure. The thickness of
the arrows is proportional to the frequency of that
particular transition.
Overall, the results presented so far point to a
spontaneous tendency to economically search a set of 9
stimuli. Moreover, the proficiency of the monkeys improved
with practice and their performance seemed to be sustained
by the strategic use of some constraints afforded by the
spatial configuration of the search space. Faced with a fixed
and spatially constrained configuration, they tended to start
from preferred locations, move predominantly on adjacent
items and, probably, they followed some preferred directions
of travel. This behaviour stands in marked contrast with the
"performance" of the random trajectory probability model
mentioned earlier.
However, the searches of the monkeys were not as
principled and economic as those of 4 and half year old
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children. On the contrary, it seems that the behaviour of the
monkeys partially overlapped with that of younger children,
falling midway between the completely principled and economic
search behaviour of the older children and the completely
unprincipled and mostly uneconomical "behaviour" of the
random model.
At this point a question still to be answered is why
monkeys did not self-regulate even more, approximating the
very principled behaviour shown by successful children. Two
alternative explanatory hypotheses can be formulated. The
first is that, in the course of task practice the subjects
tended to speed up their responses to detriment of accuracy.
The results presented for Phase II already ruled out the fact
that the subjects were increasing the speed of response when
more items were present. However, in the present case, it
was still possible that they were increasing the speed of
response in the course of task practice. The second
hypothesis is that within their search trajectory, subjects
were, at some point, loosing track of where they were and
thus found it difficult to remember the items already
touched.
In the following section these hypothesis will be evaluated,
on the basis of a time analysis of the behaviour of the
monkeys.
TIME ANALYSIS
The first hypothesis formulated to explain why the
subjects economy of search reached a plateau before becoming
optimal, was based on a speed-accuracy trade-off argument.
If the currency used by the subjects to evaluate their
economy was the time spent in each search, they might have
tried to increase the speed of response instead of trying to
search in a more principled fashion. Fig. 4.21 shows the
averaged duration of searches completed in different number
of touches for each of the successive Vincent sixths. The
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figure also shows the trial's duration, which would have been
expected if the intertouch interval remained constant
(calculated on the basis of the averaged inter-trial interval
registered on minimal paths).
averaged search duration
i I I I L_J_
8 10 111218 14 181817181820212823 24 2628X72828 30 81
number of touches
Fig. 4.22 Observed trial duration for searches of different
lengths (on the horizontal axis are the number of touches
reported) in the different blocks of trials, and duration
predicted on the basis of the averaged inter-touch interval
recorded on minimal paths (thick line).
From the figure it can be observed that the curves for
the different blocks of trials practically overlap and the
monkeys never became faster than expected.
From these results some interesting observations can be
made. The reader will remember that in Phase II, a positive
trend was found when the intertouch intervals were plotted
according to the size of the search space. Following
Sternberg and colleagues (Sternberg et al., 1982; Wright,
1990), these results were interpreted as evidence for the
presence of some form of motor programming and as a
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suggestion that the larger the search space, the more
organizational factors were recruited to explore it. Now, from
the current results, it is apparent that even in the less
economic trials the subjects were not reducing their
intertouch interval. Thus, the Sternberg argument, if
applied to the current data, would allow the conclusion that
the same organizational constraints that the subjects were
using when maximally economic (on minimal paths) were still
deployed in the less economic trials. Therefore, the latter
should not be the expression of occasional relaxations of the
subject to unprincipled searches. On the contrary, it seems
that because the strategies were never maximally principled,
they (although applied in every trial) led to some long and
non-economical searches. It can also be conjectured that the
discrepancy between the predicted and the observed trial
time in the very long searches might be an expression of the
fact that when the subjects were losing track of where they
were (along the search trajectory), some extra-time was
spent in the attempt of identifying those icons that still
needed to be visited.
Thus, apparently, a speed-accuracy trade-off account
cannot explain the failure of the monkeys in reducing the
search costs below a given point. A more plausible
hypothesis can be based on the relative frequencies of long
trials recorded in the different Vincent sixths. In fact, the
distribution shown in Fig. 4.14, 4.15, and 4.17, shows that
the frequency of the most uneconomical trials sharply
decreased in the course of practice. Thus, the hypothesis
can be formulated that in the late trials the subjects were
lacking in part of an important source of negative feedback,
and for this reason were not able to self-regulate their
behaviour above a certain level. In other words, they might
have become victims of their own success.
In order to test the hypothesis that, when provided with
some additional negative feedback for very long searches, the
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subjects would have continued to regulate their actions, a





This experiment focused on the effects of explicit negative
feedback on task fitness, and on the self-regulatory
processes towards economy, which, as we have seen,
accompany practice.
As outlined in the introduction, an economy/data reduction
hypothesis would postulate that an organism, faced with the
problem of organising long serial productions of acts, will
tend to find an optimal balance between external costs
(associated, for example, with the time spent to get a
reward) and internal costs (associated with the management
of cognitive resources5).
From the distribution of trial lengths obtained from
experiment 1, we have seen that, in the course of task
practice, the frequency of very long trials (i.e.
characterised by a large number of surplus moves over the
minimum required) was progressively reduced (see figure
4.18). However, Fig. 4.18, shows also that after a long task
exposure, the (right) tail of the distribution was still
characterized by the occasional presence of very long trials.
On the basis of these results, the hypothesis was
formulated that the subjects, after having self-regulated
their behaviour up to a certain standard of economy, started
to lack a valuable source of negative feedback (which at the
beginning of testing was provided by a high frequency of
very long searches). As a consequence, the conjecture was
made that monkeys began to encounter difficulties in the
evaluation of their own behaviour (by comparing the costs of
5 Aimed, for example, at the attainment of a satisfactory
trade-off between the cognitive strain required by the
development of strategies (which allow the reduction of the
memory load) and the advantage deriving from the reduction
of memory load itself.
Chapter IV 144
"good" and "bad" runs) and that this led to a stable state of
their performance.
Thus, in this experiment much more explicit feedback of
behaviour fitness (albeit at the end of each sequence) was
given to the subjects. The mostly unfitted sequences of
responses were penalized by omitting the reward and
prolonging the intertrial interval when the number of
redundant touches exceeded a given criterion. This was done
in order to "prune" the distribution of trials by "cutting-off"
the tail of occasional extremely long searches. The rationale
was to assess whether such a perturbation of the equilibrium
reached by the subjects between internal and external costs
could have pushed them towards further self-regulation, in
order to find a new satisfactory balance between the two
types of costs.
Materials and Methods
The same subjects and apparatus used in Experiment 1 were
employed in Experiment 2.
Procedure
The procedure followed in Experiment 2 was similar to the
one adopted in phases I and III of Experiment 1. The subject
was presented with different conditions featuring different
numbers of stimuli. In particular, conditions featuring 3, 4,
5 and 9 stimuli were presented.
As in Experiment 1, the subject was required to touch all
the stimuli on the monitor, in order to clear the screen,
produce a series of tones and obtain a peanut as a reward.
The stimuli were exactly the same as those presented in
Experiment 1.
However, in Experiment 2, the subject was penalized when
the number of reiterations in a trial exceeded a criterion
(repetitions were still allowed and were not penalized). The
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penalty consisted in the omission of the reward and in the
addition of further 5 sec delay to the 15 sec intertrial
interval.
During the extra 5 sec delay a white screen was
presented and a tone (different from that one presented
before the administration of a reward) signalled that the trial
was to be penalized. The criterion for penalty was
established, for each subject and for each stimulus number
condition, on the basis of the distribution of trial lengths
obtained from Experiment 1. As criterion, the number of
reiterations that allowed the subject to obtain the reward in
the 85% of the trials was chosen. If the subject improved,
the criterion was modified accordingly.
Data Analysis and Results
ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF TRIALS OBTAINED IN
EXPERIMENT 2
Data Analysis.
As for Experiment 1, to compare the distributions of scores
obtained in the different conditions with those expected by
chance for the same number of stimuli, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov one sample test was used (see data analysis of
Experiment 1). A Wilcoxon test for related samples was used
to compare the performance shown by the subjects in the
present experiment with the data obtained from experiment
one. A trend analysis was performed to evaluate the
improvement with practice. Finally, the chi square test was
used for a microanalysis of the spatial strategies adopted by
the subjects.
Results
3 stimuli condition. The combined distribution of scores
for the six subjects was not statistically significant,
however, when the data were analyzed for each individual
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subject, the distribution of four of the six subjects was
significantly different from the expected (Al, D = .4600, p
<.01; Ch, D = .0833, p <.05; Mi D = .2071, p <.05; 01, D =
.2400, p <.01).
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Fig. 4.23. 3 stimuli condition a) Observed (bars) and
expected (line) percentage of trials of a particular length,
b) The observed (bars) and expected (line) cumulative
distribution of trials on which the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
was based.
Comparing Fig. 4.23, with Fig. 4.3, which shows the results
obtained from the 3 stimuli condition of experiment 1, it can
be observed that the two distributions look very similar.
This confirms the hypothesis that, with such a small search
space, even a random exploration of the configuration would
produce a satisfactory percentage of minimal path trials, thus
producing no incentive to self-regulate.
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4 stimuli condition. The distribution obtained combining
the scores of the six subjects was significantly different from
the expected (D = .3697 p c.005), as well as the
distributions obtained for each of the subjects (Al, D =
.2984, p <.005; Ch, D = .3702, p <.005; Ki, D = .2704, p
<.005; Lu, D = 3844, p <.005; Mi, D = .4540, p <.005; Ol, D
= .4183, p <.005).
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Fig. 4.24. 4 stimuli condition a) Observed (bars) and
expected (line) percentage of trials of a particular length,
b) The observed (bars) and expected (line) cumulative
distribution of trials on which the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
was based.
Comparing the distribution shown in Fig. 4.24 with that
obtained for the 4 stimuli condition of experiment 1 (see Fig.
4.4), it can be observed that there was an effect of selective
feedback, and it found expression especially as an increase
of the percentage of minimal path trials.
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5 stimuli condition. The distribution obtained combining
the scores of the six subjects was different from the
expected (D = . 4629 p <. 005), as well as the distribution
obtained from each of the monkeys (Al, D = .4208, p <.005;
Ch, D = .5350, p <.005; Ki, D = .4876, p <.C05; Lu, D =
.4261, p <.005; Mi, D = .4270, p <.005; Ol, D = .5224, p
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Fig. 4.25. 5 stimuli condition a) Observed (bars) and
expected (line) percentage of trials of a particular length,
b) The observed (bars) and expected (line) cumulative
distribution of trials on which the Kolmogorov-Smimov test
was based.
Comparing Fig. 4.25 with Fig. 4.5 which shows the
distribution obtained from the 5 stimuli condition of
experiment 1, it can be observed that the distribution
obtained from experiment 2 is characterized by a sharp
reduction of long trials and by an increase in the percentage
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of both minimal paths and trials characterized by only few
surplus moves.
9 stimuli condition. The distribution for the group of the
subjects was different from the expected (D = .5529 p <.005)
as the distribution obtained for each of the individuals (Al,
D = .5153, p <.005; Ch, D = .6683, p <.005; Ki, D = .6044,
p <.005; Lu, D = .4318, p <.005; Mi, D = .4148, p <.005;
Ol, D = .5723, p <.005). The distribution of trials obtained
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Fig. 4.26. 6 stimuli condition a) Observed (bars) and
expected (line) percentage of trials of a particular length,
b) The observed (bars) and expected (line) cumulative
distribution of trials on which the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
was based.
The 9 stimuli condition is the condition where the effect of
selective feedback was most conspicuous. The distribution of
trials differs sharply from that obtained in experiment 1
(compare with Fig. 4.14). Thus, it seems clear that the
feedback provided in this experiment had its most powerful
Chapter IV 150
effect in this condition which featured a large number of
items and strong spatial constraints to be exploited.
In order to check quantitatively the overall reduction of
redundant moves produced by the selective feedback in
conditions featuring 9 stimuli, a Wilcoxon test was performed
to compare the percentages of non-redundant touches
observed in the equivalent conditions of experiment 1 and 2.
The mean percentage of non-redundant touches, performed
by all the subjects in experiment 2 was higher than in
experiment 1 (Wilcoxon's test T(N = 6) = 0 p <.05). Thus, as
shown in Fig. 4.27, the performance of all subjects benefited
from the explicit feedback provided in experiment 2.
Percentages of non-redundant touches
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Fig. 4.27. Percentage of non-redundant touches obtained
in the 9 stimuli conditions of experiment 1 (Phase III) and
2.
From Fig. 4.27, a positive correlation can also be
observed (Rho = .895 p < .05) between performance of each
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subject in the 2 experiments (i.e. the most proficient
subjects in the non-feedback condition are the best subjects
in the feedback condition as well).
The effect of explicit feedback is even more evident when
the portion of the improvement space gained in experiment 2
is considered, as shown in Fig. 4.28.
Portion of improvement space gained in
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Fig. 4.28. Portion of improvement space gained in the 9
condition stimuli of experiment 2.
EVIDENCE FOR THE USE OF CONSTRAINTS
Since, in experiment 1 some evidence was found of the fact
that performance was sustained by the deployment of spatial
strategies, an analogous analysis was performed for
experiment 2, where a better overall performance was found.
The analysis of the search strategies deployed by the
subjects was conducted (as for experiment 1) on the
condition featuring 9 stimuli, where the complete filling-up of
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the 3x3 grid, afforded stronger spatial constraints than the
other conditions.
Starting points
As, in experiment 1, it was found that starting points were
not equally distributed among the 9 possible locations (Chi^,
df = 8, p <.001 for all the monkeys).
However, since each subject did not chose an unique
starting location and there was a variability between the
starting points selected by different subjects, it proved
impossible to compare quantitatively the differential use of
this strategy in the two experiments.
Nevertheless, a quantitative comparison between the two
experiments was performed for adjacent moves, which,
allowing a measure of their overall percentage, made it
possible to compare directly the results obtained from
experiment 1 and 2.
Adjacent moves
The rationale and the procedure for the analysis of adjacent
moves was the same as delineated for experiment 1.
As for experiment 1, the chi^ performed on the combined
frequencies for the group of six monkeys was highly
significant (chi^ = 405999.3, df = 3, p <.001).
Fig. 4.29 shows the relationship between the obtained and
the expected percentages of transitions according to the
distance between two successive moves.
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Fig. 4.29. Obtained and expected percentages of
transitions for each distance (calculated in terms of items
interposed between two locations on the screen.
From Fig. 4.29 it can be observed that only adjacent
moves were more than expected. In contrast, all other types
of transitions were less than expected. The sample on which
the analysis was conducted was very affluent (n = 89159), as
for experiment 1, and again this explains the very high
value of the obtained chi .
Moreover, comparing the percentage of adjacent moves
observed in this experiment and those reported for the 9
stimuli condition of experiment 1 (see Fig. 4.19), it can be
observed that in experiment 2 the subjects performed a 10%
more adjacent moves than in the previous experiment.
As shown in Fig. 4.30, when individual subjects were
considered, analogous results were found (Al, chi2 = 6067.4,
df = 3, p <.001; Ch, chi2 7708.8, df = 3, p <.001; Ki, chi2
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= 5402.6, df = 3, p <.001; Lu,
<.001; Mi, chi2 = 8184.4, df = 3,
df = 3, p <.001).
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Fig. 4.30. Individual monkeys. Obtained and expected
percentages of transitions for each distance {calculated in
terms of items interposed between two locations on the
screen).
EVIDENCE FOR IMPROVEMENT WITH PRACTICE
As for Experiment 1, a Page's trend test was performed for
each subject, in each condition, on data divided in vincent
sixths, to assess if performance improved across successive
periods of testing.
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In all the sub-conditions none of the trends were
significant. To exemplify the type of curves obtained from
the analysis, Fig. 4.31 shows the combined performance of all
the monkeys in the different vincent sixth of the 9 stimuli
sub-condition.
Trend across blocks of trials
9 stimuli experiment 2
66
64
Averaged 16 non-redundant touohes





Page's L trend test, L{C-8,N-6) - 446 n.s.
II III IV V VI
Blocks of trials
Fig. 4.31. Percentage of non-redundant touches. On the
horizontal axis the different vincent sixth, in which the
global distribution was divided, are reported. On the
vertical axis the percentage of non-redundant touches
observed in each block of trials is reported.
From individual performances (shown in Fig. 10) it can be
noted that only one monkey (Ch) showed a positive trend
across blocks of trials.
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Fig. 4.32 Individual performances observed in the 9 stimuli
condition. See Caption of Fig. 4.31 for explanations.
Thus, it seems as if the explicit feedback, had a strong
effect on the performance as soon as it was introduced but,
further task practice, even, when accompanied by a
progressively more severe criterion for reward, did not find
a parallel in the performance of the subjects.
This conclusion was supported by an analysis of the
relationship between percentages of non-redundant touches
and the criterional mastery level required at different points
of testing. The results are shown in Fig. 4.33.
Since the criterion was established for each monkey on the
basis of its performance, the criterional levels were divided
into three groups for the analysis. The first group included
the lower group of criterional levels, class two the
intermediate, and class 3 the most severe ones (for example,
for a subject whose criterion was reduced from 12 to 3
redundant-touches allowed for reward, group 1 would include
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the performance obtained when the criterion ranged from 12
to 10 redundant touches, group 2 the performance when the
criterion was comprised between 9 and 7, and group 3 when
the criterion ranged from 6 to 4 redundant moves).
Performance in the feedback condition followed the trend
of the cut-off point for reward in only two subjects (overall
results non-significant), as shown in Fig. 4.33.
criterional levels of proficiency











10 20 30 40 50 00 70 80
* NON-REDUNDANT TOUCHES
Fig. 4.33. The three groups of criterional mastery levels
against which the percentages of non-redundant touches
were plotted, are described as low, medium and high
proficiency (see text for explanations).
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN USE OF ADJACENT MOVES AND
PERFORMANCE
The only evidence for a correlation between percentages
of adjacent moves and performance was obtained comparing
the difference between the adjacent moves observed in
minimal path trials and those observed in all the other trials
containing at least one surplus move. From Fig. 4.34, it can
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be observed that the percentage of adjacent moves was larger
when minimal paths were compared with the other trials, in
both experiment 1 and 2.
Adjacent moves 9 stimuli





V/A all other trials 40
3S9 expected
20
experiment 1 experiment 2
minimal paths 04.27 74.87
all other trials 69.38 04.83
expeoted 33.33 33.33
Fig. 4.34. Observed and expected percentages of adjacent
moves in minimal and non-minimal path trials.
Only for Alfie were adjacent moves correlated with
performance in Phase III of experiment 1 (N.B. Alfie shows a
negative trend in this condition).
Discussion
Explicit negative feedback proved effective in increasing the
economy of search of the subjects in all the conditions
featuring 4 icons or more. Hence, there is evidence in
support of the hypothesis that the ceiling effect observed in
experiment one was due to a difficulty in differentiating
between good and bad runs once the subjects had
spontaneously reduced the frequency of inefficient searches
in the course of practice.
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Further support in favour of the economy data/reduction
hypothesis was given by the finding that economic searches
were accompanied by an increase in the use of spatial
strategies such as moving to adjacent icons in successive
moves. However, even with explicit feedback, monkeys do
not spontaneously develop such principled searches which
allow 4 and half year old children to achieve a maximally
economic search efficiency.
4.4 Conclusions
In summary, with the experiments described in this chapter,
the following things seem to have been achieved.
Touch screen based procedures have been tested with
capuchin monkeys. The monkeys readily adapted to the tasks
and the apparatus. The system proved effective in allowing a
precise measure of sequential patterns of responses and
associated time variables.
Using touch screen based tasks, it proved possible to
overcome the limitations of the WGTA. The paradigms and the
apparatus afforded protracted testing, giving the opportunity
to collect an affluent data base and to evaluate changes in
expertise over time.
It was found that, practicing the task, the subjects
spontaneously reduced the number of surplus moves,
advancing towards the maximal level of behaviour fitness,
objectively defined as the ratio between number of items to
be explored and total number of touches observed.
As a comparative note, pigeons that are currently being
tested with the same apparatus and procedures (Dickinson,
in preparation) show a very different behavioural profile.
The fact itself that the versatility of the paradigms permits
the collection of data on birds too, in my opinion supports
the idea that the method is a comparative tool of extreme
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value. Pigeons tested on search spaces up to 5 icons show
only little spontaneous improvement on sets with 3 icons. In
sets of 4 and 5 icons their economy of search remains
constant even when they are given protracted exposure to
the task and selective feedback for economy (omission of
reward for trials exceeding a particular number of surplus
touches). Thus, the ability to self-regulate seems to be an
important dimension for cross-species comparison.
Practising the task, the fitness of the behaviour of the
monkeys reached similar levels for arrays comprising from 3
to 5 stimuli, albeit more trials were required before a plateau
was observed in conditions featuring more stimuli.
Nevertheless, when the possibility to improve with
practice was prevented, the length of the serial production
required for the subjects, (objectively defined as the number
of icons presented on the screen), proved to be an important
predictor of the performance of the subjects. In fact, when
different conditions (featuring different number of stimuli)
were embedded in the same testing session, an inverse
relationship between performance and number of stimuli was
found.
A complementary time analysis indicated that, when more
icons were presented, the subjects where slower in their
responses. This suggested that more sophisticated
organizational devices were deployed when a longer serial
production was required. A measurement of latencies shown
by species (such as pigeons) which do not improve their
economy of search with practice would be of great interest.
An absence of the time related phenomena observed in
monkeys would give indirectly support to the hypothesis that
these organizational factors sustained self-regulation and the
increase in the economy of search.
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In fact, principled sequential patterns (strongly
contrasting with a random walk through the configuration to
be explored) were detected in the behaviour of the monkeys.
The trajectory through the icons was constrained by the use
of preferred starting locations, the high probability of
moving to a spatially adjacent item after each choice, and
possibly the use of preferred directions of travel.
Since a parallel study with children showed a cross
correlation between constrained sequential patterns and task
fitness, the strategic factors detected in the behaviour of the
monkeys was interpreted as a tendency towards economy.
Consistently with a data/reduction hypothesis, I proposed
that the subjects were using search strategies (aimed to
reduce the number of items to be tracked), in order to avoid
an excessive number of redundant moves. The fact that the
subjects failed to achieve the maximal fitness shown by 4 and
half year old children, was taken as a validation of the idea
that, when the production of long sequences of responses is
required, performance cannot be based exclusively on brute
memory. On the contrary, very strong organizational devices
are needed for high levels of economy. If these devices are
not used in a fully principled way, the system does not
reach maximal economy.
From the results of experiment 2, it was seen that by
giving the subjects explicit feedback at the end of each trial,
their behaviour shifted further towards maximal fitness,
before showing a definite ceiling effect.
The improvement produced by the explicit feedback was
accompanied by an increase in the use of some forms of
constraints. In particular, it was shown that the subjects
were spontaneously using more adjacent moves in situations
where an explicit feedback of behaviour fitness was
provided. Moreover, it was shown that adjacent moves were
used more in the most fit trials (the minimal paths) as
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compared with those trials which contained at least one
redundant move). This phenomenon gave strong support for
the idea that the level of fitness to the task was effectively
correlated with the extent to which constraints were exploited
in a principled fashion.
Nevertheless, it proved impossible to find a clear
correlation between the change in fitness to the task and the
use of particular spatial constraints. This was due to two
main reasons. Firstly, some of the spatial constraints
afforded by the configurations featured in these experiments
did not allow a precise measure of their use. Especially
considering that they were used on probabilistic basis and
not in such a fully principled way as observed for 4 and half
year old children. Secondly, only the use of spatial
(vectorised) strategies is transparent in these sorts of tasks
and almost exclusively in the 9 stimuli condition, where the
configuration was highly constrained and remained constant
across different trials. The conjecture can be made that when
the spatial affordability of the set (sucL as its linear
arrangement) is not fully perceived at the outset and
transduced in search trajectories (as for the 4 and half year
old children) the combinatorial space of alternative paths
(within the search space) is to high to induct the potential
response templates, except at the local level illustrated by
adjacent moves.
However, it was clear that the procedures and the
apparatus were promising and that the subjects showed
incentive towards self-regulation, (in terms of a search for
sources of constraints through the search space) to achieve
economy. The general strategy of moving from weaker to
stronger forms of external intervention (i.e. selective
feedback) proved extremely appropriate given that it allowed
the observation of a tendency towards a completely
spontaneous form of regulation. Obviously, if selective
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feedback was used from the outset, the detection of such a
tendency would have been impossible.
Thus, given that some basic parameters had been set, the
way was open for new tasks, which afforded more strategic
opportunities. The specific question posed was whether or
not the subjects would have spontaneously shown a tendency
to use forms of constraints other than spatial. One obvious
candidate (as proposed by McGonigle, 1987) seemed to be the
superimposition of classificatory schemes over a search space
which allowed the subdivision into different chunks according
to different features shared by groups of icons to be
explored.
Since the strategy of implementing first untutored
versions of the task (no selective feedback) proved effective
here, it was adopted for the rest of the program. The




AN EXPERIMENT ON SPONTANEOUS CLASSIFICATION
5.1 Introduction
In the light of the conclusions mentioned at the end of the
previous chapter, the experiment that will be described here aimed
to assess if monkeys would have spontaneously imposed
categorisation schemes over a set of icons varying according to
multidimensional features (see McGonigle, 1987).
Very few researches have focused on spontaneous classification in
capuchin monkeys. Some data derive from a developmental and
comparative study conducted by Antinucci and colleagues
(Antinucci, 1989). Inspired by the Piagetian tradition, their general
methodology involved leaving the subject free to interact with sets
of randomly scattered objects. The features of the objects were
varied according to a 4 x 4 classification matrix (4 forms x 4
materials).
In one first experiment (Antinucci, 1989; Natale, 1989) the
differential application of four manipulatory schemata (mouthing,
handling, visual exploration and secondary schemata: actions that
involved both the object acted upon and another object or surface)
to the different kinds of objects was evaluated.
According to the authors, capuchin monkeys distinguished the
four types of objects from one another and this was taken as
evidence for classification through action schemata. However, most
of the difference was accounted for by the comparison of visual
exploration versus secondary schemata. Only two of the four
different groups of actions were taken into consideration. The
objects maximally differentiated were cups (high frequency of visual
exploration but a very low frequency of secondary schemata) and
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sticks (high frequency of secondary schemata and a very low level
of visual exploration).
Although some evidence of spontaneous classification in capuchin
monkey emerged from this study, several methodological weakness
make the results far from being conclusive.
Firstly, some of the comparisons between the patterns of action
schemata on different objects were merely based on the visual
inspection of the frequencies and not supported by any statistical
analysis. Secondly, one of the authors claims that: "a certain
amount of arbitrariness in identifying, equalling as instances of the
same class, and, especially, segmenting manipulative events cannot
be avoided" (Natale, 1989, p. 148).
Thirdly, the design, claimed to be partially longitudinal and
partially cross-sectional, was based on a very small sample of
subjects: one cebus was tested at 16, 36 and 48 months, a second
was tested two times at 36 and 48 months and a third only at 16
months (however, the results were obtained from data collapsed
across ages, since no differences were observed between the age
subgroups).
Apart from the methodological shortcomings, it should be noted
that classification, as defined in that study, is at its most
elementary level i.e. how and to what extent types of objects are
assimilated by different action schemata depending on their
properties. That is what Inhelder and Piaget (1964) claimed to be a
sort of practical classification, somewhat reminiscent of the later
definition by use, but not yet comparable to functional
classification.
A somewhat more sophisticated form of classification was detected
in their second study (Spinozzi and Natale, 1989). This was based
on an independent analysis of the videotaped session obtained from
the first study. Videotapes were scanned to detect all cases in
which 2 or more objects had been grouped together (compositions)
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and to find out the class properties of the successions of objects
manipulated to form each composition (object selecting).
Some evidence for classification was found even here, where the
analysis was not based exclusively on the weak criterion of
classification by differential use.
However, in this case too, the criteria for establishing instances
of classificatory behaviour were far from being strict. In fact, both
UNMIXED (objects belonging to the same uass) and MIXED (objects
belonging to different classes) compositions (as well as selections)
were considered instances of classificatcr-' activity, because both
were meant to imply that the subjects wer: taking into account the
classes into which the set of objects coui ::e divided.
Furthermore, as far as I understand, to be considered MIXED the
compositions and selections did not require that an the objects
belonged to different classes. In addition, it is very difficult to find
out what the evidence for statistical significance was, given that it
is not stated what test was used to evaluate the deviation from a
random distribution.
Moreover, the fact that most of the compositions were of two
objects only, and that those involving the grouping of more that 3
objects were extremely rare makes the evaluation of the significance
of the results even more difficult. Furthermore, most of the
compositions were generated by manipulating one object only and
those involving the manipulation of two objects never exceeded 50%.
Thus, an independent evaluation of capuchin's spontaneous
deployment of classificatory skills (based on richer patterns of
responses from a larger sample of subjects) would have provided
important information still lacking in the literature.
Apart from that, from the perspective adopted in this thesis, a
major deficiency was detected in the studies of Antinucci and
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colleagues. This is the lack of any task requirement and therefore
of any incentive to use classification as a data reducing device.
Classification can easily be seen as a skill which enables the
chunking of otherwise heterogeneous material, difficult to perceive
or remember (Miller, 1956; McGonigle, 1987).
Developmental psychologists have stressed the role of
classification as a data reducing device in memory tasks (for a
review see Flavell and Wellman, 1977) and a developmental trend has
been observed in the ability to recognize the data reduction
properties of a set of items which can be chunked in classes (as
opposed to a comparable set of conceptually unrelated items). For
example, Moynahan (1973) found that 7 year old children seem able
to recognize that serial recall of a linear sequence of coloured
blocks is likely to be easier when blocks of the same colours are
adjacent rather than randomly placed in the series (a sequence red-
red-blue-bue-yellow-yellow would be easier to reproduce from
memory than a sequence red-red-blue-yellow-blue-yellow). However,
9 and 10 year old children are significantly more likely than 7 year
olds to predict that the set of categorized items would be easier to
recall (Moynahan, 1973; Flavell and Wellman, 1977) and 6 year olds
encounter difficulties in recognizing the mnemonic advantages of
categorical organization, even when explicitly made aware of its
presence (Salatas and Flavell, 1976).
Although the developmental studies mentioned above have
concentrated on retrieval of stored information from memory
(internal search), the adaptive value that similar strategical factors
might have when the search space is external is obvious. As
stressed by Drozdal and Flavell (1975; see also Flavell and Wellman,
1977) what is usually referred to as knowledge about memory may
itself be too narrow a designation, since some of the knowledge one
might wish to talk about in this connection may not be about memory
as it is conventionally understood. It might, for example consist of
knowledge about how to search the external world intelligently, a
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form of knowledge that also undergoes a marked development with
age (Drozdal & Flavell, 1975; Flavell and Wellman, 1977).
It is in this latter sense that the role of categorisation as a data
reducing device in the sort of tasks introduced in the previous
chapter becomes transparent. In searching exhaustively a set of
icons on a touch screen monitor the subjects might find the
possibility of chunking them useful. In doing so the search of items
identifiable only by their (individual) spatial location would be
restricted to those belonging to one class. Once the class is
exhausted the subject would know that reiteration on items of that
sort is to be avoided. If search behaviour is controlled by this sort
of chunking, the number of individual items to be remembered would
then be reduced to the number of classes in which the search space
is divided.
The experiment that follows aimed to assay whether the search
behaviour of cebus monkeys would show some evidence of
spontaneous classification, and (if so) whether the monkeys made a
strategic use of such a competence by exploring the set in a
principled way i.e. exhausting one class before moving to the next.
5.2 Material and Methods
Subjects and Apparatus. The same subjects and apparatus used for
the experiments described in Chapter IV were employed for this
experiment.
Design. The experiment featured three experimental phases and a
control phase. Phase 1 aimed to assess whether subjects would have
spontaneously imposed categorisation schemes over a set of icons
divided in two disjunctive classes. In phase 2 the multiple features
of the icons were permutated to avoid possible bias due to the
salience of a particular combination of features defining a class. In
phase 3 the trade-off between class size number of classes was
manipulated to assess its effects on classification. Finally, with a
series of control trials featuring identical icons, the possibility of
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classifying was prevented in order to compare the level of economy
of search shown in "chunkable" and "non-chunkable" sets of icons.
Procedure
General procedure.
As in the set of experiments presented in the previous chapter, the
task was to search exhaustively a set of icons presented on a touch
screen.
The subject was left free to choose his own trajectory through the
search space. However, as in Experiment 2 of chapter IV, in each
trial a criterion of non-redundant touches had to be satisfied in
order to obtain a peanut as reward. When the subject failed to meet
the criterion a white screen was presented for 5sec, followed by an
intertrial interval of 15 seconds.
The criterional level of economy was set, for each monkey, on
the basis of its performance on the final phase of the previous
experiment, so that the 20% of the trials remained unrewarded.
Then, the criterion was progressively tightened according to the
level of performance of the subject to keep the 20% of the trials
unrewarded.
In order to reduce the spatial constraints afforded by the search
space, the location of the icons on the screen was selected at
random for each trial between all the possible locations defined by a
4x4 matrix (instead of 3 x 3 as in the previous experiments).
Each experimental session featured the presentation of 50 trials.
Phase 1
The set of icons presented on the screen was divided in two groups
differing multidimensionally and disjunctively. In details, a set of 8
icons was divided into a sub-set of 4 Small Red Circles (SRC) and a
sub-set of 4 Large White open figures which, for their shape
resembling the letter I, will be referred as Is (LWIs). A schematic
example of such a configuration is provided in Fig. 5.1
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Phase I
an example of configuration
Fig. 5.1
Phase 2
Each dally testing session featured the presentation of one of the
four different conditions obtained permutating the features of the
icons of phase 1, in ways that preserved the disjunctiveness of the
two classes of 4 items each. In greater detail, condition I featured
the presentation of SRCs and LWIs; condition II Large Red Circles
(LRCs) and Small White "Is" (SWIs); condition III Small White
Circles (SWCs) and Large Red "Is" (LRIs); and condition IV Large
White Circles (LWCs) and Small Red "Is" (SRIs).
The presentation of the conditions was randomized according to a
Latin square design.
Phase 3
In this last Phase the trade-off between number of classes and class
size was modified. Thus, the 8 items set featured 4 classes
(referred as A, B, C and D) of two stimuli each. In greater detail,
class A was composed of two empty brown triangles; class B of two
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solid yellow crosses; class C of two solid magenta egg-timers; and
class D of two patterned cyan hexagons. An example of such a
configuration is presented in Fig. 5.2.
Control
The procedure being the same as that featured for the previous
phase, a set of 8 identical icons (green squares) was presented to
the subjects.
5.3 Data Analysis and Results
Evidence for classification
Data Analysis.
This analysis was based on the assumption that a subject moving at
random throughout the search space (or conforming to any sort of
spatial strategy), would score a number of pairs of successive
Phase III




moves within the same class and between different classes equal to
the probability expected by a random trajectory across the search
i 9
space. Thus, for each monkey, a chi^ was performed on the
transitions from and to each class (e.g. when the search space was
divided in two classes, A and B, two chi^ were performed: one
comparing the obtained number of transitions from A to A and from
A to B with the expected values and one comparing the obtained
number of transitions from B to B and from B to A with the
expected values). This analysis made it possible to detect any
systematic use of the non-spatial constraints afforded by the set of
icons. In fact, either a tendency to stay within the same class in
successive touches or to shift to a different class at every touch
would lead to statistical significance.
Results.
A summary of the results obtained in the different phases is given
in Table 5.1.
1 It must be kept in mind that the spatial configuration of the icons
was randomly changed for each trial.
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Table 5.1 Probabilities of chi2 performed on transitions from each of the
classes presented in the different phases. Repeats excluded from the
analysis. In brackets the results are reported of a visual inspection of
the frequencies contained in the cells of each significant chi2 i.e. (=) =
transitions within the same class; (#) = transitions between different
classes (see text for further explanation).
Sub j Phasel Phase2 Phase3
Condi Condi I Condi I CondIV
A1 P<.001(f) ns P<.01(f) ns ns p<. 02 p<. 01
p<.001(=) ns p<.001(=) ns ns ns p<.001
Ch ns P<.001(f) ns ns ns p<. 05 ns
ns ns ns ns ns ns ns
Ki ns ns ns ns ns ns ns
ns ns ns ns ns ns ns
Lu - ns ns P<.01(f) ns ns ns
- ns ns p<.02(=) ns ns ns
Hi ns P<.01(f) p<.001(=) P<.01(f) P<.01(=) ns ns
p<.001(=) ns ns ns P<-02(f) ns ns
01 P<.001(f) ns p<.001(=) P<.001(f) p<.001(=) ns p<.02
p<.001(=) ns P<-001(f) p<.001(=) P<.001(f) p< .05 ns
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Phase 1 (one condition, two disjunctive classes: SRC and LWI)
Significant results were found for three subjects (Al, Ol, Mi) out of
five (Lu was not tested on this phase). Whilst all the chi2
performed for Al and Ol were significant (p c.OOl), for Mi only the
chi2 performed on transitions from LWI was significant (p c.OOl).
A visual inspection of the relative frequencies of transitions
showed that Al selected LWIs after having touched either a SRC or
a LWI; the opposite tendency was found for Ol that moved to SRCs
either from another SRC or a LWI; Mi showed a tendency to make
successive moves within the class LWI.
Phase 2 (four conditions, each featuring two disjunctive classes,
i.e. condition I: SRC-LWI; condition II: LRC-SWI; condition III:
SWC-LRI; condition IV: LWC-SRI)
For all the subjects but one (Ki), at least one significant chi^ was
found in each condition. The individual results showed:
2 significant chi2 (p c.OOl) for Al in condition II; 1 significant chi2
(p c.OOl) for Ch in condition I; 2 significant chi2 (p c.01 and P
c.02, respectively) for Lu in condition III; 2 significant chi2 (p
c.01 and p c.02 respectively) in condition IV and 1 significant chi2
in all other conditions (p c.OOl in condition II and p c.01 in
conditions I, III, and IV) for Mi; and 2 significant chi2 for 01 (p
c.OOl) in conditions II, III, and IV.
A visual inspection of the frequencies contained in the different
cells of significant chi2 showed that Al (condition II) selected LRCs,
either after having touched a SWI or another LRC;
Ch (condition I) shifted from SRCs to LWIs; Lu (condition III)
moved on SRIs either after having touched another SRI or a LWC;
Mi shifted from SRCs to LWIs (condition I), remained within LRCs
(condition II), shifted from LRIs to SWCs (condition III), and
selected LWCs either after having touched another LWC or a SRI
(condition IV); Ol selected LRCs either after having touched
another LRC or a SWI (condition II), selected LRIs either after
SWCs other LRIs (condition III), and chose LWCs, either after SRIs
or other LWCs (condition IV);
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Phase 3 (4 classes)
The analysis of this Phase involved four chi2 for each subject. For
all the subjects but one (Mi) at least one chi2 was significant.
In details, three chi2 were significant for A1 (p <.02, p <.01,
and p <.001 respectively). Two chi2 were significant for Ol (p <.02
and p <.05, respectively). Only one chi2 was significant for Ch (p
<.05), Ki (p <.05) and Lu (p <.01).2
Evidence for strategic use of classification
Data Analysis
To be an effective tool in exhaustive search, classification should be
used to reduce the number of icons to the number of chunks
represented by the classes. Therefore, a proficient searcher should
be expected to stay within the same class until it is exhausted, and
only then, to shift to the next one, keeping track of those already
explored (instead of keeping track of each of the single icons
touched). Thus, a z test (Binomial for large samples, one tailed,
corrected for continuity) was used to compare the expected chance
probability (p = .0286) with the number of trials where one of the
classes was exhausted before shifting to the other class. All
redundant touches were excluded from the analysis. Data for all the
conditions comprising two disjunctive classes were combined.
Results
Three subjects tended to exhaust one of the two classes within the
first four non-redundant touches: Ol (z = 3.53, p < .001); Ki (z =
3.12, p <.005); Mi (z = 1.65, p <.05).
Evidence for stimulus preference
Data Analysis
2 In this phase (for the large number of possible transitions) an
assay of the relative contribution of particular moves on the basis of
a visual inspection of the single cells of the chi2 was impossible.
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The analysis of transitions, and especially the visual inspection of
the data, showed that all the subjects had a tendency to choose
stimuli belonging to a particular class irrespective of the kind of
stimulus touched immediately before.
Such a tendency could have biased both the analysis of transitions
and the likelihood of exhausting one of the classes before moving to
the other.
In order to statistically test the hypothesis that the results reported
above could be accounted by stimulus preference, a z test (Binomial
test for large samples) was performed on the frequencies of
reiterations on each stimulus type. The analysis was conducted on
individual data for those conditions where evidence of classification
or strategic classification was found.
Results
A summary of the results obtained from this analysis is provided in
Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2 Preferred stimuli in conditions where evidence for classification
or strategic classification was found. The table does not include Phase 3
(see text for explanation).
Subj Phasel Phase2
Condi Condi I Condi 11 CondIV
A1 LSI no LRC no no
(2=8.5, pc.001) classification (2=6.8, pc.OOl) classification classification
Ch No no no no no
classification classification classification classification classification
Ki No LSI no LRI no
preference (z=3.f>7, p<.001)preference (2=2.12, p<.05) preference
Lu . no no LRI no
- classification classification (2=6.6, p<.001) classification
Mi LSI LSI LRC swc LWC
(*=5.5, p<.001) (*=5.5, p<.001) (2=4.5, p<.001) (2=4.1, p<.001) (2=4.7, pc.OOl)
01 SRC LSI LRC LRI SRI
(*=7.7, p<.001) (*=10.5, p<.001)(z=11.5, p<.001)(*=7.8, p<.001) (*=7.2, p<.001)
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Phase 1 (one condition, two disjunctive classes: SRC and LWI)
The three subjects which showed evidence for classification in this
phase were Al, Ki, Mi and Ol.
Al's frequencies of reiterations on SRC and LWI were 3769 and 4544
respectively (z = 8.5 p <.001); Ki performed 1773 reiterations on
SRC and 1827 on LWI and the z test was not significant; Mi
reiterated 1313 times on SRC and 1612 times on LWI (z = 5.5 p
<.001); and Ol showed 2010 reiterations on SRC and 1577 on LWI (z
= 7.2 p <.001). Thus, stimulus preference seem to be likely to
explain the behaviour of Al, Mi and Ol but not that of Ki.
Phase 2 (four conditions, each featuring two disjunctive classes
In this Phase all the subjects but one (Ki) showed evidence of
classification. The results of the z tests can be summarized as
follows:
- Al (two significant chi2 in condition II). The frequencies of
reiterations were 1889 on SWI and 2331 on LRC (z = 6.8 p <.001)
and this preference for LRCs can explain the significance of both
chi2.
- Ch (one significant chi2 in condition I) reiterated 1003 times on
SRC and 1278 times on LWI (z = 5.7 p <.001) and this preference
for SRCs can account for the significance of the chi2.
- Ki (significant z test for trials where a class was exhausted
before shifting to the other) reiterated 537 times on SRC and 665
times on LWI (z = 3.67 p <.001) in condition I; 594 times on LRC
and 572 times on SWI in condition II (z = .614 ns); 554 times on
SWC and 629 times on LRI (z = 2.12 p <.05) in condition III; 858
times on LWC and 827 times on SRI (z = .756 ns). Although the
preference for the stimuli belonging to one of the classes in some
conditions can have facilitated the fact that Ki exhausted one set
before shifting to the other, it is likely that in some occasions she
made a strategic use of classification.
- Lu (two significant chi2 in condition III) showed 2184 reiterations
on SWC and 2654 on LRI (z = 6.6 p <.001). This preference for the
LRIs can explain the significance of both the chi2 .
- Mi (one significant chi2 in condition I, II and III; and two
significant chi2 in condition IV) reiterated 1681 times on SRC and
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1837 on LWI (z = 5.5 p c.001) in condition I; 2016 times on LRC and
1738 times on SWI (z = 4.5 p c.001) in condition II; 1927 times on
LRI and 2190 times on SWC (z = 4.1 p <.001) in condition III; 1727
times on LWC and 1458 times on SRI (z = 4.7 p <.001) in condition
IV. The preference shown for one of the stimulus type in each of
the conditions can explain all the chi2 found significant for this
subject.
- 01 (two significant chi2 in conditions II, III, and IV; and a
significant z test for trials where a class was exhausted before
shifting to the other). Ol showed 1114 reiterations SRC and 1671
reiterations on LWI (z = 10.5, p <.001) in condition I; 1604
reiterations on LRC and 1015 on SWI (z = 11.5 p <.001) in condition
II; 1157 reiterations on SWC and 1567 on LRI (z = 7.8 p <.001) in
condition III; 1577 reiterations on LWC and 2010 reiterations on SRI
(z = 7.2 p <.001) in condition IV. For this subject it is evident that
a stimulus preference can account for all the statistical significance
found in all previous analyses.
Phase 3 (4 classes)
In this phase 4 different stimulus types were presented. For this
reason, instead of a binomial test, a chi2 goodness-of-fit was
performed on the reiterations on each stimulus type. All the chi2
were found significant: A1 (chi2 = 58.7, df = 3 p .001); Ch (chi2 =
24.0, df = 3 p .001); Ki (chi2 = 9.7 df = 3 p .05); Lu (chi2 = 25.6,
df = 3 p .001); Ol (chi2 = 49.7, df = 3 p .001). This result
suggests that classification was based on stimulus preference in this
phase too.
Comparison with control condition (set of identical icons).
The results presented above show that for most of the subjects the
presence of non-spatial constraints lead to reiterations on icons
belonging to a particular class. None of the subjects (with the
possible exception of Ki) made a strategic use of classification.
In this situation a decrement might be expected in the number of
reiterations if the non-spatial constraints are withdrawn from the
search space. Table 5.3 shows the overall percentage of non-
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redundant touches made in the classification phases and in the
control condition. There it can be observed that the percentages of
non-redundant touches of five subjects was higher in the control
condition than in any of the classification phases.
Table 5.3 Total number of touches (N) and percentages of non-
redundant touches obtained in Phasel, Phase2 (all conditions
combined) and in the control condition.
Subj Phasel Phase2 Phase3 Control
A1 N=954 N=2407 N=495 N=181
48.1% 54.2% 53.1% 63.3%
Ch N=591 N=2389 N=575 N=229
62.8% 68.0% 68.5% 79.9%
Ki N=795 N=1732 N=564 N=135
63.9% 72.6% 80.8% 78.1%
Lu — N=2316 N=965 N=150
- 51.5% 61.5% 72.9%
Mi N=317 N=1968 N=398 N=97
46.4% 51.9% 67.2% 73.8%
Ol N=564 N=2355 N=742 N=207
55.7% 63.7% 68.1% 74.3%
The only exception is again Ki, whose percentage of non-
redundant touches was higher in Phase 3. As mentioned above, in
Phase 3 Ki showed one significant chi^ out of four. However, a
visual inspection of the cells of this chi^ shows that the significance
can be accounted to by the systematic shifting from stimulus type B
to stimulus type D, and this tendency per se can hardly account for
an increase in performance.
5.4 Conclusions
Overall, the results point to a lack of strategic use of classification
as a spontaneous data reducing strategy in search. In other words,
monkeys failed to spontaneously develop the strategy of comparing
different classes and exhaust each of them at specified points of the
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serial production. However, there is evidence for a spontaneous
tendency to take into account the non-spatial constraints afforded
by the search space. This tendency was expressed as a non-random
exploration of the search-space, where icons belonging to a
particular class were selected more frequently than those belonging
to another class.
Thus, there is evidence for a spontaneous tendency to pick up
potentially strategical information, without however using it
efficiently. In the literature on human cognitive development, a
related phenomenon is described by Sophian and Wellman (1987) who
found that 3 year old children search for potentially strategic
information before they are able to implement it according to the
task requirements. However, at later stages of development,
children become able to use strategic information according to task
requirements. Thus, there remains an open question as to why adult
monkeys do not make a strategic use of classification skills.
It is possible that classification in monkeys is present only as a
rudimentary skill and lacks those forms of control which would allow
its strategical and flexible use. This would not necessarily mean
that sophisticated forms of control are precluded to the subjects by
their taxonomical status. A number of alternative interpretations of
the results of the present study must be ruled out before such a
conclusion can be drawn.
First, an aspect to be taken into account is the novelty of the
task faced by the monkeys. The subjects entered the present
experiments after a long practice with search-spaces which did not
afford the use of strategies other than spatial ones.
As pointed out by Brown and Deloache (1978) in the context of
human development, and by Luger and Stern (1990) in Artificial
Intelligence, the novelty of a situation plays an important role in
the failure to recognize critical aspects of the task at hand.
Novices, not knowing much about either their competences on a new
task or the strategies that can help to perform it in a more efficient
way, lack the information which would allow them to self-regulate
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their actions. Moreover, an important aspect underpining the ability
to self-regulate is the possibility of evaluating the efficiency of a
particular strategy by predicting it (for example realising that a
strategy that proved effective in a different context might be of
some use in the situation at hand). It is thus important to have
previous experience with a task that shares some commonality with
the current one.
A second important process on which self-regulation is
dependent, is the monitoring (cost evaluation) of the effects of
naturally occurring tendencies in order to develop more control over
them. In this case, it is important to have an effective differential
feedback on "conjectures" generated spontaneously. In the present
experiment, (and as stressed before in order to follow the strategy
of avoiding the use of rigid training schedules from the outset) the
procedure was not designed to provide a strong incentive to classify
strategically. Thus, the subjects might have found a satisfactory
trade-off between the cognitive strain that strategical classification
would have demanded and the cost attached to a surplus of
redundant moves, before having the opportunity to test the
efficiency of strategical classification.
On the other hand, it is still possible that the ability to compare
different classes and exhaust each of them at specified points of the
serial production is beyond cognitive skills of monkeys. This ability,
in turn, can be decomposed in two complementary components. One
is the ability to make an exhaustive and economic search within a
given class. It has been documented that young children find
difficulties in doing so. In a study by Kobasigawa (1977), first
graders who spontaneously used an available category cue to
retrieve items stored in memory, still recalled fewer items per
category than third graders did. In other words even when they
though about using the retrieval cues, the younger children failed
to conduct an exhaustive search for the items associated with each
cue. The other component is the ability to keep track of the classes
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already exhausted and so avoid backwards errors in the sequence of
classes to be explored.^
Finally a further alternative, is that the apparent failure of the
subjects to classify strategically can be due to a deliberate rejection
of such a strategy, intra-cognitively costly, in favour of spatial
strategies still affordable. In fact, also in the context of
developmental psychology have been identified a number of factors
which may attenuate the empirical evidence of an ideal relationship
between judgements about the usefulness and a particular strategy
and its use. The first is obviously the fact that the subject might
think that something else might be better in the situation at hand
(Flavell and Wellman, 1977). In our case it would not be at all
surprising that subjects previously over-exposed to a search space
affording only spatial constraints would continue to use (to a certain
degree) the strategies which paid off in he past. A second factor is
the possibility that a child may have enough knowledge to judge
that categorisation would be a good strategy if asked about it, but
not enough to think to use it spontaneously (Flavell and Wellman,
1977). Similarly, it was still open the possibilities that monkeys
would have started to classification strategically only if prompted to
do so.
For all these reasons, it was necessary to devise a set of
conclusive experiments to assess the relative contribution of these
different factors to the apparent failure of the subjects in using
classification in a principled and strategic fashion. These
experiments will be presented in the next chapter.
3 Note that what has been referred to here as a stimulus preference
can be an expression of these sorts of errors. For example, in a
situation where 4 classes A, B, C, and D are presented, a subject
exhausting class A and class B, and then going back to A before
exhausting C, and so on, would (apparently) show a strong
preference for stimuli of type A, although his behaviour could be
the expression of a deficiency in ordering A, B, C and D. The
same argument applies for a situation where the subject fails to
recognize when a particular class has been exhausted and just





From the results of the experiment described in Chapter V, it
emerged that monkeys did not spontaneously deploy categorisation
skills as a data reducing device in search. Nevertheless, when the
search space afforded categorical organization, their searches were
not based exclusively on spatial strategies. The subjects were able
to detect the non-spatial affordability of the search space (as shown
by a non-random distribution of choices among the different classes
into which the search space was divided) even if they did not use
them in a principled way to control search behaviour. Thus, the
monkeys apparently lack the ability to adapt classification skills to
the particular task at hand.
In order to be used as a data reducing device in the search
tasks that we are dealing with, classification must be deployed
according to two independent although related principles. The first
is the prescription to perform exhaustive and non-redundant
searches within classes. In other words, the subject should confine
the search to the icons belonging to one particular class and keep
track of the items touched (identifiable by their spatial location).
Doing so it can avoid both to reiterate and to exit the class before
all the similar items have been touched. The second is the
prescription to avoid reiterations between classes. In other words
the subject must keep track of the classes already explored and
avoid reiterations on items of particular kinds (i.e. identifiable by
their features other than spatial position).
A failure to conform to either (or both) of these two principles
would produce a classificatory behaviour not fitted for the task and
a profile similar to the one observed in the experiment on
spontaneous classification.
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A number of possible interpretations of the performance of the
monkeys were proposed at the end of the previous chapter. They
can be summarized as follows: 1) monkeys possess only rudimentary
classification skills which do not enable the ordering of multiple
classes in a serial production; 2) the fact that principled strategies
based on categorisation skills were not deployed systematically
prevented the subjects from evaluating their benefits (in term of
reduction of both intra- and extra-cognitive costs associated with
search); 3) having had a protracted exposure to search spaces
which only afforded spatial constraints, subjects continued to rely
(to a certain degree) on strategies which had proved effective in
the past. Being incompatible with a classificatory principle, these
might have contaminated the potentially strategical search behaviour
of the subjects.
However, the experiments presented in the previous chapter were
a necessary step to be undertaken in order to implement the
strategy followed in this entire study, namely to start with
unsupervised versions of a task and only afterwards (on the basis
of the results obtained) provide explicit instructions with selective
feedback procedures.
The experiment described here was aimed to disambiguate the
alternative interpretations proposed for the unsupervised version of
the classification task. Once it had been assessed that the subjects
were spontaneously differentiating the different icons presented
(preferring one type over another), it was a matter of empirical
investigation to assess whether they possessed the competence to
learn how to order the different classes in a sequence of responses.
Thus, in order to clarify the issues mentioned above, a paradigm
proposed by McGonigle (1994) was implemented as a hybridization of
procedures based on drilled serial learning and free classification.
The new paradigm, was designed to provide from the outset the
information that it was necessary to impose a sequential order to the
different icons presented on the screen. This ordering requirement
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is conveyed in a training phase, during which the subject learns a
particular sequence containing a single icon for each ordinal step.
This training phase is similar to the classical experiments on serial
learning (e.g. McGonigle, 1987; D'Amato and Colombo, 1988;
Terrace, 1987).
After the training phase, the subject is faced with different
versions of the learned sequence, this time containing multiple
identical icons for each ordinal step. If the subject shows a high
level of economy in searching these sets, the search space can be
enlarged by adding new members to the different categories.
This procedure gives the subjects the opportunity to fully
appreciate the data-reduction benefits (if any) deriving from the
use of classification in search. Then, the following phases
(featuring the enlargement of the search space), would allow an
assay of whether they recognize the usefulness of the strategy
(learned in the previous phase) and would export it to a search
space structurally similar to the previous one (because organized on
the basis of the same categories).
Each successive phase, in fact, can be considered as a transfer
test because it makes it possible to assess to what extent the
subject generalizes (or, in other words, spontaneously classifies)
the ordinal position of a given icon (or class of icons) contained in
the training set to all its duplicates included in the test sequence.
Moreover, in order to learn a search strategy based on the serial
ordering of items according to their class membership, the subject
must refrain from using spatial constraints such as adjacency or
linear organization. In fact, spatial and categorical strategies would
be fully incompatible (unless spatial strategies are confined to
searches within a particular class). In order to prevent a potentially
satisfactory trade-off between intra-cognitive and extra-cognitive
costs, a principle of maximal efficiency (no reiterations allowed) is
required to gain the reward, both in training and in the
generalization phase.
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In addition to the disambiguation of the issues which emerged
from the experiment described in the previous chapter, the new
paradigm allows the collection of further interesting data. In fact,
the procedure permits the manipulation of the generalization
conditions for a given sequence length in order to evaluate the
effects of the composition of the transfer sequence on generalization
(such as the trade-off between class size and number of classes or
the relationship between class size and ordinal position of the
class). The search space can also be organized in hierarchically
nested sets of classes. Some of these further procedures were also
tested in the present experiment.
An experiment conducted on children, using an analogous
procedure (McGonigle and Jaswall, 1993) provides template data on
which the behaviour of the monkeys can be mapped. Five year old
children showed evidence for spontaneous classification starting from
series of four items grouped in two classes up to sets of fifteen
items organized in five classes of three items each. The fact that
most of the children were able to retain lists of such an impressive
length (as compared with the magical number 7 +/- 2 described by
Miller, 1956 as the working memory span for human adults),
searching almost errorless from the outset, strongly supports the
hypothesis of the important role of classification as a data reducing
device.
Moreover, the pattern of the few errors observed in children
showed strong regularities. On the basis of this principled error
space it was possible to advance some interpretative hypothesis of
the psychological mechanisms underpining performance. For example,
errors typically tended to occur at class boundaries and reiteration
errors within a class were extremely rare. This strongly suggested
that the subjects had chunked the list in classes and that if
difficulties arose, they were chiefly due to the demands posed by
retaining the order in which the classes had to be explored. When
the class ordering was well represented the demands of keeping
track of the items within a class were minimal.
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The paradigm, thus, seems to provide a data set of qualitatively
different behaviours, affording rich interpretative possibilities (in
terms of either success or failure) of potential comparative
relevance. In other words (as pointed out by McGonigle, 1994) it
was hoped that this hybrid paradigm would have combined the best
of the arbitrary and highly supervised serial learning procedures
with the free choice procedures that have characterized this study
so far. This experiment conducted on monkey subjects was therefore
also intended as an evaluation of the potentialities of the paradigm.
6.2 Design
The experiment involved a pretraining stage and 7 following phases.
Their order of administration proceeded from 1 to 7. Phase 1 and 3,
were training phases in which ordered sequences of 2 and 3 stimuli
respectively were taught to the subjects. Phase 2 and 4 were the
corresponding generalization phases for phases 1 and 3, i.e. the
sequences of the training phases were multiplexed (adding a new
item at each ordinal node). Phase 5 and phase 6 aimed to evaluate
the role of class size per ordinal position and featured the
presentation of conditions with a variable number of icons at each
ordinal node of the sequence. Phase 7 was a generalization phase
which involved the multiplexing of a three ordinal step sequence to
form a 9 item search space. The design of each phase was informed
by the results obtained from the previous phases. Thus, in order to
make the overall plan of the experiment intelligible, the details of
the procedure for each phase will be presented together with a
discussion of the results.
6.3 Materials
Subjects. The six monkeys used for the previous experiments
entered this study. However, when the analyses of the data
reported in this thesis were conducted, three years of testing had
already been carried out. Therefore, the results reported here
concern only those subjects who had completed the research program
up to a particular phase. A brief update of further results obtained
in the time in which I sum writing will be given in a post-script.
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Apparatus. The same apparatus used for the experiments described
in Chapter V was employed for the present experiment.
Stimuli. The stimuli for each phase and each monkey were selected
from a set of 8 icons differing multidimensionally and disjunctively
from each other: 1) blue hourglass; 2) green square; 3) red star;
4) white triangle; 5) yellow plus; 6) brown circle; 7) open hexagon;
and 8) pink I-shape.
6.4 Procedure and results
I) Pretraining
Rationale. The aim of the pretraining stage was to familiarize the
monkeys with the serial order requirements of the new task.
Procedure. For each trial, the subject was presented with an icon
appearing at random in one of the 16 possible locations defined by a
4x4 grid. Once touched the icon disappeared and a second icon
was presented, without delay, in a random location on the screen. A
touch on this second icon terminated the trial and a peanut was
dispensed as reward.
Each subject received two pretraining sessions of 60 trials each.
Results. All the monkeys adapted to the task within two sessions,
readily touching the icons as soon as they appeared on the screen.
II) Phase 1: teaching a 2-item-list
Rationale. In Phase 1 the subjects were trained to respond in a
particular order to two items simultaneously presented on the
screen. The phase was a precondition for phase 2 where the
sequence would have been increased at each ordinal node.
Procedure. The particular icons received by a subject in the
pretraining were used as stimuli for the same subject in Phase 1.
The two icons were presented simultaneously on the screen and the
subject had to touch them in a given order (the same in which the
icons appeared in the pretraining). Each subject received a
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different sequence of icons (the sequence will be referred in
abstract terms for all the subjects as AB). This phase was
presented until a criterion of 75% correct was reached over the last
20 trials.
Results and Discussion. None of the subjects failed to reach
criterion. The probability of obtaining by chance the required level
of performance specified by the criterion (75% correct in the last 20
trials) is p <.05 (cumulative binomial distribution: probability of a
single success equal to .5). Thus, at the end of training, all the
subjects were able to order two icons and their performance was
above chance level. The averaged number of trials to criterion was
276.2. On individual basis: 386 for Al; 167 for Ch; 235 for Ki; 169
for Lu; 246 for Mi; and 315 for Ol.
Ill) Phase 2: generalization of a 2-item-list to a 2-"chunk"-sequence
Rationale. Phase 2 was the first condition where a sequence was
multiplexed by adding items at each of its ordinal nodes. Since in
the experiment presented in chapter V no evidence for spontaneous
classification was found, spontaneous chunking was not expected
here either. However, by giving enough exposure to the task and
providing strong incentive, it was attempted to teach the monkeys
to chunk identical icons at each ordinal step. Moreover, by
manipulating the sequence length and the presence of "chunkable"
items in either first or second ordinal node, it was aimed to
characterize the sort of expertise which was transferred from the
previous phase to the present one.
Procedure. This phase featured the presentation of four different
conditions: 1) a control condition identical to the training of Phase 1
(condition AB); 2) a condition featuring three icons, two identical
to the first element of the sequence AB and one identical to the
second (condition AAB); 3) a condition featuring three stimuli, one
identical to the first element of the sequence AB and two identical
to the second (condition ABB); and 4) a condition featuring four
stimuli, two of which were identical to the first element of the
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sequence AB and the other two were identical to the second
(condition AABB). The last three conditions will be dubbed
generalization conditions. In all the conditions, the subject was
required to exhaust the set of icons in the minimal number of moves
and in the particular order practiced in the training phase. In other
words, all stimuli of type A had to be touched before stimuli of type
B. However, as long as this requirement was satisfied, the order in
which two icons of the same type were touched was irrelevant. All
trials where the subject satisfied the two requirements of maximal
economy and of serial order were rewarded with a peanut.
The presentation of each single condition was terminated when a
percentage of 75% correct trials over the last 20 was achieved. In
the meantime, the subject had to maintain a performance of 3 correct
responses out of 4 trials of the control condition. If it failed to
retain this level of performance in the control trials, it was
presented with additional consecutive control trials, until the
criterion was met.
Results and Discussion. Five subjects (Al, Ch, Ki, Lu, and Ol)
reached criterion in all the conditions. In the control condition (AB)
the overall percentage of correct responses for all the five subjects
was well above the required 75% (Al, N = 141, CR = 122 = 86.5%;;
Ki, N = 160, CR = 147 = 91.9%; Lu, N = 297, CR = 288 = 97.0%; 01,
N = 301, CR = 283 = 94.0%).
The number of trials required by each subject to reach criterion
in the different transfer conditions are shown in Table 6.1(a).
Table 6.1(b) shows the overall percentages of correct trials
performed by each subject in the transfer conditions.
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Table 6.1 a) number of trials to criterion required by each
subject in the transfer conditions featured in Phase 2; b) overall
percentage of correct responses shown by each subject in
transfer conditions featured in Phase 2;
a) SUBJ CONDITIONS
AAB ABB AABB
A1 137 24 139
Ch 118 38 238
Ki 64 30 161
Lu 102 21 300
Ol 113 93 376
Mean 107 41 243
b) SUBJ CONDITIONS
AAB ABB AABB
A1 33.6%** 66.7%** 16.5%**
Ch 56.8%** 65.8%** 49.2%**
Ki 59.4%** 73.3%** 49.7%**
Lu 44.1%** 71.4%** 42.0%**
Ol 54.9%** 63.4%** 42.3%**
Mean 49.8%** 68.1%** 39.9%**
** binomial test p <.001. The test was based on the cumulative
binomial distribution of obtaining n or more successes, considering
that the probability of a single success in the conditions AAB, ABB
and AABB was of .165, .165 and .036, respectively.
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These results show that five monkeys, after having learnt to
order two different icons were able to chunk their multiple copies at
each ordinal position.
Comparing the number of trials to criterion of the different
generalization conditions it seems clear that the composition of the
set of icons plays an important role independently from its size. The
AAB condition, far from being equivalent to the ABB condition with
which it shares the total number of items, requires more trials to be
mastered. This can be explained by the fact that subjects transfer
the already learnt sequence AB to the generalization conditions.
Thus, while success in the ABB condition can be achieved by
touching AB first and then the remaining B by default, the same
strategy would lead to failure when deployed in the AAB condition.
The analysis of the errors observed in this phase is perfectly
consistent with this interpretation and is summarized in Table 6.2.
In fact, errors of type AB are far more abundant than both errors
of type AAA and B.
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Table 6.2 Frequencies of types of errors observed in the
different conditions of Phase 2.
a) Condition ABB
Subj Type of error
ABA B Tot
A1 5 3 8
KI 4 4 8
Lu 5 1 6
Ol 19 15 34
Tot 33 23 56
b) Condition AAB
Subj Type of error
AAA AB B Tot
A1 27 53 11 91
Ki 7 15 4 26
Lu 13 40 4 57
Ol 14 35 2 51
Tot 61 143 21 225
c) Condition AABB
Subj Type of error
AAA AB B AABA Tot
A1 5 79 13 19 116
Ki 5 51 9 16 81
Lu 7 121 13 33 174
Ol 25 156 11 25 217
Tot 42 407 46 93 588
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From the comparative point of view it is interesting to note that
one of the 5 year old children tested by McGonigle and Jaswall
(1993), who failed to show spontaneous classification in similar
testing conditions, showed an identical pattern of errors. Not once
did this subject respond correctly to the seguences AAB or AABB
in 39 and 36 trials respectively. Instead, she omitted the second A
and incorrectly executed the sequence AB. Only after explicit
instruction she responded correctly to an AAB trial. On the
following trials the subject executed both AAB and AABB correctly.
By contrast from table 6.1a, it can be observed that monkeys, once
they have learned to respond correctly to the sequence ABB, still
needed further trials to learn the sequences AAB and AABB.
It seems therefore that when not 100% errorless, the patterns of
errors shown by children is similar to those observed in cebus.
However, a major difference can be identified in the fact that when
the child acquired a strategy based on classification in the AAB
condition she immediately exported it to condition AAB and even
AABB irrespective of the fact that the sequence had been increased
by one item.
Of course no strong claims can be made on the basis of the
observation of an individual case, but it seems that further study
would be of great interest especially if younger children (who might
better overlap with the monkeys) are used as subjects.
A second important factor which contributes to the difficulty of
the task for the monkeys seems to be the length of the series to be
produced. In fact, the highest number of trial to criterion was
found for the condition with 4 items (AABB). This condition, as the
AAB condition, is incompatible with an AB sequence of responses
and this type of response accounts for most of the errors observed
in this condition. However, both the number of trials to criterion
and the total number of errors testify an increase in difficulty
compared with the AAB condition. Thus, the surplus demand must
be an expression of the extension of the serial production required
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by the AABB condition which increases the probability of
perpetrating errors of different types.
IV) Phase 3: teaching a 3-item-list
Rationale. In this phase the training of the monkeys was extended
to a 3-item-list. This was a precondition for the following phases
featuring the multiplexing of a set of icons composed of three
ordinal steps.
Procedure. A third novel stimulus C was added to the sequence AB.
Thus, three stimuli were simultaneously presented in random
positions on the screen. The subject was required to touch all of
them, in the required order ABC. This phase was presented until a
criterion of 75% correct trials was reached over 120 trials.
Results and Discussion. Four of the five subjects (Al, KI, Lu, and
01) reached criterion in this condition. The probability of obtaining
by chance the criterional level of mastery in this phase (75% correct
in the last 20 trials) is less than .001 (cumulative binomial
distribution: probability of a single success equal .33 x .5 x .5 =
.08). Thus, the performance of the four subjects was significantly
above chance at the end of training.
The averaged number of trials to criterion for the four subjects
was 262.5. In detail, the number of trials performed by each subject
was 199 for Al; 356 for Ki; 300 for Lu; and 195 for Ol.
Table 6.3 shows the frequencies of the different types of errors
observed in Phase 3.
Chapter VI 197
Table 6.3 Frequencies of types of errors observed in Phase 3.
Subj Type of error
ABA B C AC Tot
A1 51 4 0 34 89
Ki 33 13 13 129 188
Lu 32 9 6 62 109
Ol 25 6 4 40 75
Tot 141 32 23 265 461
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A comparison of the mean number of trials required to reach
criterion in Phase 3 and Phase 1 suggests the presence of a positive
transfer from the early phases to the first encounter with a
sequence composed of three ordinal steps. This result contrasts with
comparable studies in capuchin monkeys (D'Amato and Colombo,
1988) and pigeons (Straub & Terrace 1981; Terrace and Chen, 1991)
multiple arbitrary list learning, where subjects require more time to
complete each phase as a new item is added at the end of a list. By
contrast the monkeys in the present experiment show some similarity
with the profile obtained from 5 year old children (McGonigle and
Jaswall, 1994) who seem to export what is learnt in one phase to
subsequent phases. In other words an already learned sequence is
recognized in the new one and executed accordingly, while any
novel item is responded last by default.
However, on individual basis, it is evident that only two subjects
(A1 and Ol) required less trials to reach criterion on a three items
sequence after practicing with different conditions involving two
ordinal steps only. For the other two subjects (Ki and Lu) the
addition of a further ordinal step resulted in a relative increase in
the difficulty of the task. These subjects seem to fail to recognize
the similarity of the learned and the novel sequence and possibly
have to relearn the entire sequence in each phase by trial and
error.
However, the learning process seemed to be more sophisticated
than associative chaining. The most common error observed in Phase
3 was the AC type. This points against a classical skinnerian
interpretation of how the series is learnt by the subjects. In fact,
an associative chaining hypothesis would predict a strong association
between the adjacent items A and B and cannot account for errors
produced by skipping an item of the series. On the contrary, there
seems to be evidence for a strong representation of the end items A
and C. When errors occur, they are caused by neglect of the middle
item B. Only one subject (Al) produced ABA errors more often than
AC type of errors. Al's result is open to two different
interpretations: on the one hand it is possible that the subject
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tended to neglect the novel item C because of memory constraints,
on the other it is equally possible that he misunderstood the
requirements of the task and persevered on what proved successful
in the previous phases i.e. the completion of the sequence AB,
reiterating it instead of completing the sequence by touching the
item C.
V) Phase 4: a transfer test. From a 3-item-list to a 3-"chunk"-
sequence.
Rationale. After the subjects had learnt to master a 3-item-sequence
in Phase 3, Phase 4 was administered as a transfer test of three
sessions, to assay whether the subjects would have spontaneously
chunked 2 identical items at each of the three ordinal steps. By now
the subjects had also experienced phase 2, where they learnt to
chunk two items at each ordinal step of a 4-item-sequence. It was
therefore interesting to observe if chunking had by now become
part of their repertoire of strategies. If so they could have
spontaneously chunked the new sequence from the out-set
recognizing the structural similarity of the novel search space with
the sets presented in Phase 2.
Procedure. The sequence ABC was doubled in order to form a six
items set (AABBCC). The subject was required to exhaust the set
respecting the order ABC and to avoid redundant moves within each
of the classes of identical stimuli. Trials of ABC type (identical to
those of training Phase 2) were interspersed with trials of AABBCC
type at a ratio of 1 to 1 for the first session and 1 to 4 for the
second and the third session. The second and the third sessions
featured the presentation of a warm-up stage comprising of ten
trials of type ABC. A criterion of 7 correct warm-up trials out of 10
had to be reached. In case the subject failed to meet this criterion,
additional blocks of ten warm-up trials were presented, until the
required level of mastery was reached. Each daily session featured a
total of sixty trials, including the warm-ups. The four monkeys
which had completed all the conditions of Phase 3 were tested for
transfer in Phase 4.
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Results and Discussion. Three subjects (Al, KI and Ol) required
only one block of warm-up trials to reach the criterion of 7 correct
responses out of 10, before each daily testing session. The number
of warm-up trials required by the fourth subject (Lu) ranged from
10 to 30.
The level of performance retained by all the subjects in the
control trials interspersed with the generalization condition was well
above the specified criterion (Al, N = 41, CR = 39 = 95.1%; Ki, N =
32, CR = 31 = 96.9%; Lu, N = 29, CR = 25 = 86.2%; Ol, N = 35, CR
= 31 = 88.6%).
The percentages of correct responses are shown in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4 Frequencies and percentages (in brackets) of correct
responses obtained in Phase 4.









Mean 132 61 (11.9%)**
** binomial test p <.001. The test was based on the cumulative
binomial distribution of obtaining n or more successes, considering
that the probability of a single success was p = .0004.
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The results seem to indicate some degree of transfer from the
early phases to this one in which three classes of two items were
presented. In fact, although the percentages of correct responses is
always below the 15%, the very low probability of performing an
AABBCC sequence by chance (p = .33 x .2x .4x .2x .4x .2 =
.0004) makes the results obtained from all the subjects highly
significant, even when the number of trials completed was very
small (see subject Lu in Table 6.4).
However, from the error space it seems that none of the subjects
showed a strong spontaneous tendency to chunk the two items at
each ordinal step. The frequencies of the different types of
generalization errors are reported in Table 6.5.




type A1 Ki Lu Ol Tot.
B 6 12 0 1 19
C 1 0 1 0 2
AB 65 51 0 60 176
AC 10 7 8 6 31
AAA 5 1 0 4 10
AAC 13 19 8 6 46
AABA 0 5 2 0 7
AABC 47 34 12 28 121
AABBB 2 0 1 1 4
AABBA 0 5 0 3 8
AABBCAO 8 0 1 9
AABBCB9 4 2 6 21
Tot. 158 146 34 116 454
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From the table it can be observed that the most common errors
were those of type AB and AABC. Thus, it seems that the original
sequence was retained well by the subjects. Given the very low
number of errors due to reiterations on items within a class or to
items belonging to classes already exhausted, it seems unlikely that
the errors were caused by memory constraints. On the contrary, it
seems (again) that they can be explained by a lack of spontaneous
strategic use of classification, or, in alternative, to a
misunderstanding of the task requirements (the subjects simply tried
out the learnt sequence ABC, neglecting the second item to be
touched at each step).
VI) Phase 5: diagnostics
Rationale. A lack of generalization was observed in the previous
phase and, as a consequence, the monkeys for three sessions had
been rewarded only in a small percentage of trials. It was necessary
to give the monkeys an easier task, to allow them to get more
rewards per session and avoid possible frustration. At the same time
an assessment of the following points was necessary: 1) that the
sequence ABC was well retained by the subjects; and 2) that the
monkeys remembered the "chunking" requirements of the task.
Furthermore, an evaluation of how well the items were represented
at each different ordinal position would have been interesting. It
was therefore decided with Phase 5 to present sets of 4 items in
three conditions featuring the three possible permutations of the
three chunks AA, BB and CC.
Procedure. Phase 5 featured the presentation of three conditions
obtained decomposing the sequence AABBCC in its constituents
AABB, BBCC, and AACC. The session lasted until a criterion of
75% correct over the last 20 trials was reached in all conditions. The
order of presentation of the three conditions followed the
pseudorandomization procedure adopted for the previous phases.
Moreover, control trials ABC were interspersed at a ratio 1:4.
Results and Discussion. Two subjects (A1 and Ol) always reached
criterion in the first block of ten warm-up trials. The other two
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subjects required from 10 to 20 (Ki) and from 10 to 30 trials (Lu)
to reach criterion in the warm-ups.
The performance of 3 subjects in the control trials interspersed
with the generalization conditions was well above the specified
criterion (Al, N = 10, CR = 10 = 100%; Ki, N = 13, CR = 12 =
86.7%; Ol, N = 8, CR = 8 = 100%); Lu occasionally failed to hold the
specified criterional level of mastery and, for this reason, received
more control trials to recover her performance (Lu, N = 29, CR = 21
= 72.4%).
The number of trials to criterion and the percentages of correct
responses obtained from the different generalization phases are
reported in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6 a) Trials to criterion required to achieve criterion (75%
correct responses in 20 trials) and overall percentage of correct




Al 42 (69.0%)** 23 (65.2%)** 52 (57.7%)**
KI 20 (75.0%)** 49 (59.2%)** 77 (59.7%)**
Lu 102 (43.1%)** 97 (54.6%)** 53 (64.6%)**
Ol 39 (61.5%)** 54 (51.9%)** 18 (83.3%)**
Mean 50.7 55.7 50.0
(62.1%)** (57.7%)** (66.3%)**
** binomial test P <.001. The test was based on the cumulative
binomial distribution of obtaining the observed percentage of correct
responses or higher, considering that the probability of a single
success was p = .5 x .33 x .66 x .33 = .036.
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The results reported in the table show that, given enough
exposure to a series requiring two chunks and two ordinal steps the
subjects were able to classify the items at the appropriate point of
the series. The fact that the ABC series was well represented as a
whole is shown by the highest performance obtained in the condition
AACC. This again demonstrated that the subjects had a strong
representation of the starting and ending points of the series, while
the representation of the intermediate item B was weaker.
Table 6.7 shows the frequencies of the different types of errors
which occurred in each generalization condition.
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Table 6.7 Frequencies of different types of errors made in the




type A1 Ki Lu Ol Tot
B 0 5 11 0 16
AB 12 24 30 15 81
AAA 1 0 0 0 1
AABA 0 2 3 0 5




type A1 Ki Lu Ol Tot
C 0 1 6 1 8
BC 5 12 33 15 65
BBB 0 0 4 2 6
BBCB 3 7 15 8 33




type A1 Ki Lu 01 Tot
C 2 5 0 0 7
AC 6 24 16 2 48
AAA 12 0 3 0 15
AACA 2 2 10 1 15
Tot. 22 31 29 3 85
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The distribution of the errors shows again that the majority of
them (AB in condition AABB, BC in condition BBCC, and AC in
condition AACC) occurred because the subjects tended to neglect
the second item to be touched at each ordinal step. Once again, it
seems that they were trying to cope with the task performing the
learnt sequence ABC without spontaneously chunking the two items
at each step.
VII) Phase 6: training "chunkable"-6-item-sequences.
Rationale. The results obtained from Phase 4 showed only a weak
tendency to classify spontaneously a sequence of three chunks. In
Phase 6 it was attempted to teach the monkeys to do so by means of
extensive task exposure. Moreover, the possible effects of the
composition of the set were taken into account. The relative speed
of acquisition of sets organized in three classes of two stimuli each
and two classes of three stimuli each was evaluated.
Procedure. Four different conditions were presented i.e. a condition
featuring trials analogous to those of the generalization Phase 2
(AABBCC) and three conditions featuring trials similar to those
presented in Phase 5 but containing three items instead of two for
each class of icons (AAABBB, BBBCCC and AAACCC). Trials of
these four types were interspersed according to the standard
pseudorandomization procedure described above.
The presentation of each single condition was terminated when a
percentage of 75% correct trials over the last 20 was achieved.
Each daily testing session was preceded by the administration of
warm up trials identical to those presented in conditions 4 and 5.
As for Phase 5, the warm up trials were presented in blocks of ten
until a criterion of 7 correct out of 10 was reached.
Results and Discussion. In the warm-up trials, all the subjects
usually reached the criterion of 7 correct responses out of 10 in the
first 10 responses, only in two occasions three subjects (Ki, Lu and
Ol) required up to 30 trials to reach criterion.
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Two subjects (A1 and Lu) learned all the conditions of this
phase, Ol learnt the AAACCC condition only and Ki none. The
number of trials to criterion in the four generalization conditions are
shown in Table 6.8. Table 6.8 also depicts the overall percentages
of correct responses obtained in these conditions and the
correspondent probability respect to the binomial distribution.
Table 6.8 a) number of trials to criterion required by each
subject in the transfer conditions featured in Phase 6; b) overall
percentage of correct responses shown by each subject in
transfer conditions featured in Phase 6.
a) SUBJ CONDITIONS
AAABBB BBBCCC AAACCC AABBCC
A1 214 449 121 537
Ki -
Lu 182 60 109 272
01 - 20
Mean 198 254.5 83.3 404.5
b) SUBJ CONDITIONS
AAABBB BBBCCC AAACCC AABBCC
A1 34.6** 42.8%** 57.0** 35.4%**
Ki -
Lu 52.2%** 60.0%** 59.6%** 27.6%**
Ol - — 75.0%**
Mean
** binomial test p <.001. The test was based on the cumulative
binomial distribution of obtaining n or more successes, considering
that the probability of a single success in conditions AAABBB,
BBBCCC and AAACCC was of p = .5x .4x .4x ,6x ,4x .4 =
.008; and .0004 in condition AABBCC.
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Results obtained from Phase 6 show that, given enough trials 2
monkeys were able to classify in conditions involving three ordinal
steps composed of two items each and two ordinal steps composed of
three items each. Taken together the number of trials to criterion
and the overall percentage of correct sequences observed for the
different phases seem to show that the composition of the set
influences the level of difficulty of the task. In general, monkeys
found sets of two chunks of three items each easier than sets of
three chunks of two items. The overall series was well retained as
(consistently with the results obtained from Phase 4) the AAACCC
sequence seem to be the easiest to master. Ol, in this phase showed
a perfect transfer, and perhaps for the first time evidence for a
spontaneous tendency to classify, since reached criterion in the
minimal number of trials. By contrast she failed to learn the other
sequences.
Table 6.9 depicts the frequencies of the different types of errors
observed in the different conditions of this phase.
Chapter VI 209
Table 6.9 Frequencies of different types of errors made in the




type A1 Ki Lu Ol Tot.
B 4 - 1 - 5
AB 31 - 14 - 45
AAB 84 - 43 - 127
AAAA 18 - 26 - 44
AAABA 2 - 3 - 5
AAABBA1 - 0 - 1




type A1 Ki Lu Ol Tot.
C 1 - 0 - 1
BC 5 - 3 - 8
BBC 30 - 16 - 46
BBBB 16 - 1 - 17
BBBCB 0 - 3 - 3
BBBCCBO - 1 - 1




type A1 Ki Lu Ol Tot.
C 1 - 2 0 3
AC 5 - 3 0 8
AAC 30 - 32 3 65
AAAA 16 - 7 2 25
AAACA 0 - 0 0 0
AAACCAO - 0 0 0




type A1 Ki Lu Ol Tot.
B 3 - 7 - 10
AB 104 - 49 - 153
AAA 35 - 23 - 58
AABA 11 - 2 - 13
AABBA 2 - 1 - 3
AABBB 0 - 5 - 5
C 2 - 2 - 4
AC 8 - 5 - 13
AAC 19 - 25 - 44
AABC 132 - 75 - 207
AABBCA3 - 0 - 3
AABBCB15 - 3 - 18
Tot. 334 - 197 - 531
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Consistently with the results obtained from previous phases the
most common error observed in all the different conditions was the
"exit" from a particular ordinal step before all the items of the
chunk were touched. By contrast the skipping of an entire class or
reiteration errors were extremely rare.
VIII) Phase 7. A final transfer test.
Rationale. Since two monkeys learned to classify a 6-items-sequence
in the previous phase. It was of major interest to evaluate whether
now they would have spontaneously transferred this competence as a
data reducing strategy in a new set featuring 9 items (divided into
three sub-sets of three). As we have seen in chapter IV, the
length of the serial production required to search a set of 9 items
was an incentive for the subjects to deploy spatial strategies. Now
that spatial strategies could not be deployed, an assessment was
necessary of whether the subjects would have spontaneously used
classification as a strategy. Moreover, on the basis of the
performance of the subjects, the evaluation of the relative efficiency
of strategies based on classification as compared with spatial ones
would have been feasible.
Procedure. This phase was analogous to Phase 2 but at each node of
the sequence AABBCC an item was added, in order to form a nine
items set (AAABBBCCC). As for Phase 2, the subject was required
to exhaust the set according to the order ABC and to avoid
redundant moves within each of the classes of identical stimuli. A
further difference in respect to Phase 2 was that in Phase 7 no
trials of the ABC type were interspersed with trials of
AAABBBCCC, (since the subject had already had a long practice
with this sort of trials). However, in order to be sure that the
performance on the series ABC was not disrupted, five warm-up
trials of ABC type were presented before each daily session. In
case the subject failed to perform correctly at least 4 of the 5
warm-up trials, other blocks of 5 warm-up were presented until the
criterion was reached. In addition to the warm-up trials, each daily
session featured fifty trials of AAABBBCCC type. Two sessions
were administered as a transfer test to the monkeys.
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Results and Discussion. In the warm-ups, both A1 and Lu always
reached criterion in the minimal number of trials (4 out of 5). The
overall performance of the 100 trials presented was of 13% and 18%
correct for A1 and Lu, respectively.
Since the number of trials presented was relatively small and the
probability of performing a correct sequence extremely low (being p
= 3/9 x 2/8 x 1/8 x 3/8 x 2/8 x 1/8 x 3/8 x 2/8 x 1/8 =
.000001416) it seems that some transfer from previous phases had
occurred.
Once acquired, the ability to impose classificatory schemes over
the search space seems to be effective as a data reduction strategy.
Some evidence for this can be evinced from a comparison of Lu's
current performance with the performance shown in those conditions
of the experiments reported in chapter IV, which featured the
presentation of nine items (as in the last condition of the present
experiment), but afforded spatial constraints only. The percentage
of minimal paths performed by Lu when faced with 9 stimuli in the
experiments presented in chapter IV was of 2.32% and 6.49% in the
non-feedback and in the feedback condition, respectively. The 18%
of correct trials performed by Lu in the last condition of this
experiment sharply contrasts even with the peak performance she
registered in the previous experiments (the 4th block of the
feedback condition) which was only of 10.81% minimal path trials.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the behaviour of subject
Al, whose percentage of minimal path trials was respectively of
2.87% and 8.29% in the phases featuring 9 items of the non-feedback
and feedback conditions of the experiments presented in chapter IV.
Thus, also Al with his 13% of minimal path trials shown in Phase 7
of the present experiment, provides evidence for the effectiveness
of the superimposition of classification schemas over the search
space. However, the peak performance registered by Al in the
experiments presented in chapter IV (3rd block of the feedback
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condition) was of 16.42%, slightly higher than that shown in Phase 7
of the present experiment.
The frequencies of the different types of errors observed in this
phase are shown in Table 6.10.




type A1 Lu Tot.
B 1 0 1
AB 9 7 16
AAB 51 32 83
AAAA 1 5 6
AAABA 0 2 2
AAABBA 0 1 1
AAABBBA 0 0 0
AAABBBB 1 4 5
C 1 4 5
AC 1 0 1
AAC 0 1 1
AAAC 1 2 3
AAABC 11 5 16
AAABBC 10 19 29
AAABBBCA 0 0 0
AAABBBCB 0 0 0
AAABBBCCA 0 0 0
AAABBBCCB 0 0 0
Tot. 87 82 169
The table shows that the most common errors were the AAB type,
followed by the AAABBC type. This pattern seems consistent with
those observed for the other generalization phases in which the
subjects tended to export lists already acquired to the new
multiplexed ones, without considering the increase of the number of
icons at each ordinal position. Similarly, in the present phase the
subjects (which learned an AABBCC sequence in Phase 6) tended to
neglect the third item at each ordinal node.
This pattern of errors was observed in some of the 5 year old
children tested by McGonigle and Jaswall (1993) on an AAABBBCCC.
Chapter VI 213
sequence. Six out of 8 subjects committed errors of the AAB type
as the monkeys did, albeit with a much lower frequency. However,
another common error observed in children was of the AAAC type,
i.e. where a whole class of icons was neglected. This type of error
was taken by McGonigle and Jaswall as evidence for the fact that
the subjects recalled the lists as classes of items and not as
individual units. Monkeys very rarely performed this type of error.
6.5 Conclusions
Overall, the results obtained from this experiment help to clarify
the issues raised from the previous chapter. If monkeys do not
spontaneously classify (or do so only at a certain extent) they are
able to learn to do so. The ability to take simultaneously into
consideration multiple classes of items and to put them in a
principled order seem to be within their competence.
However, the subjects do not seem to readily deploy classification
as a data reducing strategy, even after they have learnt to classify
similar sequences featuring a smaller number of items. By contrast,
five year old children seem to do so in comparable tasks (McGonigle
and Jaswall, 1993). Therefore, the spontaneous use of classification
(in these sorts of tasks) seem to be a promising dimension for
species comparisons.
The patterns of errors, moreover, offer a rich set of
interpretative possibilities which can help to characterize the
psychological processes underpinning performance in search tasks.
The systematic study of differences and analogies between children
of different ages and different species of primates could provide
valuable information about the relationship between the ontogeny and
the phylogeny of complex cognitive skills.
6.6 Post-script
During the writing phase of this Phd thesis, further testing has
been carried out on the paradigm featured in this chapter by a
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colleague (Dickinson, Phd in preparation). The additional data he
collected using the same apparatus, subjects and procedures
featured in this chapter seem to provide a further indication of the
potentialities of the paradigm.
In fact, after an extended period of training all the six monkeys
reached the criterion of 75% correct on the six item series AABBCC
sequence. Four monkeys reached the same criterion on the 9 item
sequence AAABBBCCC and one even on a 12 item sequence
AAAABBBBCCC. For this latter subject (Ch) there is also evidence
for some degree of transfer from the 9 to the 12 items condition.
This is expressed by both the number of trials to criterion (1686
for the 9 items condition and 569 for the 12 items condition) and the
overall percentage of correct trials (37% in the 9 items condition and
42% in the 12 items condition).
In the light of these results the effectiveness of classification in
the organization of serial behaviour is striking. Especially comparing
the maximum sequence length obtained in serial learning studies with
the performance of the monkeys observed here. As mentioned in
Chapter II, capuchin monkeys can learn to produce a maximum of 5
items in a specified order (D'Amato and Colombo, 1988).
A preliminary time analysis undertaken with some of the data
available at the time of writing provides further evidence of the
psychological reality of the classificatory competences of the
monkeys. In fact, if classification has to be considered a data
reducing strategy which allows the subjects to reduce the total
number of items to be remembered to the number of chunks, one
should expect a longer latency at chunk boundaries (see McGonigle
and Jaswall, 1993). This would be because once the subject has
identified the first member of a class, execution of subsequent items
should require relatively little effort.
This is what has been observed by analysing data obtained from
Phase 4. For example, in a sequence AABBCC (suitable for the
analysis since it is formed by three classes of two items each), the
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typical pattern of latencies would show peaks in correspondence of
the first A touched, the first B, and the first C (Fig. 6.1). 1
a) b)
Mean RT between and within classes
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First RT inoluctod
Moan RT betwoen and within classes
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First RT occluded
Y//////////A
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Fig. 6.1 Mean RTs obtained for the first (between classes) and
the second item (within classes) touched for each class. Only
correct trials were included in the analysis. In a) the analysis
included the first reaction time, usually very long. In b) the
first reaction time has been excluded from the analysis to show
that the effect (longer latencies at class boundaries) cannot be
accounted merely by the long latencies recorded at the beginning
of each trial.
The same effect was observed for each of the individuals. Even
when the first reaction time (the length of which might sometimes be
biased by the fact that the subject does not immediately start to
respond when the stimuli appear on the screen) is excluded from
the analysis the effect emerges for three out of four subjects.
1 An analysis currently in progress (Dickinson, in preparation) on
further data collected by the time of writing seems to support the
results when a more extensive data base is taken into consideration.
There is also evidence for a similar pattern on longer series such as
AAABBBCCC.
Chapter VI 2
Subject Ollie showed an inverse relationship (with shorter decision
times at class boundaries). However this subject was very fast in
responding compared to the others and this might have produced a
difficulty in differentiating between the two types of responses.
The same pattern of latencies has been observed in children by
McGonigle and Jaswall (1993) who also found a rich set of other time
related phenomena. For example, these authors found a correlation
between latencies of the responses to the first item of each chunk of
a list and the length of the list itself. This demonstrates that
children do not merely pause between chunks; rather, the first-item
latency truly represents search time and increases when more
classes have to be taken into account.
It goes without saying that a comparison of the latency pattern
shown by the monkeys when faced with lists of different length




7.1 A critical assessment of the paradigms developed In this thesis
The rationale for the study of primate cognition can be
considered threefold. First of all, only through comparative
exercises, aimed at determining differences and analogies between
related species might it be possible to trace the course of the
evolution of human intelligence. Thus, the investigation of primate's
cognitive skills serves what has traditionally been considered the
pure objective of comparative psychology. Secondly, the
characterization of primate cognition might help the mapping of
human higher order cognitive functions onto animal models more
plausible than those based on rodents for neuropsychological
research. This can ultimately lead to bio-medical applications of the
discipline. Finally, as suggested by McGonigle (1982; McGonigle and
Chalmers, 1984), the use of monkey subjects, in relevant
experiments, might prove an effective way of unpacking some high
order cognitive abilities, which are difficult to disentangle working
exclusively on adult humans and children.
Moreover, monkeys are more resistant to prolonged exposure to
the same task than both human adults and children (see, for
example, McGonigle and Chalmers, 1992). The study of non-human
primates, therefore, allows a better investigation of changes in
expertise over time. In addition, the study of experimentally naive
and non-verbal subjects permits the observation of how expertise is
gained from the very beginning and without the mediation of
language (see Terrace and McGonigle, 1994).
However, following the arguments put forward by McGonigle
(1984), in the first two chapters of this thesis, it was argued that,
to date, most of the research conducted in comparative cognition has
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failed in finding those dimensions along which species might
meaningfully be compared.
At first it was argued that conventional paradigms like
discrimination learning, reversal learning, learning sets, delayed
responses, and matching to sample, in their binary forms, although
sometimes successful in showing quantitative and qualitative
differences between broad taxonomic groupings (like the distinction
between mammals and non-mammals), constantly failed to indicate
differences between more complex organisms, particularly between
primate species. It was put forward that the main limitation of those
paradigms lay in their inadequacy to determine what is learned and
the structure and content of what is remembered, as contrasted with
the evaluation of mere rates of learning or simple memory span over
time (see Warren, 1965; McGonigle, 1984). From a critical assessment
of the traditional studies, it emerged that the serial aspects of
behaviour have been crucially under-represented in these studies.
Aspects which from many different perspectives have been
recognized as fundamental for the characterization of cognition,
(Lashley, 1951; McGonigle 1986; Terrace and McGonigle, 1994;
Miyashita, 1988).
When studies on serial learning and related issues were examined,
it emerged that serial learning paradigms overlook the strategies
that subjects might spontaneously develop, when faced with the
problem of organizing long serial productions of actions. In fact,
when a subject is rigidly trained to perform an arbitrary sequence
of responses (or, in general, to solve any particular problem), it
becomes impossible to know whether it would have recruited
competences (either built in or transferred from previous practice
with similar problems), in order to maximize its proficiency in the
task in hand. It was suggested that this issue might be particularly
relevant for the understanding of key questions in comparative
cognition. Namely, what is the generality of a particular competence
? How does it develop ? How can general epistemological procedures
be characterized ? I argued that all these questions deal with the
issue of self-regulation, in other words with the problem of which
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resources an organism might be able to recruit in order to
compensate for its own cognitive limitations.
In Chapter V, those studies which have concentrated on
spontaneous manipulations in capuchin monkeys were reviewed. Two
main restrictions of these studies emerged. On the one hand it was
suggested that spontaneity per se. in absence of task requirements,
cannot show the emergence of any strategical use of competences.
On the other, as a practical point, the sort of paradigms based on
spontaneous play do not allow sufficient exposure to the situation
from which the data aire derived to provide an analysis of change of
expertise over time. Yet, an analysis of what heis been dubbed
"microdevelopment" (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) is of primary importance
for the stance of self-regulation. Only by allowing the subject to
become expert with a task, we give it the chance to recognize the
relevant aspects of the situation at hand and the opportunity to
self-monitor its own behaviour in order to recognize the possible
limitations of its own cognitive resources (for a discussion of a
similar point of view see also Brown and Deloache, 1978; and Luger
and Stern, 1990).
Thus, it was emphasized that a major aim of the present study
was to devise new paradigms, to overcome the major difficulties of
the traditional ones. Keeping in mind the major sources of criticism
of the conventional paradigms, I will now proceed with an overall
evaluation of the research program implemented in this study.
The first set of experiments of WGTA based experiments, was
derived from paradigms already developed in the context of
developmental psychology. In this thesis, they were conceived as a
pilot study to familiarize the wild born and experimentally naive
subjects with the testing situation itself and to introduce them to a
set of problems based on the exploration of multiple alternatives. In
fact, the familiarisation of the subjects with search tasks, where
multiple locations had to be explored serially, was considered a
necessary precondition for the rest of the research program.
Moreover, the tasks seemed appropriate because they also afforded
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the possibility of using strategic devices in order to reduce the
search space.
Finally, as for all the experiments which would have followed, the
opportunity to detect relevant information and deploy the
appropriate strategy was given to the subjects from the outset. This
approach differs from the majority of tasks implemented with WGTA,
where the solution had to be found inductively by means of what
Spence (1951) called blind trial and error procedures and, on the
contrary, is in some way reminiscent of the early experiments on
insight reviewed in the first chapter (e.g. Koehler, 1917).
For all these aspects, these first experiments were a necessary
preamble to the ones which followed. Only if subjects were familiar
with testing, and showed incentive to perform search tasks within a
set of multiple alternatives, as well as expressing some evidence for
strategic use of the information available, it would have been
possible to proceed along the experimental program. The results
showed that the enterprise was viable. The subjects proved keen to
search and prone to deploy strategical devices as economic, rational,
data-reducing strategies.
Apart from helping the implementation of the rest of the research
program, this first set of experiments, never conducted before with
non-human subjects, provided the first comparative data on the
relationship between search for a hidden object and inference.
Moreover, an accurate analysis of the sort of information needed
to be coordinated by the subjects, in order to solve the different
conditions of the experiments, led to the detection of an implicit
hierarchy of complexity within the tasks, previously overlooked by
the original authors (Somerville and Capuani-Shumaker 1984).
However, the tasks themselves shared some of the difficulties
outlined for the traditional experiments based on spontaneous play.
In fact, they did not allow protracted periods of testing and the
subjects, especially in the most difficult conditions of the task,
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showed evidence of distress and demotivation. Moreover, given the
social nature of the cues, on the basis of which the subjects had to
solve the task, it was difficult to attribute failures unambiguously to
restrictions in the competences of the subjects, as opposed to
spurious problems in dealing with information transmitted by another
agent (and, for the monkeys, not even a conspecific). Last but not
least, it was clearly confirmed that in order to study search and
self-regulation, it was necessary to move on to an experimental
apparatus, which allowed a measure of reiteration to evaluate the
extent to which subjects could keep track of moves made serially
over time. In this respect, the WGTA appeared to be inadequate,
because each manual interrogation of an object displaces it from its
1
test position, thus living a visible trace of a visit.
The second set of experiments was, thus, conducted using touch¬
screen based procedures, which had already proved efficient for the
administration of size seriation tasks in children (McGonigle, 1987a,
b; McGonigle, 1989; McGonigle et al. 1992; Chalmers and McGonigle
1993). The first two experiments based on such procedures, were
an inaugural attempt to test such technologies with capuchin
monkeys. In fact, although they proved effective with macaques
(Swartz et al., 1991), touch screens had never been tried out with
capuchin monkeys. The only related apparatus that has been used
successfully with this species is the Lehigh Valley operant chamber,
a device based on projectors fitted with transparent plastic keys
which serve as response mechanisms. Such a device differs in many
features from a touch screen. First, there is a difference in the
resolution of images produced by projectors and those generated on
computer monitors. Secondly, the operant keys move slightly
backwards when pressed, providing a kinesthetic feedback to the
subject for each stimulus touched. Such a feedback is not provided
1 Actually, this sort of external indicators of previously explored
alternatives, can be used as part of a notational system that can
help the subject to overcome the limitations of its own memory, and,
as shown for children, the change in the strategical use of
notational systems is a privileged window on cognitive growth
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). However, in order to study the ability of
the subjects to self-regulate, its use must be optional and not
inevitable as with the WGTA.
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with touch screens. Moreover, it was needed to assess the
sensitivity of the touch screens to the touch style, the size and the
moisture of the fingers of capuchins.
The finding that capuchins readily adapted to this sort of
apparatus, thus represented a first result of the study. It opened
the way to novel researches with this species, previously precluded
by the use of the operant chamber alone. In fact, touch screens
allow the presentation of stimuli much more flexibly than the operant
chamber, both in terms of possible locations on the screen and
speed of presentation. The results that followed clearly
demonstrated the potentiality of this new apparatus.
The gradual increment of the set size proved an effective
procedure to instantiate search tasks with large numbers of
alternatives. In fact, the subjects showed to be capable, not only to
perform spontaneously exhaustive searches within large sets of
icons, but also the length of their sequences of responses has no
precedents in the literature on primate cognition. However, the
major innovation of the paradigm was the freedom that it accorded to
the subject in finding its own path through the search space.
The evidence for positive trends in the percentages of non-
redundant moves, in absence of any arbitrarily imposed penalization
for reiterations, was the first direct demonstration in laboratory
studies that, without any explicit feedback, monkeys cure
nevertheless able to self-regulate their serial production by
monitoring the delay (for a discussion on the relative role of
time/muscular effort in foraging strategies see Gallistel, 1992)
inevitably associated with the production of reiterative moves.
This phenomenon corroborated the hypothesis formulated by
McGonigle and Chalmers (1992) on the basis of a related finding in
the context of transitive inference in squirrel monkeys, which was a
key background for the present research program. Consistently with
the hypothesis of McGonigle and Chalmers, the results of this
experiment showed a natural tendency towards economy. Such a
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finding provides an alternative hypothesis to traditional
interpretations of learning, phylogenetic trends and ontogenesis.
This tendency towards economy might, in fact, be a motivating
factor for evolving systems (i.e. undergoing transformations either
in terms of learning, speciation, or development) to invest in
complexity and cognitive growth, in order to gain in terms of better
management of resources when faced with non-trivial tasks. The
assessment of the presence of such a spontaneous tendency towards
economy was a precondition for the exploration of the sorts of
constraints monkeys might be able to exploit when dealing with
complex serial tasks which heavily challenge their memory capacity.
However, the finding that subjects tried to maximize their
economy of search only up to a given level of performance,
supported the idea that we need to distinguish between two sorts of
cost factors which the self-regulating system might take into account
while monitoring its own behaviour. One type of cost was designated
as intra-cognitive and was related to the amount of internal
resources which the deployment of a particular strategy demands.
The other was designated as extra-cognitive and was related to the
time spent to gain the reward. It was hypothesized that self-
regulation was active only until an optimal (or subjectively judged
so) trade-off between these two cost factors was achieved.
From a comparison of the performance of monkeys and children
(McGonigle et al., 1992), it emerged that the former were never as
principled in their searches as the latter. This observation led to
the instantiation of a procedure then used throughout the rest of
the experimental program. The subjects, having had the opportunity
to self-regulate (on the basis of the feedback implicit in the
situation at hand, as in experiment 1 of Chapter IV), were then (in
the second experiment presented in Chapter IV), exposed to a
selective feedback, in order to check whether the standstill of their
improvement was the expression of a true "resistance point" for the
species.
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Results obtained from the second experiment presented in
Chapter IV, gave some support to the hypothesis of the trade-off
between intra- and inter-cognitive costs. Adding extra-cognitive
costs to the search task (by means of a penalization of the most
inefficient trials), produced further self-regulation and a dramatic
improvement in the economy of search. Moreover, as the selective
feedback was based on the penalization of redundant moves and not
search time, it compelled the subjects to self-monitor the number of
their touches as well as the time spent in searching.
The fact that efficiency was sustained by the deployment of
strategic factors, and not just by brute memory, was evinced from
the larger number of adjacent moves observed in minimal path trials
compared to trials where some redundant moves were performed. It
was also expressed in the finding that the strategy of moving on
adjacent items was employed more in the second experiment of
Chapter IV (where a better overall performance was observed) than
in the first experiment.
In any case, even with selective feedback monkeys were never as
principled as children. Thus, it seems that with the second
experiment the upper level performance for this species was
reached. This was an important point to assess before some
conclusion of comparative relevance could have been made about the
"resistance points" for capuchins in this task. As mentioned above,
children, presented with an identical task, showed an almost perfect
performance. Nevertheless, when the forms of constraints used by
the two species were compared a similarity emerged in the data
reducing strategies adopted by both species. The most interesting
finding in this respect was that, by a qualitative analysis of the
strategies adopted by the monkeys, it was possible to decompose the
very principled trajectory through the search space shown by the
children into different additive sub-components. In fact, facing a
configuration of 9 items, a principled path through it could be
obtained by using particular starting points, an adjacency principle,
and moving along privileged vectors. Although, all these sub-
strategies were employed by the monkeys only to a certain degree
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(i.e. on statistical basis), the most evident source of difference
between their behaviour and that of children was in the lack of a
principled use of the third one. Moreover, and interestingly
enough, younger children approximated monkey's behaviour better
than older ones.
With these set of experiments the common problem rising from
floor or ceiling effects in performance was overcome (effects which
can completely obscure the rich set of intermediate possibility which
ultimately are the only way of characterizing cognitive change in the
course of either ontogenesis or phylogenesis).
This has been made possible by both the selection of the
appropriate paradigms and the appropriate species. If the nature of
the paradigms allowed a clear specification of the strategies adopted
by the subjects, the use of monkey subjects allowed an in-depth
investigation of how the knowledge of the task emerged gradually.
As we have seen from comparable data reported for other species,
the perfectly strategic behaviour shown by the majority of children
and the completely flat performance of pigeons would have prevented
such an analysis of microdevelopment.
These results themselves prove the validity of the paradigm in
respect to the criteria outlined above. In fact, there is enough
similarity between the forms that the organization takes in the two
species to promise the possible use of monkeys as a model of some
aspects of human cognition. On the other hand, the task elicits the
emergence of inter-species differences, both quantitative and
qualitative, supporting the hypothesis that these sorts of paradigms
would be better comparative tools than those traditionally employed.
Furthermore, by means of these tasks it was possible to observe
how complex forms of organization can be assembled from simpler
sub-components. It seems that with this research it has been
possible to work at an appropriate level of analysis as contrasted
with radical forms of reductionism in psychology. Here we have the
possibility to observe how basic elements (which nevertheless have
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got their own idiosyncratic properties if taken in isolation) give rise
to complex behaviours, when embedded in a set of meaningful
relationships with each other. As pointed out by Luria (1987), to
avoid becoming futile, the reduction of complex psychological
phenomena should be operated only up to certain limits. This is the
level where it is possible to characterize "units" which "can
preserve all the richness of the behaviour while at the same time
pointing out models for which it can be the subject of an accurate
study" (Luria, 1987, p. 675). It seems that in the context of this
study it has proved possible to identify these "models" in the
different sub-strategies and the nature of their interaction.
Finally, the procedure and the apparatus proved suitable for a
prolonged presentation of the tasks. Only allowing subjects to
practice enough with the task and presenting them with different
feedback conditions was it possible to see which spatial constraints
afforded by the stimuli configuration the subjects were able to use.
This favoured the advancement of the experimental program to
evaluate (as proposed by McGonigle, 1987) whether the subjects
would have been able to profit from forms of constraints less
restrictive than the spatial ones alone.
The experiments that followed explored the extent to which
capuchins showed some propensity to focus their attention on the
non-spatial features of the configuration of items to be searched.
Furthermore, the study tried to asses whether, in order to provide
an external aid for their memory system, they would have shown a
tendency to structure the search space on the basis of classification
schemas and organize their behaviour accordingly. These
experiments can be considered as a novel approach to the
comparative study of classification from different points of view.
First of all, it was the first time that a classification task was
presented to monkeys on touch sensitive computer monitors.
Moreover, it was the first time that capuchin monkeys were faced
with a task where the superimpression of classification schemas was
completely optional, albeit in the presence of an overall incentive to
perform an economic search. From this perspective, the paradigm
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radically differed from the study of spontaneous classification
(Antinucci, 1989) mentioned in Chapter V, where the subject is left
free to manipulate a set of three-dimensional objects in absence of
any task requirement. The study provided the first opportunity to
evaluate whether, when the opportunity to classify is offered more
as an useful accessory to the economic solution of the task than a
requirement of the task itself, it would have been exploited as a
strategic, data reducing factor.
The results showed that the subjects were perceptively able to
distinguish between the different icons presented on the monitor and
that they used the opportunity to classify offered by the
configuration. However, this did not lead to an increase in
performance and a number of possible explanations were offered.
Firstly, it was conjectured that, as it has been observed in 3
year old children (Sophian and Wellman, 1987), monkeys failed to
recognize the potential data reducing function of organizing the
search space in a principled way. This could have been due to a
lack of those skills necessary to evaluate their own memory
constraints and to find an aid in the features afforded by the
search space.
Secondly, the possibility was considered that monkeys lacked
those categorisation skills that allow the simultaneous comparison of
different classes.^ However, it was possible, as observed in the
previous experiments, that the subject found a satisfactory trade-off
between the cognitive strain that such a form of classification would
have required and the extra-cognitive costs attached to a search not
maximally economic.
Thus, although not conclusive for the stance of self-regulation
and strategical classification, the results of these experiments
2 For a discussion of the difference between selecting similar items
belonging to only one class, the typical behaviour shown in
spontaneous play by children below 2 years, and the awareness of
the presence of more than one class, shown by older children see
Sugarman (1983).
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provided the indication that the subjects were able to search the set
of icons in a non-random fashion according to non-spatial features.
Therefore, the same approach which had proved effective to
disambiguate the results of the experiments presented in Chapter
IV, was used for the last set of experiments. Namely, the strategy
of moving from weak to strong forms of training was adopted again.
In this case the strongest forms of constraints were implemented
as the hybrid paradigm proposed by McGonigle (1994) which
incorporates tutored serial learning and free classification
procedures. A penalty was imposed over unprincipled searches,
giving the subjects more incentive to classify in a principled way.
The possibility to observe the strategy adopted by proficient
subjects (children) provided optimal information for use in training
monkeys. In this way it was possible to asses whether they were
able to learn to use classification as a memory aid and if so to
observe the effects on performance.
This approach contrasts with most of research conducted in
developmental psychology where once a particular strategy is
inculcated in subjects who did not use it spontaneously the
experiment is considered complete.-^ In fact, here it was possible to
go beyond the mere assessment of monkey's capability to acquire a
strategy and evaluate the extent to which the strategy could be
exported to similar tasks. Thus, the paradigm was designed to
satisfy not only the behavioural criteria of observing that a
particular performance was achieved but also to observe whether a
real cognitive change had taken place. In other words the paradigm
allowed the evaluation of whether the subject's acquisition of the
strategy would change its future understanding of similar tasks.
3 Usually, following the distinction proposed by Flavell (1970), this
approach has been adopted to try to answer the question of whether
the lack of strategies is to be considered as a production or as a
mediational deficit.
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Moreover, as a complementary set of information, the possibility
of analysing both time related aspects of performance and the
quality of the errors would have enabled the characterization and
assessment of the psychological status of the phenomena observed.
The last set of experiments proved effective in clarifying most of
the issues which had remained ambiguous in the previous ones. The
results showed that capuchins are able to compare different classes
and to order them according to a particular sequence. The
usefulness of classification as a data reducing device emerges from a
comparison of the results obtained in the present study with data
reported in the literature on serial learning. To date, the maximum
sequence length observed for capuchins has been of five items
(D'Amato and Colombo, 1988), while macaques have been trained to
perform multiple series of six items each (Swartz et al., 1991). A
serial production of up to nine items above chance, as shown by two
subjects in this experiment, thus seems to have no precedent in the
literature on serial learning. However, for the differences in the
serial requirements of the tasks used by D'Amato and Colombo
(1988) and Swartz et al. (1991) on the one hand, and those used in
the present study on the other, this comparison with their data
must be considered only as an indication of the promise of serially
ordered classification in the study of serial aspects of behaviour.
Some more indications of the usefulness of classification in
sustaining long serial productions were manifested in the increased
performance of the subject, when compared with the economy shown
in searching sets of icons that did not afford the superimposition of
classificatory schemas (although featuring the same number of
icons).
However, strong evidence for spontaneous classification was not
found. Whilst the fact that subjects classified above chance level
(even in the first trials of each of the multiplexed versions of the
core series) can be considered as evidence that some form of
transfer had occurred, the phenomenon was not strong enough to
warrant the claim that the subjects spontaneously generalized the
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expertise acquired in the core series to the multiplexed versions of
it. On the contrary, from the qualitative analysis of the errors, it
emerged quite clearly that the subjects were simply extending what
they had learned in the previous version of the task to the
conditions where more items were presented at each ordinal node,
thus neglecting some of the items and performing forward errors
along the sequence.
From preliminary analyses of reaction times (and from the first
results obtained from the analysis currently in progress, mentioned
in the post-script in chapter VI), it seems evident that the subjects
were chunking the set of icons on the basis of the classes in which
it could be organized, as was observed for children (McGonigle and
Jaswall, 1994). Thus, in this last experiment emerged again a
similar profile for monkeys and children (see McGonigle and Jaswall,
1994) in both error types and temporal aspects of performance.
However, when the spontaneity of classification was compared,
major differences were found between the two species. While
children do not need to learn to chunk items together, monkeys
seem to do so only if given enough task practice and incentive.
These findings strongly support the hypothesis put forward by
McGonigle (1984) that one of the most important cognitive dimensions
(and thus along which different species might meaningfully be
compared) is the extent to which a particular organism is able to
individuate, on the one hand the limitations of its cognitive
resources, and, on the other, the relevance of their strategic use
in different tasks. In other words, the ability to deploy strategic
skills and to self-regulate, a competence that, as put forward in the
introduction, has recently received much attention as an index of
cognitive growth in the context of human cognitive development
(Flavell and Wellman, 1977; Brown and Deloache; 1978; McGonigle
and Chalmers, 1992).
In fact, as for the previous paradigms, this last experiment
proved the adequacy of the present research program. Once again,
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there seem to be enough similarities in the behaviour of monkeys
and children to make the matching of some human cognitive skills
onto animal models plausible, while the emergence of both
quantitative and qualitative differences between species (human and
non-human in this case) shows that the tasks are tapping into non-
trivial aspects of cognition which might help its characterization.
To summarize, this thesis has shown that it is possible to study
self-regulation in non-human subjects. Forms of organization of
external cues and changes in expertise emerge in capuchin monkeys
in absence of any artificial feedback imposed by the experimenter.
The focus on search proved fruitful as a general framework,
allowing at the same time: 1) the use of well defined measures of
efficiency for quantitative analyses; 2) the observation of those
strategies which the subjects selected from a rich set of
qualitatively different possibilities; 3) the way in which they can be
combined together and their relation with efficiency; 4) how they
are achieved; 5) and how much they are exportable to similar
problems.
Moreover, the paradigms implemented in this thesis allow the
manipulation of external cost factors in order to see to what extent
an organism is able to rearrange adaptively its competences. On the
basis of this sort of information it becomes possible to asses on
which grounds different organisms converge and, in contrcist, where
they find different solutions to a particular problem, and how
effective (in terms of the trade-off between efficiency in a
particular task and exportability to different tasks) these solutions
are.
Detached from the criterion of comparative relevance, and at a
more general and conceptual level of analysis, one hopes that this
research has set the basis for a novel theory of cognitive change
and might ultimately answer ambitious questions concerning what
cognition should be considered about. This latter statement should
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not be taken as mere rhetoric since it is far from being clear what
the term cognition stands for in animal psychology.
Sometimes we have witnessed a simple restatement in cognitive
terms of old concepts mutuated from traditional associative learning
theories. For example, in a most recent review of current
researches, with the ambitious title of "Comparative Cognition:
Beginning the Second Century of the Study of Animal Intelligence",
Wasserman (1993) speaking in praise of the discipline, declared that
recent developments in human cognitive psychology have again made
the study of animal intelligence central to a traditional goal of
psychology. This goal, in his opinion (borrowed from Gluck and
Bower, 1988) is to view complex human abilities as emerging from a
configuration of elementary associative processes that can be studied
in simple organisms.
Sometimes the effort of those who advocate cognitive approaches
has been dedicated to demonstrate the ability of animals to form
internal representations, without however having the possibility to
go further and characterize the nature of those representations and
the processes which act upon them.
When a differentiation between different levels of representative
skills has been attempted, often the research has been biased by
what Brown and Deloache (1878) have individuated as a fatal error
in developmental psychology too, namely the selection of unrelated
tasks each designed to assess the presence of particular
competences. Results from animal studies for example have answered
questions such as whether a particular organism possessed the
capacity to form concepts at different levels of abstractions (e.g.
Hernstein, 1984; Premack, 1976); whether it forms internal
representations of lists of items in a serial learning task (D'Amato
and Colombo, 1988); or whether it possesses counting abilities and
uses numbers in a representational way (Boysen and Bernston,
1989); or in a PiagetLan perspective, what stage it might reach on
an object permanence scale (Antinucci, 1989). In all these cases the
underlying assumption was that an animal either possessed or did
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not possess a particular competence or, going a little further, that
it was possible to assess the degree of development of that
particular competence and the sort of representations that supports
it. As pointed out by McGonigle (1984, 1991) the question of what
the function of a particular competence is, when the cognitive
system is considered as a whole, has been very rarely posed.
The present research, by contrast, tapped onto the
understanding of how different capacities (inferential skills, visual
scanning and detection of spatial constraints, categorisation skills
and motor planning) might converge on the goal of making a
potentially demanding task (serial, non-reiterative exploration of a
large set of alternatives) relatively easy to solve. In other words on
the issue of strategical intervention over a problem space.
As pointed out by Brown and Deloache (1978), even experiments
which focused on similar topics have traditionally been confined to
the crude assessment of the presence or absence of strategic
intervention. Such an approach would inevitably lead to a dead end,
once this basic question is answered. The research that has been
presented here seems to go much further because it brought to light
a rich set of intermediate stages of strategic control over behaviour.
On these grounds, following McGonigle's theory as outlined
above, I would propose that a profitable way of characterizing
cognitive change might be to consider it as the product of gaining
increasing control over different competences. This would ultimately
lead to a flexible management of internal resources whenever the
organism is presented with problematic situations to solve.
In the following section the way in which the natural progression
of the present research program is currently being implemented and
possible future developments of it will be outlined.
Chapter VII 234
7.2 Indications for further research
As mentioned at different points of this thesis the work described
here is part of a vast project stemmed from the research conducted
by McGonigle and colleagues on the mechanisms underlying serially
ordered behaviours in human and non-human primates. The project
is still in progress and here some current implementations of it will
be delineated, which represent the natural progression of the
program inaugurated with the present study.
The classification studies presented in this thesis have dealt with
disjunctive classes composed each of identical icons. It has now been
assessed that the subjects are able to classify and order classes
according to particular sequences. Moreover, there is a sufficient
number of subjects that is able to deal with sequences of-up to nine
items (see post-script at the end of chapter VI). Therefore, with
such a long serial production, supported by some form of chunking,
it is now possible to manipulate the composition of the set in various
ways and proceed to the second step of the program as proposed by
McGonigle (1987; 1994). This consists in dividing the classes in
different ways (for example icons might be non identical within each
class, sharing only one common feature on the basis of which they
can be distinguished from the members of the other classes). In this
way the classes can then be organized in a hierarchical fashion, to
see the extent to which the subjects would also be able to exploit
also the constraints afforded within each class to organize their
serial production.
Within each class, moreover, it is possible to transform the icons
according different linear dimension in order to provide the subjects
with the opportunity to organize their search behaviour according to
seriation principles. As specified by McGonigle (1994) these
transformations can be performed along different types of dimensions
such as rotation (e.g. one of the icons within a class is presented
in frontal position, another rotated of 45 degrees, another of 90
degrees and so on), size (transformations based on percentage of
area change), outlines (each level of the transformation is based on
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the thickness of the outline) and many others. Then, it would be
possible to present linear transformations between classes so that,
for example class A (say squares) has items larger then class B
(say circles) and class B has items larger than class C (say
triangles). Within each of the classes the opportunity to seriate can
be offered by manipulations of other dimensions (such as rotation,
thickness etc.). This would provide the possibility to organize a
directional search based on categorisation and seriation which
demands very little memory effort to explore exhaustively a large
set of icons.
The implementation of this procedure is already in progress, and
started with the subject who reached criterion on a twelve items
set. In order to construct a set of hierarchically nested classes the
multiple disjunctive features currently defining the classes are
progressively being eliminated within the categories. Presently one
subject has reached criterion on a set of nine icons where colour
has been eliminated and the classes are now distinguishable on the
basis of their shape and texture alone.
For the other subjects, the results obtained from the last
experiment presented here are currently being integrated with the
collection of novel data and additional analyses. Although, in fact,
from the results reported in this study, a lack of spontaneous
generalization from "core" lists to multiplexed versions of it
emerged, the question concerning what would have happened giving
the monkeys even more practice with multiplexed versions of the
list, (before confronting them with sets including more items at each
node) was still an open one. It was still possible that, at the end of
the study, the subjects had not yet reached the sort of expert
solution of the task that allows its generalization at different levels
of complexity. Indeed, the data currently being collected, as
mentioned in the post script to Chapter VI, support this
hypothesis.
From this consideration stems another interesting variation of the
paradigm. This would be concerned with a different type of transfer
Chapter VII 236
which has not been explored in this study. What in this study has
been evaluated, is the extent to which the subjects spontaneously
generalize the expertise learned on core lists of items to conditions
where each ordinal node is multiplexed. The exploration of the
ability to transfer the expertise acquired in a particular series of
ordered classes to other series, featuring the same structure and
size of the search space but different icons (as in the classical
learning set, but without the limitations of its binary version
featuring unrelated items) would be worth undertaking.
It would be of particular interest to compare these two forms of
transfer. In fact, the relationship between the level and the
modality of acquisition of a particular strategy (expressed for
example by the degree of transfer between "core" sequences and
their multiplexed versions) and the transfer of knowledge from one
task context to another (for example sequences featuring novel
elements) would be of outstanding value for the understanding of
cognitive change. Far beyond the mere assessment of behavioural
mastery of a particular task, it would give the opportunity to
evaluate the cognitive objectives which a system satisfies when it is
taught to use a particular strategy and (by contrast) when the
strategy is acquired by means of self-discovery.
Moreover, this modification of the paradigm would make it
possible, in a successive experimental phase, to teach the subjects
to join together different lists (for example just teaching them to
order in succession the last item/class of a sequence and the first
one of another). This would open the way to the evaluation of their
capability to deal with very long serial productions (for a similar
proposal, however based on core lists only, see Swartz et al., 1991)
once they have been meaningfully organized in different types of
chunks (each of the sequence per se, according to Terrace^ can be
considered a type of chunk, and the classes, as shown in this
study, another).
4 See Terrace and McGonigle, 1994.
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Furthermore, having subjects proficient in dealing with different
seguences, organized in classes, it would be possible to mix the
different series, preserving only the ordinal position of each class.
This procedure has been used by Swartz, Chen and Terrace, albeit
with series composed of just one item for each ordinal step. The
paradigms featured in this thesis would give the opportunity to
work with subjects dealing with classes of items, to which is
attached an ordinal value. This might open the way to the study of
competences which share some analogies with human language (where
classes linguistic units, defined at different levels of abstraction are
ordered according to grammatical rules). The approach might
ultimately prove more profitable than those mentioned in chapter one
for the understanding of the actual syntactic competences of non-
human primates.
Apart from the natural extensions of the present paradigm, the
apparatus and procedures featured in this study can be used for
the implementation of several related ones. An example would be a
paradigm proposed by McGonigle (see McGonigle and Chalmers, 1986)
based on matching to sample procedures, featuring sets of multiple
icons as opposed to the classical binary version of the task. The
subjects would be presented with a template consisting of variable
numbers of items. Following a delay, they would then be required to
identify the template in a larger configuration containing it as a
sub-set. Given that the template is composed of multiple items, the
subject would have to select an order of report. The spontaneous
ordering profile selected by the subject would then reveal the way
in which the stimuli were organized in memory. Different ways of
organizing the set can be then put in relation with the accuracy of
retention.
Quite detached from the possible implementation of new
paradigms, an interesting enterprise would be to test different
samples of subjects on exactly the same tasks employed for the
present study.
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Since the ability to self-regulate is subject to developmental
trends (Flavell and Wellman, 1977), and from the results of all the
experiments described in this thesis monkeys and 4 year old
children overlapped in some aspects or others of their performance
(McGonigle et. al, 1992; McGonigle and Jaswall, 1994), an obvious
continuation of the present study, would be to present the same
tasks to younger children to see whether the gap between human
and non-human competences can be reduced even more. This would
provide valuable information about the relationship between
ontogenesis and phylogenesis, a central issue in both comparative
psychology and evolutionary biology (Gould, 1977). For the same
reason, it would be interesting to collect data with apes (i.e.
species even more related with humans) using the same paradigms.
In summary, the present study aimed at developing and
implementing novel experimental apparatus, paradigms and
procedures, to intrude in a new territory of comparative cognition
and survey its potential resources. The mission apparently was
accomplished and the province seems to promise rewards for a
cohort of novel experimented, enterprises.
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APPENDIX A
SOME ADDITIONAL DATA AVAILABLE IN THE LITERATURE ON SDE
IN MONKEYS
Following McGonigle and Chalmers (1977; 1986) and in the attempt to
identify the basis of possible representation of linear order in
monkeys, D'Amato and Colombo (1990) tried to elicit the Symbolic
Distance Effect (SDE) in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella).
D'Amato and Colombo assumed that if the SDE was found in
monkeys performing a serial learning task, then the effect could
have been taken as evidence for the fact that their performance was
based on a spatial representational device.
In a first experiment, D'Amato and Colombo (1990) trained their
subjects to perform an arbitrarious sequence of responses, using
the conventional forward procedure described in Chapter II. Then,
they tested the monkeys on all the possiole pairings of the five
terms and registered their response time for pairs characterized by
different distances between the two stimuli (such as, AB vs AC vs
AD vs AE). The monkeys failed to show a Symbolic Distance Effect.
Interestingly, the effect appeared in their second experiment,
where monkeys were trained on a task derived from the study of
McGonigle and Chalmers on transitivity (McGonigle and Chalmers,
1977). In this second experiment the monkeys were trained on
couples of adjacent items (AB, BC, CD, DE) and then tested, as
usual, on all the possible pairings of the five terms.
In order to account for the differences in the results of their two
experiments, D'Amato and Colombo were forced to assume that the
subjects had at their disposal two different sorts of processes to
deal with the serial organization of behaviour. One is the classical
associations chain, which they claim would account for serial
learning, and the other is the spatial paralogical device which can
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explain the appearance of the Symbolic Distance Effect when
subjects are trained on pairs of conditional discrimination (mutuated
from an ordered series). They had also to accommodate this latter
interpretation to their previous accounts of the results from serial
learning experiments and those using wild cards (see chapter II,
section 2.2).
An interesting conclusion which can be drawn from this study is
that capuchin monkeys seem to develop more sophisticated forms of
representations in situations where they have to find by themselves
the relationship between pairs of items belonging to a non-
arbitrarily ordered sequence. By contrast, in a situation where the
sequence is arbitrarily defined by the experimenters and rigidly
thought step by step, they do not spontaneously devise such a type
of organization.
It is also interesting to note that D'Amato and Colombo obtained
the Symbolic Distance Effect only after the second of two
training/testing cycles. The authors interpreted this finding as
follows:
"It might be possible that the 9 training and 10 testing sessions
of their first cycle might non have been sufficient to completely
divert these subjects from the associative chain mode of processing,
which was the rationale for the second training/test cycle" (D'Amato
and Colombo, 1990, p. 137).
Thus, overall, it seems not only that items which can be
organized in meaningful (non-arbitrary) sequences allow the subjects
to construct sophisticated forms of representation of their serial
production, but a protracted exposure to the task is required in




THE RANDOM PROBABILITY MODEL
(quoted by permission from St Johnston, 1993).
Assuming that each stimulus is chosen at random at each point in
the trial, what is the probability that the agent will receive the
reward (i.e. have exhausted the set of stimuli) on turn T ? The
key to working this out is to forget that the trial ends when the set
is exhausted and assume that the trial just continues on and on.
A(N, M): The event that in N goes the agent will have touched all
M stimuli.
If we know this, then we can work out the probability that it gets
the reward on turn T, because this is simply p(A (T, M) - p(A (T
- 1, M)), the probability that it has touched them all by turn T
minus the probability that it has touched them all already by turn T
- 1.
To solve this consider the number of sequences which the agent can
make to satisfy A(N, M).
The total number of possible sequences is MN, but we have to
subtract off this number of sequences which don't involve touching
all M stimuli. Any sequence will touch precisely _i stimuli for some i
in 1, 2, M. Let us call the number of stimuli a sequence
involves (touches) its index.
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So the index of
XXX
is 1, while the index of
x y
is 2.
Now, fix the length of the sequence (N above). From all sequences
of length N, we want to find those with index M. This is all
sequence of length N less those with an index of M - 1, M - 2,
3, 2, or 1. (Since every sequence must have some index in 1,,
M).
But the number of sequences of length N with index M - 1 is simply
the number of sequences satisfying A(N, M - 1), and so on. Well,
that's almost true. We need to allow for the fact that if we have M
stimuli then here are many different sets of M - 1 stimuli the
sequence could have involved. In general if we consider A(N, m)
M
there are ( ) sets of stimuli. Since no sequence with index m can
m
be in any two of the sets of m from M stimuli (because ALL of the
stimuli have to be included in the sequence) we count no sequence
twice in this analysis.
So, the total number of sequences with index m we have to subtract
M
is ( ) A(N, m).
m
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So, summing over all the indexes we have to take away from the
original number of sequences, we find
M-l M
A(N, M) = MN - E ( ) A(N, m).
M=1 m
This is the total number of sequences with index M.
The probability of having won by turn N with M stimuli (assuming
we carry on playing after we win) is simply
A(N, M)
v7~ = P^N- M)MN
and after a little bit of maths
recurrence relation:
p(N, M) = 0 for M > N
p(N, 1) = 1 for N > 0
M-l M mN
p(N, M) = 1 - E ( ) p
M=1 m MN
this boils down to the following
(N, m) otherwise.
As mentioned before, the probability of winning on turn T is simply
p(T, M) - p(T - 1, M).
